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Absicht Aristoteles Begriffe Behauptung Bestimmungen Bewußtseyn beyden Beyspiele blos bloß bloße Daseyn David Hume denken dern Despotismus dieſe dieß Dinge Dreyeck durchaus eben einander Empfindung Erkenntniß Erscheinungen erst être finden frey Freyheit ganze Gefühl Gegenstand Geist Gemüths Gewalt gewiß gewisse giebt Glauben gleich Gott Grund håtte heißt Idealismus Illuminaten irgend iſt Kant Kantischen könnte Kraft läßt Lehre Leibniz Leidenschaften lich machen mais Mann Menschen menschlichen Meynung Montesquieu muß müſſen nåmlich Natur nothwendig nunft objective philosophischen Platon qu'il raison recht Rede Religion Sache sagen sagt schlechterdings Schrift Seele sehen ſelbſt Sensualismus seyn ſich ſie ſind Sinne Sinnlichkeit Sokrates Spinoza Stande Theile Theismus Thiere thun tout transscendentalen Traume Tugend überall Ueberzeugung Unendliche unserer Ursache Urtheile Verknüpfung Vermögen Vernunft Verstand viel vollkommen Vorstellungen wahre wahrhaft Wahrheit Wahrnehmung wåre wåren Weise weiß Welt Wesen wider willkührliche wirklich wissen Wissenschaft wohl wollen Wort zugleich zuleht zwey zweyten دو
Pagina 144 - NOTHING is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical...
Pagina 146 - This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms.
Pagina 146 - But its true and proper name, as we observed before, is belief; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination.
Pagina 144 - Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief ? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases ; contrary to what we find by daily experience.
Pagina 146 - The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed.
Pagina 44 - Wilkins' forty Summa Genera, to the head of quantity alone, so as to make Mathematics and Logic, Natural History and Civil History, Natural Philosophy and philosophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte.
Pagina 140 - It seems evident that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses ; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated.
Pagina 140 - ... prepossession to repose faith in their senses, and that without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion and preserve this belief of external objects in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.