we explain any passage, or that which is put upon it by our opponents, is the sense which was intended by the writer? -p. 405.

After specifying some of the principal causes of the ambiguity of language, he says,

But where the words which compose a sentence are such, that the sentence may be used to express more than one meaning, its true meaning is to be determined SOLELY by a reference to EXTRINSIC CONSIDERATIONS, such as we have stated. In

the case supposed (a case of very frequent occurrence) all that we can learn from the mere words of the sentence, is the different meanings which the sentence is capable of expressing. It is obvious that the words, considered in themselves, can afford no assistance in determining which of these different meanings was that inten

To render our cause as it would seem hopeless, he lays down the following principle.

But these considerations are in our minds of so much weight, as to render it certain, that the Trinitarian exposition of every genuine passage of the New-Testament is false. Their force can be avoided only in one way, not by proving, positively, that the words will bear a Trinitarian mea. ning-for we have, all along, for the sake of argument, gone upon this suppositionbut by proving, negatively, that it is impossible they should have been used in any other than a Trinitarian meaning;—

that the words will bear but one sense, and that this is the only sense, which they could have been intended to express.pp. 413, 414.

The first of these principles of in

solved solely by a process of reasoning, founded upon such considerations as we have stated.-p. 409.

He then cites several examples of the figurative use of language, two of which are from the Scriptures, viz. John xi. 26, and vi. 53, and to the inquiry why we do not understand these texts literally, he answers,

Solely because we have such notions of the character and doctrines of our Saviour that we are satisfied that he would not teach any thing irrational or absurd; and that the declaration in question would be very irrational, if understood literally with out reference to the doctrine of transubstantiation; and altogether absurd, if supposed to imply the truth of this doctrine. It is upon the same principle, that we interpret a very large proportion of all the figurative language which we meet with. We at once reject the literal meaning of the words, and understand them as figurative, because if we did not do this, they

would convey some meaning which contradicts common sense; and it would be inconsistent with our notions of the character of the writer, to suppose him to intend such a meaning.-pp. 411, 412.

He further says,

Upon the principle just stated, we may reject the literal meaning of a passage, even where we cannot pronounce with confidence, what is its true meaning. The words of our Saviour just quoted, are an example in point. One may be fully jus tified in rejecting their literal meaning, who is wholly unable to determine their true meaning. p. 412.

"that we may reject the literal meaning of a passage, even where we cannot pronounce with confidence what is its true meaning." true meaning." That there may be cases to which this principle is appliBut we cable, we readily admit. maintain that to warrant its application, there must be some peculiar cir

cumstance which shall mark the case as an exception to the ordinary mode of speaking or writing. For example our Lord made declarations which he designed should not be understood at the time, but be explained by subsequent events. The ordinary design however, of speaking and writing is not to conceal our meaning, but to be understood, and the general rule is to be determined in reference to this fact. When therefore it is apparent that the writer intends to convey his meaning clearly, and is obviously competent to make it clear, then we are not authorized to reject his literal meaning unless we can clearly perceive some other to be his real meaning. The mere fact that a word has been used figuratively, is not of itself enough to decide that it is thus used, in a particular case. An apparent falsehoood or absurdity is not enough to prove that an assertion is to be understood figuratively; for the writer may have designed a falsehood, or he may have been ignorant of what we know, or he may know more than

we, and be qualified to pronounce us under a mistake in our supposed knowledge. The supposed infallibility of a writer in connexion with the known absurdity of a literal meaning of his words, is not enough to authorize a figurative interpretation; for language is capable of a definite meaning, and the evidence that a literal meaning, though absurd, is the real meaning of the speaker, may be greater than the evidence on which we rest the belief of his infallibility. So obviously just is this principle, that the most distinguished Unitarians, maintaining the absurdity of the literal meaning of Trinitarian texts, and yet being fully persuaded that it was the real meaning of the writers, have actually denied their infallibility. This measure of infidelity deserves at least the credit of consistency.

