Keview of New Publications. Inquiry into the relation of Cause and Effect: by THOMAS BROWN, Edinburgh. Third Edition. THE works of Doctor Brown, we believe, will have an extensive popularity. For a season at least, they will draw the publick attention from the productions of other metaphysicians even from those of Dugald Stewart himself. This we believe, not because we have yet had an opportunity to examine his great work on the Philosophy of the mind, and to form an estimate of its value, as a philosophical theory; but because the specimen of his writings, which we have before us, affords indubitable evidence, that as an author he possesses powers of no ordinary stamp. We know no other metaphysician, who writes like Doctor Brown:-none whose writings are so distinguished by qualities, which ensure publick admiration. We notice, in the first place an apparently familiar acquaintance with the opinions and reasonings of other philosophers, on the subject of which he treats; and what is often of more importance with the views and sentiments of men in common life. On his subject he is perfectly at home, and makes his readers soon feel at home in it too. We remark in the second place, the undoubted confidence, which he always seems to feel, in his own powers, as applied to the investigation, and in the conclusion to which it has led him. He shews us that if skepticism precedes philosophical investigation; with him, at least, it does not follow it. There is not, perhaps in the whole range of metaphysical speculation, a more difficult inquiry' than that of the relation of cause and effect:-none, which is supposed to be involved in more mystery, and which has more divided the opinions of modern metaphysicians; yet in the treatise before us, our author delivers his opinions, not indeed in a tone of haughty superiority, but with an unwavering assurance of their truth. We do not remember a single instance, in which he advances an opinion, on the main subject of inquiry, with any degree of hesitancy or doubt. He never advances it, with diffidence as his opinion, which perhaps may be controverted; or as what seems to be true, but as what is, unquestionably, true:-and he is less surprised at his own discovery of the truth, than he is at the fact, that the acutest philosophers, as well as men of common sense, should, for so long a time, have overlooked a truth so very obvious; and have amused themselves, with modes of expression, which, reaily mark no distinct object of thought. We remark, further, in Doctor Brown, a never-failing elasticity of mind; of which we know not where to find a parallel. In the volume before us, we believe there is not a single page in which the writer flags:-not one, which seems to have been written with an intellect fatigued or drowsy. Every where, he is animated and spirited: and if a subject of controversy is started, he engages in it, without animosity, but with that keenness of investigation, which marks a man, eagerly impatient to apprehend the truth, and confident of his power to discover and ascertain it. If, again, the inquiry only touches on a subject, fitted to excite emotion, his imagination breaks away from a course of ratiocination, and bounds forth, in a strain of lofty and brilliant imagery, which he clothes with as rich and splendid a drapery of language, as ever poet selected to adorn the pictures of his fancy. On other occasions, when the discussion of some more abstruse point, requires unusual simplicity of language, his style becomes merely elegant, or even plain. The general character of his style, however, is lofty and inclined to the majestic,-yet, always, perspicuous, if not always possessed of philosophical precision. A treatise on metaphysics, formerly, led one to expect, abstruse and incomprehensible speculations,-distinctions, when there were no differences, and all made doubly repulsive by being expressed in the barbarous jargon of the schools, or, at best, in a dry, technica' phraseology; but the modern Scotch metaphysicians have shewn the world, that sound philosophy may be taught, in polite and elegant language. Doctor Reid's style possesses, in a high degree, perspicuity, ease, and simplicity; while Dugald Stewart has added as much elegance and ornament, as was thought to be compatible with the severity of philosophical reasoning. Doctor Brown's style, however, as much surpasses Stewart's, in these respects, as his does that of Reid. Never, surely, since the days of Plato, has philosophy been decorated with so gorgeous a robe, as that which was thrown around her by her late professor. Let us not be understood, however, wholly to approve the style of Doctor Brown, as applied to philosophical investigations. It is indeed adapt ed to catch attention, and to hold it delighted. It is fitted to recommend severe studies to persons of imagination and taste, but it is not well adapted to express, precisely, the abstract truths of a deep philosophy, with all their limitations, and the various degrees of evidence, with which they are supported. The brilliancy of the style, is often too great to give us a distinct view of the object. Its fulness and flow are incompatible with the rigorous precision of close reasoning; while its enchanting beauty, diverts our attention, fills us with pleasing emotions and disposes us to adopt, at once, the opinions so delightfully conveyed, rather than to subject them to a rigid scrutiny. Another quality of Doctor Brown's writings, which cannot fail to recommend them to a large class of his readers, is the plainess and simplicity, which they seem to give to subjects, heretofore considered the most abstruse and difficult. He attempts to clear our speculations, even on the subject of power and efficiency, from mystery and incomprehensibility. Every thing is made visible, and even tangible. The truth is pointed out to our perception, as distinctly as the objects of vision to the sight. Our author moves in a flood of light, which every where surrounds him in his path; and he almost makes us astonished, as he seems to be himself, that obscurity should ever have been supposed to rest on these enquiries. We suspect, however, that some of Doctor Brown's readers, who have been usually considered the deepest metaphysicians, will find fault with the work, on the very ground, on which others will commend it. The simplicity of his system, they will consider as evidence of its defects. Its plainness they will ascribe to the utter rejection of all that is most profound and interesting in the subject, because it is incomprehensible. Metaphysics, thus deprived of its deep and abstruse speculations, will appear, to them, as the mere facts of chemistry would do if stated to a modern chemist, by one who denied the doctrine of definite proportions, and the atomic theory. They will even deny, that he has made his own system distinctly intel ligible, or that he perfectly understood it himself. This has already been said, we are told, by illustrious authority on the other side of the water. The light, which brightens his path, is not, it will be said, the light of truth:-it proceeds not so much from the understanding, as from the ima gination; it is an illumination flung from the brilliancy of his images and the splendour of his diction: and like that which a painter throws upon the objects of his pencil, it gives a strong lustre to the prominent parts of an object, while it casts the others