losses in killed and wounded men equalled those of England, France, Belgium and the United States combined! Bussia's operations during the Autumn of 1914 and January 1915 made it impossible for the forces of the Central Empires to strike decisively on the Western Front. By March, 1915, the German High Command had apparently concluded that the most formidable blows must be directed against Russia, and large transfers of troops were made from the Franco-Belgian to the Russian Front. Thus by Russia's sacrifice it was possible for preparations to be made on the Western Front, notably British preparations, which made certain in the ultimate defeat of the enemy. Again, by costly offensives in 1916 Russia relieved the pressure at Verdun and made its salvation possible.

This is not the place nor the occasion for even the briefest sketch of the World War, but if we are to understand what has happened to Russia, we must get into our minds the fact that her staggering sacrifices in the war, account for the Revolution and for its special character.

It was not merely the stupendous loss of man power. Along with that went disorganization of the whole economic life. The railways, inadequate for the needs of peace, and hopelessly inadequate for the needs of war, went rapidly to pieces. Corruption and mis

management, similar to that in 1904 during the war with Japan, were everywhere manifest. The soldiers were miserably provided for. There were ominous rumors of treason in high places. In the soil of these conditions discontent flourished apace.

The war, which during the first year received a far greater measure of popular approval and support than any other war in which Russia had engaged in more than a century, lost that distinction and steadily became more and more unpopular. The cry for peace arose and mingled with the cry for bread. Over the battlefields and through the cities and villages surged the cry, ominously increasing in intensity, "Give us Peace and Bread."

Such was the background of the Revolution.

III

The Revolution came with dramatic and unexpected swiftness. There had been signs of a menacing volume of discontent and protest during the preceding months, at which statesmen in the Allied Countries had expressed alarm. But neither the Russian Government nor the democratic leaders of the people had any idea that the crisis would come with such swiftness. How completely the statesmen misread the portentous signs can be judged from a single illustration. Alarmed by the growing revolutionary unrest, the British

Government sent a distinguished statesman of large experience in foreign affairs-Lord Milner-to observe the situation in Russia and make report upon it. He arrived in February, 1917.

However after careful consultation with the Russian leaders, Lord Milner satisfied himself that the unrest was of little consequence, returned to England, and reported to the War Cabinet that there was no danger of revolution in Russia, that the dynasty was more strongly entrenched in the affections of the people than ever before, that there was a greater national consciousness than Russia had ever known, manifesting itself in a definite and widespread feeling of patriotism. Within a few days after that report was made, the Revolution was an accomplished fact, and the dynasty was overthrown. Yet there was reasonable justification for Lord Milner's report. Even the Revolutionary leaders have frequently admitted that prudent concessions by the bureaucracy at the eleventh hour could have averted the Revolution. The first leaders of the Revolution were not internationalists, but strong nationalists. They were ardent patriots and unwavering in their loyalty to the Allied Cause. However keenly they felt that Russia had not been properly supported by her allies, they harbored 'no intention of forsaking them and making a separate peace. They hoped that the Allies

would come to Russia's assistance and that the struggle to a victorious peace could be carried on. The task they assumed was herculean-and, as we now know, impossible of accomplishment.

A military dictatorship, by drastic changes in the management of the army, by meeting the critical food situation in the towns and cities, firmly repressing agitation and disorder, and leaving to the future all questions of democracy, might have carried on the war to the end. Or, by frankly and promptly abandoning the war and attending wholly to the establishment of a democratic regime, the constitutional and democratic character of the Revolution might have been successfully preserved and its capture by the Bolshevist leaders averted.

But the men who composed the Provisional Government chose neither of these alternatives. They sought to meet, at the same time the needs of War and the needs of Democracy. Loyalty to the War, to the international ideals of the Allies and to the obligations of Russia to its allies, was linked to loyalty to the democratic ideals which for three score years had inspired the best and bravest of Russian's sons and daughters. However much we may honor the first leaders of the Russian Revolution-men like Rodzianko, Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, and others -and however much we may honor their intentions,

we cannot resist the remorseless logic of the facts, so clear in the retrospective light, that the program they set themselves was beyond human power to accomplish.

Bolshevism in Russia at this time, we must remember, was confined to a petty sect. Its numerical strength was no greater than that of our own I. W. W., Its leaders could have been dealt with and repressed at any time during the first four months. It was as a spark among the dry leaves of the forest, which might have been trodden out with ease. But that would have meant the adoption of measures of repression suggestive of the old regime and quite repugnant to the generous democratic idealism with which the leaders were inspired. There were men in the Provisional Government whose democratic idealism was tempered by considerations of prudence and expediency. These men would have placed the handful of Bolshevist leaders in prison, or in front of a firing squad, but the majority of their colleagues scorned the suggestion of any such compromise with their faith. There was one moment, in July, when Trotzky and Kamenev were actually imprisoned, when Lenin was in hiding, his whereabouts known and so completely surrounded by the police that he could have been taken prisoner without difficulty. These men and their associates had admitted conspiring against the Provisional Government. It was believed