pressure still lighter. Now it is evident, that if a demand were secured to the farmer for one-fourth more than what we have supposed to be the average demand, or for ten million instead of eight million quarters, the produce of the country in a season as unfavourable as that supposed would, at the usual rate of consumption, last ten months instead of eight. But this increased demand must come from a foreign market, in which the home grower may be enabled to sell with profit at a reduced price. By this increase of demand an augmentation of the supply of grain is ensured; whilst in years of scarcity, by shutting the ports, this increased produce becomes available to the home consumer, and supplies that deficiency to which the hand of nature has given rise.

But we must now advert to the third objection urged against rais. ing the importation price of corn; viz. that the wages of labour will be raised, and consequently our manufacturers will be rendered unable to find a foreign market for their goods; while the farmer, paying dearer for every thing, will not in fact be benefited by raising the importation price. The opinion, that there is a necessary and inseparable connection between the price of corn and the wages of labour, is very general: but setting aside for the present all appeal to facts, the justice of this opinion may well be questioned; for, let us see what naturally takes place with respect to the demand for labour, and the supply of it, when provisions are dear, and when they are cheap and first, with respect to the demand for labour when provisions are cheap: if it is for an article of home consumption, the demand will be increased; but

will the supply of labour be equally increased? By no means, quite the reverse whoever is in the smallest degree acquainted with our manufacturing towns must know, that when the workmen can support themselves with the labour of four days in the week, few of them will work six days; so that, generally speaking, whenever the wages are high, or provisions are cheap, there is comparatively little industry. Whereas when provisions are high, not only those who before would work only four days a week, offer to work six days, or even by working extra hours to make out seven days in the week, and thus in fact produce a great increased supply of labour; but many who before, from age, infirmity, or other causes, did no work, now press forward to be supplied; while, on the other hand, if the manufacture is for home consumption, the same increased price of provisions, which created a greater supply of labour, will create a lessened demand for it, by creating a din inished demand for the commodities produced by it.

But there is no occasion to con

sider this topic generally: if on any point the evidence laid before the committee on the corn laws was satisfactory and complete, it was on this, that the wages, at least of manufacturing labour, and the price of corn are totally unconnected: tables exhibiting the wages of manufacturing labour in different parts of the kingd m, during a series of years, and the price of corn during the same series or years, were given in; from which if any general conclusion could be drawn it was this, that so far from the wages of labour rising with the high price of corn, and falling when corn falls, the reverse was the case; the price of labour, like

the

the price of every thing else, depending entirely on the proportion between the supply and demand. Hitherto we have considered the controversy respecting the corn laws, as entirely between those who contended that the importation price should be raised, as necessary to protect British agriculture; and those who, while they allowed that British agriculture ought to be protected by legislative interference, agreed that its real interests were sufficiently protected by the importation price of 1801, and that to raise it higher could not benefit it, while it would enrich the land owners at the expense of the nation. We shall now briefly state the arguments of those who were of opinion that the commerce in corn ought to be entirely free, and the replies given to these arguments by the advocates for the corn laws.

The advocates for a free trade in corn contend, that it must always be for the benefit of the great mass of the people, to procure corn, as well as every other commodity, from those places where it can be afforded at the cheapest rate; and that it seems the dictate of common sense, as well as of sound policy, to act in this manner, instead of giving a higher price for any article nerely because it is grown or manufactured at home. In reply to the observation, that it is of the utmost consequence, that, in the supply of corn, at least, we should be independent of foreign nations, they observe that corn may always be obtained for its equiva lent;-that if it be the fact that the labour and capital of this country ean be rendered more available and productive when employed in a different manner from the raising of corn, the produce of the labour and capital, thus employed, will

exchange for more corn than could be got by the direct application of that labour and capital to the raising it. All laws therefore which prevent the free importation of corn at all times, only benefit the landowner, while they oblige the consumer to pay a higher price, and have a less supply of corn than he otherwise could. Bounties, on the other hand, not only take out of the home market what would probably otherwise remain there, but oblige the consumer to be at the expense of taking away corn from himself. On these accounts they would leave the corn trade quite free and open.

To these arguments it has been replied, that as corn is undoubtedly a most essential article, we ought not to depend for our regular and sufficient supply of it, en foreign nations; and that it is much better to be certain of a regular and full supply within ourselves, even though we pay a higher price for it, than to be thus dependent. Besides, it is not fair to the land-owner to propose to make the corn trade free, while almost all the productions of British industry are protected from foreign competition, either by the absolute prohibition of foreign articles, or by high duties on their importation; while many of our manufactures are enabled to compete with foreign manufactures. in their own markets, by bounties or drawbacks on exportation. Let therefore, it is urged, the corn trade be put on the same footing with the other branches of our industry; otherwise capital will be naturally drawn from the unprotected to the protected branch of industry. "It is certain then that perfect freedom of intercourse, however salutary, when extended generally to every branch of commerce, would be M4. attended

attended with fatal effects, either to the corn trade, or to a trade in any other commodity to which it was exclusively confined, whilst all other branches of industry continued to enjoy the advantages arising from bounties and prohibitory duties."