We grant that the known absurdity of a literal meaning creates a presumption that a speaker designs to speak figuratively, and we are naturally influenced by such a presumption to inquire whether the words convey a definite meaning figuratively interpreted. If they do, the case is plain, we are to reject the literal and adopt the figurative import. If they do not, the speaker is convicted of absurdity and his authority must be given up. On no other principle is language capable of expressing absurdities, nor can any man, not even a Trinitarian, be convicted of uttering absurdities.

We have a striking illustration of the unsoundness of the principle of Mr. C. and the Reviewer, in the application which they make of it to the doctrine of transubstantiation. They maintain that the literal import of the texts, which are supposed by the Catholic to teach this doctrine, is to be rejected solely on the ground of its absurdity, in connexion with the character of Christ. But this principle contains an assumption which leaves christianity open to the assaults of infidelity without a defence. The infidel concedes nothing to the authority of the speaker, and yet without as

suming that authority, the Unitarian has no means of exempting the declaration of Christ from palpable absurdity. The infidel claims, and justly claims, that we shew the declarations in question not to be absurd by shewing independently of the speaker's authority, that they have some other than a literal meaning. But this the Unitarian confesses himself unable to do. Thus the very principle which Mr. C. and the Reviewer adopt to confute the Catholic, tends to confirm the infidel in rejecting the revelation of God; and on the supposition that there are many such cases, (and these writers seem to suppose that there are) we see not why they are not obliged to yield to the infidel a complete triumph. The fact is, that both the Catholic and the infidel are to be met on the same ground, viz. by shewing independently of the authority of the speaker, that the language of our Lord does admit and require a figurative meaning.

We have thus attempted to shew that the absurdity of the literal meaning of a writer is not, in itself, proof that it is not his real meaning, and that such absurdity being known, with no evidence existing of a figurative meaning, simply goes to discredit the writer's authority. Would Unitarians then use their reason as not abusing it, instead of discarding the Trinitarian interpretation of texts solely on the ground of its absurdity, they would feel obliged to deny the inspiration of the sacred writers or the truth of the God who inspired them.

Another principle of interpretation adopted by Unitarians is, that the figurative use of language especially of the term God, authorizes a figurative interpretation of that term when applied to Christ. We regret that when Mr. C. and the Reviewer have so strenuously insisted that the usus loquendi authorizes us to attach a figurative meaning to the term God as applied to Christ, that they should not attempt to substantiate the assertion by adducing instances in point. It belongs to Unitarians to shew that

there are the same reasons for supposing the term to be figurative in the one case, which there are for supposing it to be so in the other. This they have not attempted. The whole shew of argument lies in the assumption, that merely because the term God is sometimes used in an inferior sense, therefore it may be supposed to be used in an inferior sense when applied to Christ. We readily concede that so far as authority or exaltation is concerned, there would be the same propriety in applying the term to Christ, in this sense, as to mere men or angels. And so, for aught we know, there might be propriety in applying the term to Christ, in some other figurative sense. But this does not decide that the word is, or that we have the least warrant for supposing that it is, thus applied to Christ. Indeed if we may say as Unitarians do, that words may be supposed to be used figuratively in any particular case with no other evidence of the fact than that the same words are "sometimes" used figuratively and that a literal meaning is absurd, there is an end to all precision of language. From the charge of uttering absurdities, every writer has complete exemption in the figurative and consequent indeterminate meaning of terms. Nor can it be proved, admitting this principle, at least in a great majority of the declarations of the fact, that any Trinitarian has ever literally asserted that the Son is God; nor that Mr. C. or the Reviewer has literally denied that he is God. Unitarians must either abandon this principle of interpreting language, or in all candour and fairness must say that Trinitarians never intended literally to assert the divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, but as the literal meaning of their language is absurd and as they may be supposed to possess a common share of intelligence and honesty, it is to be concluded that Trinitarians have only written and spoken FIGURATIVELY on this subject. But the real question is, have we the same evidence that the word God is used in an inferior sense when ap

