fallen back into such a state of in difference or disbelief, with regard to religion, that a monarch who would by wise and prudent measures, and by his own example, have brought them back into the right path, would have been a great blessing to them and to the world at large; for their love of military glory and their ambition of conquest had been greatly fed and strengthened by the looseness of their moral and religious principles. But they were in such a critical state, that it required great caution and circumspection in bringing about this change; and if Louis endeavoured to effect it by morose and severe regulations, it was much to be feared that he would injure his own influence and the permanence of his government, without promoting the object which he had in view.

But there were other difficulties and dangers that surrounded the restored monarch, besides those which had their origin and foundation in his personal character and habits, as contrasted with the national character and habits of his subjects. He had been restored by means of the successes and conquests of foreign powers; by their successes and conquests over the French people. This reflection could not but be extremely galling to them; even to those who were most weary of the tyranny and op. pression of Bonaparte, and most desirous of the restoration of the Bourbons: for it is an extraordinary and undoubted fact, that many of the most loyal of the emigrants rejoiced at and were proud of the victories of their countrymen, even when they were gained over the allies who were fighting their cause, and by Bonaparte, towards whom, as the

enemy of the Bourbons and their own enemy, they bore a most deep and deadly hatred. Such is the influence of the love of national glory in the bosoms of Frenchmen, that it overpowers all regard to national benefit, and even smothers for a time the feelings of loyalty and personal interest. It was to be feared, therefore, that Louis XVIII., having been restored to the throne of his ancestors by the victories of the allies over France, would for a long time recall to the minds of a considerable portion of his subjects their national defeat and disgrace; and thence be regarded by no means in a favourable point of view.

But these unfavourable impressions towards their restored mo narch would also be strengthened by the reflection that he had been restored principally by the perseverance and bravery of Britain in the conquest; of that country which was the natural enemy of France which had uniformly set herself up against every attempt of France to obtain the great object of all Frenchmen, the preponderancy in Europe, if not the conquest of the continental part of that quarter of the world. Louis too had found a refuge in Britain, at a period when no other state dared receive and protect him. These considerations could not be pleasing to Frenchmen. It was not to be supposed that they would give us credit for all that disinterested purity and benevolence to which we laid claim; and when we declared that our object was the benefit and prosperity of France, as well as the tranquillity and independence of Europe, they must have recol lected the ancient rivalry between the two countries, and been incredulous.

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On these and several other accounts the situation of Louis was extremely critical and difficult on his restoration to the throne of his ancestors. He entered a country, a great proportion of the inhabitants of which had either been born or been educated at a period when the Bourbons were considered as pretenders to the throne of France; as a race who had forfeited all claims to it, not only by the fault of Louis XVI. but also by having united themselves with those powers who were opposing the glory and conquests of France. He ascended the throne of his ancestors, unknown to military fame, incapable from his infirmities of leading into the field a nation now almost all warriors, and who had long been accustomed to regard as synonymous terms their monarch and a conqueror. If he looked around him, he saw nearly half a million of soldiers attached to Bonaparte, both by the habits of their lives, and by their relation to him as the man who led them to conquest and plunder. These men could not like peace; they could still less like the person who was to rule over them by having deposed their favourite, and who, in all points that were calculated to excite their esteem and confidence, was so very unlike their favourite.

If Louis looked at the great bulk of the French nation, he found them exhausted with the pressure of the war, and glad of repose and peace: here then he might expect attachment to his person and government, for by his restoration they would obtain what they so much needed and so anxionsly desired. But he must have been ignorant indeed of the French character, if he expected that, after

they had breathed a little, they would not recall to mind the glo ries and conquests of Bonaparte's reign, and contrast them unfavourably with the events of the reign of Louis.

But it might have been supposed that the favourable terms granted to France by the allies would have won on the gratitude of that peo ple; and this, indirectly, contributed to the popularity of Louis XVIII. and the permanence of his government, since there could be no doubt that it was principally on his account that such favourable terms were granted to them. If the French nation had only con trasted the behaviour of the allies with the behaviour of Bonaparte when he was victorious, the impression must have been highly favourable to the former. The allies, after having suffered the greatest degradation from Bonaparte, after they had seen their respective countries desolated by the conqueror, and themselves obliged to bend to his will, become masters of France: the capital of that country is in their power; their soldiers, who feelingly recollect all the misery to which their own country had been exposed from France, many or most of whom could recall to mind their houses destroyed, and their nearest and dearest relations murdered,-behold Paris before them completely in their power; they pant for vengeance; they expect. it from their leaders; it is due not only to their own sufferings, but also, by the laws and usages of war, to the victories and conquests which they have so gloriously a chieved. And yet, under all these circumstances, the allies spare Paris! they enter it, not as conquerors, not as avengers of their own wrongs, but as friends! they