The general conclusions to which on this difficult and important subject we should be disposed to come, and which are borne out by the evidence laid before parliament, are, -that the high price of corn, which the farmers declare they ought to have in order to reimburse them selves and protect British agriculture, arises not so much from the general prevalence of exorbitant rents, or of exorbitant profits by the farmer, as from the great expense of taxation, and the consequent ad. vance in the wages of labour and the price of all commodities;-that

the rents of lands, and the profits of farmers, and the price of grain, have not risen in a greater propor tion than the rate of taxation and the price of commodities have increased; and that therefore, to lower the price of corn considerably, by allowing the free competition of foreign corn, would be to reduce the land owners and farmers below their roper level in society, and thus both directly and indirectly to injure domestic agriculture.-At any rate, if the price of the produce of land is to be materially lowered, it would be but fair and just that the poor rates, which at present cannot be rated at less than 8,000,0002. per annum, and which are paid entirely by the land, should be paid by commercial and manufacturing as well as landed capital.

of British finance as well as political economy. We allude to the high price of bread; a subject which not only early in the year 1814, but also during the preceding year, called forth a very general and deep interest in the public mind. In the same manner as the legislature con, sidered it their duty, and for the good and protection of the people, to pass laws regarding the exporta tion and importation of corn, they also thought it necessary, for the same reasons, to interfere in pointing out the mode in which the price of

bread

bread was to be fixed and regulated. This indeed was first done in the very earliest and darkest ages of British legislation, when the government thought it proper or necessary to interfere on every point of purchase, and that it would be wrong to permit the prices of commodities to settle, of their own accord, at that rate which the proportion between the supply and demand must always determine; and also at a period when the concerns of British commerce were comparatively very confined, simple, and trifling in amount. But it is worthy of remark, and we have introduced this subject in some degree to call the attention of our readers to the fact, that while the government of this country has been advancing rapidly, and in a more steady and regular pace than the government of any other country, at least in Europe, towards very liberal views, and very wise and patriotic measures, with respect to the security and political, civil and religious freedom of the people; it has scarcely advanced one step beyond other governments in the comprehensiveness and solidity of the principles on which it legislates and acts with regard to commerce; and this is the more extraordinary, since it might naturally be supposed that, in a country like Britain, where commerce had been carried on so long to a much greater extent, and in all the varieties of its most complicated and most important relations, it would long before this have been discovered that commerce flourishes best, and attains to the most lengthened and vigorous duration, when left entirely to itself; and that the sagacity of no government can be so acute in discovering what is beneficial to it, as the interest of those engaged in its concerns,

However extraordinary the cir cumstance may be, it is nevertheless undoubtedly true, that the legislature of Britain still interferes too much in matters of trade and commerce: in one respect, indeed, this interference may be deemed necessary, and within its immediate and peculiar province; we allude to the large amount of the taxes which are derived from articles of commerce; but it is still questionable, in our opinion, whether it might not be practicable for the legislature to enact in such a manner as to secure taxes of this description, without stepping beyond their legitimate province, and attempting to regulate, to protect, or to extend the commerce of the country. At any rate, the excuse for this interference, which we have just hinted at, will not avail them respecting their legislating in fixing the price of bread; they must be defended here, on the plea, that such interference is necessary in order to prevent the community from being forced to pay a higher price for this necessary of life, than they ought to do, and than they will do, when their interference is exercised. Though we are still too apt to confound what is right or necessary with what has been long established, yet we should ridicule the idea of fixing the price of meat, or of woollen or cotton cloth, in the same manner as the price of bread is fixed; and when we read that in ancient times our government interfered with the sale and the price of almost every commodity, and established a monopoly of some of the most essential articles of life, we cannot help pitying the fate of our ancestors, and condemning the absurd, mischievous, and selfish policy of their rulers. And yet, to

the

1

the eye of common sense and impartiality, it is not easy to perceive how it can be just, or advantageous to the community, to fix the price of bread, and unjust or prejudicial to the community for the legislature to interfere in regulating the price of meat, or woollen or cotton cloth. We have already stated that we have introduced this subject, not so much because it falls immediately within our province, or because of itself it is of great importance; but because we consider it the duty of the historian and the annalist, to take every opportunity to give his readers an insight, not merely into the manners and habits of the age of which he treats, but also into le state of their knowledge on subjects both of general policy and political œconomy; and yet this branch of the duty of the annalist and historian is too frequently neglected or despised, especially in so far as it relates to the marking of the progress which governments, as well as the governed, have made in those most important branches of knowledge to which we have just alluded. Influenced by this consideration, we shall briefly state the arguments that were advanced, during the discussion on the price of bread, by those who were of opinion that government ought to continue its interference in fixing it, and by those who thought that the price of bread, like the price of many other things, ought to be left to find its own level.

It is hardly necessary to inform our readers, that in London, and in other parts of the kingdom, the magistrates are empowered, but not obliged, to fix the price of bread according to the average price of flour, for a certain period: the complaint, especially in London, was, that the price of flour was during

the year 1813 more especially much higher than the price of wheat warraned, and consequently that the magistrate was under the necessity of fixing the price of bread much higher than it ought to be. The excessive and disproportioned price of flour, it was contended, arose from the combinations of the flourmerchants, and from the circumstance that the bakers, from whose returns the magistrate fixed the assize of bread, being either interested themselves, or under the influence of the flour-merchants, gave in false returns, or at least only returned the best kinds of flour, which they of course bought at the highest prices. This was the complaint: we shall afterwards consider to what cause, if it was well founded, the subject of it ought to be ascribed: we are now to consider the remedy that was proposed by it; and this we do, principally for the purpose of pointing out the small advances which we have hitherto made in the science of political economy. Those who were of opinion that the legislature acted wisely in fixing the price of bread, but who at the same time complained that their interfe rence was by no means effectual in securing to the public that article. at a reasonable rate, proposed to remedy the evil by extending the interference of government: but when it became necessary to point out the advantages, and even the practicability, of further interference, they exhibited only the most crude, prejudiced and illiberal notions on the subject. The fact was, that the evil complained of originated principally, if not entirely, from the interference of the legislature already exercised, and that by extending that interference it would have been confirmed and increased instead of being removed.