The Constitution of Good Societies

Alperovitz alternative American argue argument autonomy behavior Buchanan Cambridge University Press capitalist citizenry citizens collective action commercial republic common-pool resources competition conception concern consider constitutional choice constitutionalism Dahl decision theory decisions deliberation deliberative democracy democratic discourse discussion Dryzek economic Elinor Ostrom Elkin empirical equality example experts Gar Alperovitz goals Harvard University Hayek human ideal important individual institutional design instrumental rationality Jon Elster judgment kind knowledge Kulo labor lawmaking legislature liberal liberty limits Madison Marxism matter means ment nomic organization Ostrom participation political economy political institutions Political Science possible potential practice preferences principles problem productive public choice public interest question rational rational ignorance rational reconstruction reason reconstruction reflective equilibrium reform republican republican regime requires rules science of institutional sense simply social capital society Sołtan Stephen Elkin theory tion tional tive tradition tutional values Vanberg York