Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts, like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its 12 million people, is free but poor. It is an underdeveloped country; its economy is weak, average individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to south Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.

Understandably the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means economic expansion.

For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system, adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.

Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside and through governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.

In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.

And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problems-how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy. Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the north, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of men under arms. Moreover, while the Government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.

Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it or, equally important, the moralethe hope, the confidence, the pride-necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.

Still another fact! Strategically south Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of south Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now-both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.

We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.

*

(In 1960 The Communist Party of North Vietnam openly avowed its purpose to liberate the south from the "rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This statement summarizes Communist activity in South Vietnam and announced increased U.S. military assistance.)

24. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 4, 1961

(Excerpt)1

I thought that it might be useful if I were to make some comments on the background of the situation in Viet-Nam-that is, not background comments but comments on the background.

Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units of the Government of Viet-Nam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Viet-Nam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Viet Cong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Viet-Nam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam which called for the reunification of Viet-Nam by all "appropriate means." In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the "liberation" of south Viet-Nam. In retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the 5 years between 1954 and 1959.

Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the south from the "rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The most recent gains by the Pathet Lao in the southern part of Laos have given added seriousness to the security situation in VietNam. Communist control over Lao territory bordering Viet-Nam south of the 17th parallel makes more secure one of the three principal

routes by which north Vietnamese armed units have been able to infiltrate the Republic of Viet-Nam. The other two routes are, as is well known, directly across the 17th parallel and by sea along the coastline of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition to the obvious fact that the strength of the Pathet Lao has been tremendously increased by the importation of light and heavy arms from the outside, we have no reason to doubt that the north Vietnamese armed units not operating in Laos have been similarly reequipped and strengthened from the same outside source.

The increased Communist activity in the Republic of Viet-Nam and countermeasures to meet this threat have been matters of urgent and recent discussion, both by the officials of Viet-Nam and the United States. In connection with these the President has authorized an increase in the amount of military assistance, and a number of other measures have been determined upon. Furthermore the United States has undertaken training and advisory measures which are designed to strengthen both materially and militarily the ability of the Viet-Nam armed forces to overcome this increased Communist threat. A part of the effort, of course, must include in a situation of this sort a vigorous civil program as well in the economic and social field. As you may recall, the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization expressed their concern about the situation in Viet-Nam in our recent conference in Bangkok, and it is perfectly apparent that we must all give very serious attention to developments in that country. Now, I think I will be able to take a few questions.

Q. In your remarks on south Viet-Nam are you, in fact, suggesting that, as the war in Laos draws to a close, the Communists are simply opening up a new theater in southeast Asia?

A. I don't believe this is a shift from one theater to another. I think both of these countries have been under pressure from the Communists from the north, and the pressures in Laos have served to increase the pressures somewhat in Viet-Nam. The most active part of Communist efforts in Viet-Nam is occurring not in the north actually but in the south, the far south, in the Saigon area. But a considerable number of the personnel and also some of the supplies undoubtedly have been coming in from the north by infiltration-some of it through Laos.

(In view of the worsening situation in South Vietnam, President Kennedy announced on May 5, 1961 that Vice President Johnson would discuss with President Ngo Dinh Diem measures to help the country resist Communist pressures. The joint communique set forth the outcome of these discussions.)

25. JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT SAIGON BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM, MAY 13, 1961 1

1

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties-it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of

its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force. Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, educations, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

(In October 1961 President Kennedy sent General Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam for consultations and recommendations, which resulted in the decision to bolster military strength of South Vietnam.)

26. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
NOVEMBER 17, 1961 (Excerpt)1

Insofar as Viet-Nam, one of our other principal points of concern involved, I should like to just make a few comments on that. The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in north Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.