Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy
Cambridge University Press, 6 ott 2014
In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are widespread, will local politicians ever voluntarily abandon them? Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, an original public opinion survey, and cross-municipal data in Argentina, this book illustrates how clientelism works and documents the electoral gains and costs of the practice. In doing so, it points to a possible subnational path towards greater accountability within democracy.
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Politician Behavior and Voter Beliefs
Why Some Politicians Opt Out
4 Clientelism Social Policy and Measurement
5 Clientelism across Municipalities in Argentinas National Food Security Program
6 Survey and Experimental Evidence for the Costs of Clientelism
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accountability Argentina argue audience costs Auyero beneficiary list benefits Bolsa Familia Brazil chapter cities citizens civil society clien clientelism treatment clientelist exchange conditional cash transfer confidence intervals constituents context contrast corruption costs of clientelism decentralization democracy distribution effects elections electoral empirical evidence example expected explain focus funded government performance high competition implementation increases incumbent indicator variable individual information about clientelism interaction Kitschelt Latin America legislative opposition likelihood logistic regression Low poverty mayoral intervention Mexico middle class non-Peronist Nonetheless nonpoor voters partisan partisanship Peronist mayors Peronist party PNSA political behavior political competition political support politicians population practice predicted probability province quality of government Radical party redistribution regression regression analysis rely on clientelism respondents Rıo role Salta sample social assistance social class social desirability bias social policy social welfare office social welfare provision statistically significant Stokes subnational survey experiment targeted theory vote intention voting behavior