Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of TruthOxford University Press, 2014 - 275 pagine Michael V. Wedin presents a new interpretation of Parmenides' Way of Truth the most important philosophical treatise before the work of Plato and Aristotle. The Way of Truth contains the first extended philosophical argument in the western tradition--an argument which decrees that there can be no motion, change, growth, coming to be, or destruction; and indeed that there can be only one thing. These severe metaphysical theses are established by a series of deductions and these deductions in turn rest on an even more fundamental claim, namely, the claim that it is impossible that there be something that is not. This claim is itself established by a deduction that Wedin calls the Governing Deduction. Wedin offers a rigorous reconstruction of the Governing Deduction and shows how it is used in the arguments that establish Parmenides' severe metaphysical theses (what Wedin calls the Corollaries of the Governing Deduction). He also provides successful answers to most commentators who find Parmenides' arguments to be shot through with logical fallacies. Finally, Wedin turns to what is currently the fashionable reading of Parmenides, according to which he falls squarely in the tradition of the Ionian natural philosophers. He argues that the arguments for the Ionian Interpretation fail badly. Thus, we must simply determine where Parmenides' argument runs, and here there is no substitute for rigorous logical reconstruction. On this count, as our reconstructions make clear, the argument of the Way of Truth leads to a Parmenides who is indeed a severe arbiter of philosophical discourse and who brings to a precipitous halt the entire enterprise of natural explanation in the Ionian tradition. |
Sommario
Introduction | 1 |
Part I The Governing Deduction and Parmenides
Master Argument
| 9 |
Part II The Deductive Consequences of the Governing
Deduction
| 83 |
Part III Critical Reflections
| 193 |
Articulated Text of the Way of Truth | 261 |
264 | |
269 | |
271 | |
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Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth Michael V. Wedin Anteprima limitata - 2014 |
Parole e frasi comuni
A-segment appears argu Aristotle Aristotle’s asserts B-segment basic entities Causal Thesis claim committed conclusion continuity course Curd Curd’s deductive consequences deductive reasoning denial deny disjunction distinct Eleatic entails exist existential existential closure fact false favor first-order flying formula Governing Deduction Hence Heraclitus hold identity thesis idiom immobility argument inference inquiry insist internal negation Ionian Interpretation lack everything logical Long’s mixed path modal equivalence modal extension mortals motionless Mourelatos name-claim namely necessarily negative Nehamas notion ontological Owen Owen’s Palmer Parmenides Path II perishing Plato plausible predicational monism premise Presocratic problem properties propositions proscription quantifiers question reading reason reconstruction reject requires right side Section Sedley self-defeat semantics sentence simply sphere strategy subject monism suggests suppose target Theaetetus thing thinking third path tion token Torcutt true truth truth conditions worry WT’s εἶναι νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἐόν