delinquent be punished; it is neceffary over and above, that the mischief be repaired.

Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjuft, tho' not understood by the author to be fo, it is wifely ordered that reparation fhould follow; which will thus appear. Confidering the fallibility of man, it would be too fevere never to give any allowance for error. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiffion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is fo happily framed, as to avoid these extremes by distinguishing between gain and lofs. No man is confcious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to fave himself from lofs: if there must be a lofs, common fenfe dictates, that it ought to rest upon the perfon who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the perfon who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the estate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himself of an er

ror committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But in lucro captando, the moral fenfe teacheth a different leffon; which is, that no man ought to Hay hold of another's error to make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repofitories of his ancestor, gives it away, mistaking it for a common pebble: the purchaser is in confcience and equity bound to restore, or to pay a just price.

Thirdly, The following confiderations respecting the precaution that is neceffary in acting, unfold a final cause, no less beautiful than that last mentioned. Society could not fubfift in any tolerable manner, were full fcope given to rashness and negligence, and to every action that ftrictly speaking is not criminal; whence it is a maxim founded no lefs upon utility than upon juftice, That men in fociety ought to be extremely circumfpect, as to every action that may poffibly do harm. On the other hand, it is alfo a maxim, That as the profperity and happiness of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, instead of being difcouraged by dread of confequences. Thefe

maxims,

*

maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroach ing one upon the other.

There is a cer

and circumfpec

tain degree of attention tion that men generally bestow upon af fairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient to defend against a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great difcouragementto activity if a lefs degree were sufficient, there would be too great fcope for rafh or remifs conduct; which would prove the bane of fociety. Thefe limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the fection of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mischief, or acts rafhly and uncautiously without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for confequences; but that the man who acts.cautioufly, without foreseeing or fufpecting any mischief, ought not to be liable for confequences.

In the fame fection it is laid down, that the moral fenfe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and at

tention,

tention, which may be very fmall, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final cause of that regulation will appear upon considering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumstances, there would be a neceffity of enquiring into the character of individuals, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their underftanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricable. But by affuming the common nature of the fpecies as a ftandard, by which every man in confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered eafy and expeditious.

SECT. VIII.

Liberty and Neceffity confidered with refpect to Morality.

HAving in the foregoing fections afcer

tained the reality of a moral sense, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation,

1

approbation, praife and blame; the purpofe of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that thefe fentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being, in order to which, it is first necessary to explain these laws; for there has been much controversy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinift fects.

Human actions, as laid down in the first fection, are of three kinds: one, where we act by instinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With refpect to the first, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the inftinctive impulfe *. Voluntary

* A ftonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can shift for themselves, leave the neft instinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a fwallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally, without diftinction. The young ftonechatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up

dead.