plied to Christ which we have of its figurative use in other cases. . To answer this question, we enquire what is the true reason, for the opinion that in the declaration, "I said ye are gods" (Elohim) the terin is not used literally and that it was not the design of the speaker to assert the real divinity of those of whom he speaks. If our preceding remarks be just, then from the fact that language is "sometimes" used figuratively, or from the infallibility of the speaker, or from the absurdity of a literal meaning, nothing appears to decide that the term (Elohim) gods is used in the passage before us in a figurative sense. Hence it follows that from these sources of argument, the Unitarian cannot make out a single instance of the figurative application of the term by an inspired writer, to men or angels. We hesitate not indeed to pronounce with the Unitarian, that the word is used in a figurative sense in the 82d Psalm. But it is of vital importance to ascertain the reason which authorizes this interpretation. Now this we maintain is not the authority of the speaker in connexion with the absurdity of a literal import; but lies in the fact that the meaning of the writer, figuratively interpreted, is definite and undeniably apparent. His design is to exalt Jehovah above all other beings however exalted; see verse 1st. in which the declaration was made. "God standeth in the congregation of the mighty, he judgeth among the gods." The speaker applies the term gods to earthly magistrates or princes, strongly to designate their exaltation, that thus still higher supremacy may be seen to belong to the true God, as "higher than the highest." The language is used in such a manner as to evince its figurative use, beyond a moment's doubt, by giving us the meaning of the speaker as definitely as had he used the most literal terms. The very language itself precludes the possibility of a literal import, and requires a figurative interpretation. The only question is, are there not passages of scripture which assert the divin

ity of Christ without this mark of figurative phraseology? Let the Reviewer answer. "There are a few texts which will bear a Trinitarian meaning throughout." p. 415. Now we ask, will the text which is supposed to furnish the parallel, bear a literal meaning throughout? Does not every passage adduced by Unitarians as an example of the inferior use of the word God, mark the inferiority of the beings spoken of to God, as explicitly as language can mark it, and therefore require a figurative interpretation. If not, it is to no purpose that the passage is adduced as an example. If it does, then the question is, does every passage in which the word is applied to Christ mark with the same precision his inferiority? "There are a few texts which will bear a Trinitarian meaning throughout;" of course the alleged parallelism utterly fails In the one case the inferiority of the beings called gods is distinctly asserted, and therefore the texts will not bear a literal interpretation. In the other there is not an intimation of the inferiority of the being called God, and of course the text will not bear a figurative meaning.

Thus we have shown, if we are not deceived, that the first principle of Unitarian interpretation is wholly irrational in itself, and that it is equally irrational to apply the second to the interpretation of Trinitarian texts. In these texts there is not according to the concessions of Unitarians themselves, an intimation that the term God is used figuratively. They must therefore concede that the Trinitarian meaning if rejected at all, must be rejected solely on the ground of its absurdity. But what greater absurdity than this? Who will say that God in revealing to us the character of the Saviour of the world, has not used language which is intelligible in every age? Has he then left us to reject the "obvious sense" of that language when it is capable of no other sense? Is that language literally interpreted, absurd, and figuratively interpreted, without meaning? Is the only sense

which the words of inspiration will bear an absurd one? To this, we think the Unitarian is driven. A revelation from heaven has made known to us a great Deliverer from sin and misery, the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him. "Who is he then that we may believe on him?" The Unitarian cannot tell. The most important declarations concerning this exalted person, regarded as figurative are without meaning, and regarded as literal, are absurd and incredible. Is this then the revelation which God has given of his Son; or are Unitarians in the interpretation of the sacred oracles chargeable with a perversion of reason?