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treat it with as much respect and tenderness as if it had been one of their own capitals. Could such conduct fail to produce its proper impression on the minds of the Parisians, and of Frenchmen in general. The former, in particular, must have dreaded far different conduct; they must have recollected all that the allies had suffered from France, and that the people of Paris were always ready to lend themselves to the most tyrannical acts of Bonaparte's government: they must have recollected these things generally; but a more particular recollection must have dwelt upon their minds, of the recent devastation of a large portion of Russia, and of the conflagration of the ancient capital of that empire, of a capital which was regarded as holy by those soldiers who were now masters of the capital of France. What reason, therefore, had they to expect that Paris would be treated in a different manner from Moscow? Certainly, none. What ought therefore to have been their feelings to wards the allied powers when Paris was spared; when it was not only spared, but when the allied armies entered it as friends? And what ought to have been their feelings towards Louis XVIII, on whose account principally the allies conducted themselves in such an unprecedented manner? Certainly, the allies and Louis had great reason to hope that the inhabitants of France, and of Paris in particular, would manifest their gratitude in the manner which would be most acceptable to the former, by becoming loyal, obedient, and peaceful subjects to the latter. This was not much to expect, since it was only expecting that Frenchmen would discover their gratitude for

being restored to peace and tranquillity, for being freed from a tyrant, and for having their country and capital spared by the conquerors, in that manner which alone could secure to themselves, the blessings which they enjoyed.

But those who were intimately acquainted with the French character, doubted whether these considerations would have their proper effect upon them. Indeed, in a very short time this volatile and vain nation began to call in question the claims of the allies to regard themselves as the conquerors of France; and when once this was doubted, the debt of gratitude was speedily denied. France, they said, had been overrun by treachery; and Paris itself would not have been won, if it had been properly defended. They did not however think proper to recollect, that, even allowing all this to be true, they were not the less indebted to the allies for their clemency: they did not recollect, for how many of her victories and conquests France had been indebted to treachery: these things they forgot, and contented themselves with the reflec tion, that if France had been true to herself she never could have been conquered. As soon as this feeling and belief sprang up, it was evident that attachment to Louis would be weakened.

Notwithstanding, however, all these circumstances contributed to render the foundation of Louis's government rather insecure, there were other circumstances of a much more powerful and general nature which greatly counterbalanced the former. In the first place, the French marshals, though several: of them were slow and reluctant in sending in their adhesion to the new government, it was natural.

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to suppose would rally round Louis if he showed them proper attention. They had indeed been raised to the rank and fortune which they enjoyed by Bonaparte; and it might have been imagined that they would have felt a strong attachment to him but on the other hand they knew that the favours which they had received from him were bestowed from considerations of his own personal interest: some of them recollecting whence he had risen, might be induced to think that they, were as deserving of the imperial rank as he, while others he had treated with great haughtiness.But the consideration which would weigh most with the French marshals was, that Bonaparte, by the blindness and madness of his ambition, had brought their rank and fortune into great jeopardy: it is well known that they did not approve of the Russian campaign, and still less of his conduct during the campaign in Germany in the subsequent year.-It had always been supposed, that one of the principal obstacles to a counter-revolution in France would be the change of property, and the possession of rank by those who would be stript of it in case of that event. With respect to the latter circumstance, as long as Bonaparte's measures secured the possession of rank, or contributed to raise it higher, so long he would be defended by those who were anxious about it: but it was also evident that he would be deserted as soon as his measures threatened the ruin of those whom he had raised, provided they saw less danger in joining a counter-re volution. This was precisely the case when the allies gained possession of Paris: Bonaparte's attacks were desperate: if the marshals continued to adhere to him, they

must share his fate: the allies promised them the continuance of their rank and fortune, if they deserted him and joined Louis; and they followed the direction of their own interest.

This was extremely fortunate for Louis; for, while he could secure the marshals and generals of the French army, he had not much to dread from the soldiers themselves; not because they also saw their interest in adhering to the new government, or because the marshals had such influence over them as to lead them to forego their interest; but because without leaders they could do nothing. Louis therefore acted prudently and wisely in endeavouring to attach the marshals and generals still more to himself, by paying them great alten-' tion. It may be doubted, however, whether the views of Louis in this respect were wisely seconded by the British government in the appointment of an ambassador at Paris. The marquis of Wel lington, on his return to England, was received with the highest honours that could be bestowed on a subject: he was raised to the rank of duke; received in the most flattering manner possible the thanks of both houses of parliament, which voted a very large sum for the purchase of an estate to be vested in his family: nor were his prince or his countrymen less anxious to show him how highly they thought of his services. After staying a short time in London, he was appointed ambassador at Paris; and this, as we hinted above, was cer tainly not an appointment likely to be of service to Louis XVIII. It no doubt was intended as a compliment to him, by sending the person of whom Britain thought most highly, and to whom Louis

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