5 SECT. VI. Laws refpecting Reparation. THE principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral fyftem for ac complishing two ends: which are, to reprefs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the lofs fuftained by wrongs of whatever kind. With refpect to the former, reparation is a fpecies of punishment: with refpect to the latter, it is an act of justice. Thefe ends will be better understood, after ascertaining the nature and foundation of reparation; to which the following divifion of actions is neceffary. First, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in profecution of a right or privilege. Third, indifferent actions, defcribed above. Actions of the first kind subject not a man to reparation, whatever damage enfues; because it is his duty to perform them, and it would be inconfift ent ent with morality that a man fhould be fubjected to reparation for doing his duty. The laws of reparation that concern actions of the fecond kind, are more complex. The focial ftate, highly beneficial by affording opportunity for mutual good offices, is attended with fome inconveniencies; as where a perfon happens to be in a fituation of neceffarily harming others by exercifing a right or privilege. If the forefight of harming another restrain me not from exercifing my right, the intereft of that other is made fubfervient to mine: on the other hand, if fuch forefight reftrain me from exercifing my right, my intereft is made fubfervient to his. What doth the moral sense provide in that case? To preserve as far as poffible an equality among perfons born free and by nature equal in rank, the moral fenfe dictates a rule, no lefs beautiful than falutary; which is, That the exercifing a right will not justify me for doing direct mischief ; but will justify me, tho' I foresee that mischief may poffibly happen. The first branch of the rule refolves into a propofition established above, That no intereft of mine, not even life itfelf, will authorise me to hurt an innocent perfon. The other branch is fupported by expediency: for if the bare poffibility of hurting others were fufficient to reftrain a man from profecuting his rights and privileges; men would be too much cramped in action, or rather would be reduced to a ftate of abfolute inactivity. With refpect to the first branch, I am criminal, and liable even to punishment: with refpect to the other, I am not even culpable, nor bound to repair the mischief that happens to enfue. But this propofition admits a temperament, which is, that if any danger be forefeen, I am in fome degree culpable, if I be not at due pains to prevent it. For example, where in pulling down an old houte happen to wound one paffing accidentally, without calling aloud to beware. With refpect to indifferent actions, the moral fenfe dictates, that we ought carefully to avoid doing mischief, either direct or confequential. As we fuffer no lofs by forbearing actions that are done for paftime merely, fuch an action is culpable or faulty, if the confequent mifchief was foreseen or might have been foreseen; and the actor of courfe is fubjected to reparation. paration. As this is a cardinal point in the doctrine of reparation, I fhall endeavour to explain it more fully. Without intending any harm, a man may foresee, that what he is about to do will probably、 or poffibly produce mifchief; and fometimes mifchief follows that was neither intended nor foreseen. The action in the former cafe is not criminal; because ill intention is effential to a crime: but it is culpable or faulty; and if mifchief enfue, the actor blames himfelf, and is blamed by others, for having done what he ought not to have done. Thus, a man who throws a large stone among a crowd of people, is highly culpable; because he must foresee that mifchief will probably enfue, tho' he has no intention to hurt any perfon. As to the latter cafe, tho' mifchief was neither intended nor forefeen, yet if it might have been foreseen, the action is rafh or uncautious, and confequently culpable or faulty in fome degree. Thus, if a man, fhooting at a mark for recreation near a high road, happen to wound one paffing accidentally, without calling aloud to keep out of the way, the action is in fome degree culpable, because because the mischief might have been foreseen. But tho' mischief enfsue, an action is not culpable or faulty if all reasonable precaution have been adhibited: the moral fenfe declares the author to be innocent * and blameless: the mischief is accidental; and the action may be termed unlucky, but comes not under the denomination of either right or wrong. In general, when we act merely for amusement, our nature makes us anfwerable for the harm that enfues, if it was either foreseen or might with due attention have been foreseen. But our rights and privileges would profit us little, if their exercise were put under the fame restraint: it is more wifely ordered, that the probability of mifchief, even forefeen, fhould not restrain a man from profecuting his concerns, which may often be of confequence to him; provided that he act with due precaution. He proceeds accordingly with a fafe confcience, and is not afraid of be ing blamed either by God or man. * Innocent here is oppofed to culpable: in a broader fenfe it is oppofed to criminal. With respect to punishment, an action tho' culpable is innocent, if it be not criminal: with refpect to repa ration, it is not innocent if it be culpable. 1 |