We are now prepared to consider the third principle which the Reviewer has laid down respecting the interpretation of Trinitarian texts; viz. that Trinitarians are bound "to prove negatively, that it is impossible they should have been used in any other than a Trinitarian meaning; that the words will bear but one sense, and that this is the only sense which they could have been used to express." We readily accept the task assigned us, and affirm the impossibility demanded by the Reviewer. We maintain it on two grounds; first, that there is not in the passage in question the least legitimate evidence, that the term God is used in a figurative sense, and that the want of such evidence is decisive that the term is not used figuratively; and secondly, that the term is applied to Christ, with such adjuncts, that it can have no other than a literal meaning.

As to the point whether the term "will bear but one sense," if the enquiry were simply whether like other terms, it be capable of a figurative use in certain cases, there can be no diversity of opinion. But this fact, as we have shewn, does not affect at all the real point at issue. The true and only question is whether the term will bear a figurative sense when applied to Christ, according to the principles by which we determine it to have a figurative meaning in other cases?

This question we have already answered, and if rightly, then this door is effectually shut against the Unitarian; for in some instances the term God is applied to Christ, when it will bear no other than the Trinitarian sense. It is no more possible that it should have any other sense, than it is that the inspired writers should have adopted a method of writing which no other writer, who intended to teach truth intelligibly, ever adopted; a method which deprives language of all definiteness and precision of meaning, and thus renders it no longer the vehicle of thought.

The other ground is that the term God is applied to Christ with such adjuncts, that it is impossible it should have any other than a literal meaning. We here come on to ground already successfully occupied by Professor Stuart, and fully unite with him in saying;

That the very reason above all other reasons, why I believe Christ to be truly divine, is because the connexion, when he is called God, ascribes to him such attributes and works, as leave me no room to doubt,

that the New Testament writers meant to assert his proper divinity.—pp. 109, 110.

It is impossible to do justice to this part of Mr. S's. argument, without transcribing the whole of his able letter. This however our limits forbid, nor does equity of argumentation demand it, since neither Mr. C. nor the Reviewer has attempted to meet the Professor on this ground. The presumption is warranted, when they have not even professed to assail the main argument of their opponent, that it is unassailable. We shall therefore only recur to its general structure, referring our readers, who are willing to see a most luminous and decisive array of testimony in support of the divinity of the Saviour, to the whole of Mr. S's third letter.

Mr. Stuart's object is to shew, that the New Testament bestows upon Christ the appellation of God, accompanied by such adjuncts as unavoidably to lead the honest interpreter of

the scriptures, to understand the term when thus applied in its highest sense. In prosecuting this object, he has shewn, that the New Testament attributes to Christ equality with God; represents him as the Creator, the Preserver, and Governor of the universe; declares his omniscience, his omnipotence, his eternity, and exhibits him both by precepts and examples, as the object of prayer and divine worship, by the church in heaven and on earth. He alludes also to that multitude of texts, which require us to love him, to obey him, to confide in him and to commit ourselves to him, in a manner which could not be required were he not God. We now ask what mode of speaking could be devised which should teach the divinity of the Lord Jesus? If to call a being God, if to ascribe to him every attribute of God, if to exhibit him as performing the works which God only can perform, if to represent him as the object of that worship which is due only to God, and of all those acts of holy obedience which God only can claim, does not designate that being as really God, and render every other meaning of the term impossible, we ask how can the meaning of language be made certain? How do we learn from the Bible that there is a God? How is he described, how is he distinguished from all other beings? Let it be told in what manner this is done which will not decide that the Lord Jesus Christ is God.

And now, notwithstanding Christ is called God again and again, and after finding every thing said of him to designate him as God which we find said of the Father, and when inspiration thus comments on its own declarations, are we to be told that these declarations may possibly have another meaning? Is this the manner in which the inspired writers use language? Adopt the same principle and ask what is the doctrine of Trinitarians-they assert Christ to be God, they ascribe to him divine attributes, and render to him divine wor