into a deeper shade. But it is time to close our remarks on the general characteristics of Doctor Brown, as a writer, while we proceed to exhibit his theory of Causation. When similar effects, are seen to proceed, invariably, from a given cause, it has been, universally, supposed, by men in common life, and by philosophers, also, until the time of Hume, that there must be some reason for this uniformity; and it has generally, been supposed, that there is something in the cause, or antecedent, which enables it to produce an uniform effect. To this invisible something, which was believed to be the true reason or cause of uniformity in the visible effect, and which was supposed to belong to the antecedent, they gave the names of power or efficiency; and speculative men, striving in vain to form a distinct conception of that, which was signified by these terms, have mused over them, until filled with a kind of awful as tonishment, at the inscrutable mystery, they were supposed to cover. Doctor Brown, however, comes forward, in this treatise, and in imitation of Hume, denies, absolutely, that there is any such thing as power; in the sense in which men have endeavoured to understand it. He denies that there is any thing more in the antecedent, to make it a cause, than there is in the consequent, to make it an effect. He denies, in fact, that events are connected in any way whatever, except by the invariable sequence of antecedent and consequent. He contends, that one object or event is called the effect, and another the cause, solely, because the former immediately and invariably follows the latter; and accordingly, he defines "a cause" to be "that which immediately precedes any change, and which existing at any time, in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change;" or more concisely, "that which has been, and is, and will be constantly followed by a certain change ;" and "power," he says, is a "word for expressing abstractly and briefly the antecedence itself, and the invariableness of the relation." He is not content with saying, that this is Vol. 3.-No. X. 74 all we know of power and causation; he declares that it is all there is in causation, or that can be conceived or believed, respecting it; and even that it is absurd to suppose causes and effects connected together, at all; or related in any other way, than by uniform succession. This denial of any thing, in power or causation, but what is visible, seems to us, if we rightly understand it, to be the leading peculiarity, of Doctor Brown's theory. Philosophers, and those who were not philosophers, have always noticed the uniformity of past events, and have always believed, that the same uniformity will continue; that the future will resemble the past, that the same physical causes will, invariably, be followed by the same effects,--the same antecedents, by the same consequents. But they also, believed, that there is more in causation than what appears; that there is some ground of this apparent uniformity,-something, in efficient causes, at least, which connects them with their effects; the supposition of which, produces the conviction, in our minds, that they always will produce the same effects. Doctor Brown, however, after examining the idea and belief of power, as it exists in the miud, finds nothing on the most careful analysis, but the bare perception of past sequences in events, followed, immediately, by the belief, that the same sequences will be observed in future. Farther than this he contends, we have no notion, whatever, of power or causation; and neither philosophers nor common people, would ever he supposes, have imagined, that they had such a notion, had they not been bewildered by abstract terms and figurative expressions, which they found already existing in language, and which they of course, supposed were used to indicate some mysterious kind of con nection in events. In answer to the question, why do we believe, that the future will resemble the past, that the sequence of events is invariable, or in common language, that the same cause will always produce the same effect; he says in one word, it is because we cannot help it. The belief is intuitive, or instinctive, or, as Doct. Reid, would say,' constitutional.' It is the immediate and invariable consequent of the perception of past uniformity. It is, therefore, the effect of such perception; and is no more to be explained or accounted for, than is any other effect. Such is the result of Doct. Brown's Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect;' expressed with as much simplicity and plainness as we can give to it. He illustrates and endeavours to confirm his doctrine, by a reference to the successive events in the material world, to the supposed influence of the mind and will over our bodily actions, and even the train of our thoughts, and lastly to the power of that great First Cause, from whose will every series of events received its commencement. In all, he finds the same thing; one event immediately and invariably succeeding another, and he finds nothing else. He can detect nothing like power, and finds no reason to believe in is existence; though he has no obiection to the term, if used merely to signty the relation of invariable antecedence. In respect to the successive events of the material world, such a theory bas long been adopted by philosophers. It was advanced by Descartes and Malebranche, under the head of 'Occasional causes ;' a name given to regular antecedents, which were supposed to be destitute of efficiency. The efficiency or active power which was thus denied to matter, was supposed by Reid and Stewart to be found in mind, and to be suggested also by all the changes observed in nature. This efficiency, however, is not ascribed to the physical causes or antecedents of such changes, but is properly attributed to that Eternal Omnipresent Mind which first created matter, which constantly upholds it, and by his unceasing energy carries forward the operations of nature. In answer to the question, "In what manner do you acquire the idea of causation, power, efficiency?" Stewart says, "The most probable account of the matter seems to be, that the idea of causation, or of power, necessarily accompanies the percep tion of change, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which sensation implies a being who feels; and thought, a being who thinks. A power of beginning motion, for example, is an attribute of mind, no less than sensation and thought; and wherever motion commences, we have evidence that mind has operated" "Are we therefore to conclude" he continues, "that the divine power is constantly exerted to produce the phenomena of the material world, and to suppose that one and the same cause produces that infinite multiplicity of effects which are every moment taking place in the universe ?" And he lets us know that he prefers this "simple and sublime doctrine, which supposes the order of the universe to be not only at first established, but every moment maintained by the incessant agency of one Supreme Mind; a doctrine," he says, "against which no objection can be stated but what is founded on prejudices resulting from our own imperfections." Doctor Brown, however, thinks differently. He discovers no efficiency, no active power in mind more than in matter. Volitions precede certain motions of our limbs, immediately and invariably; while they themselves follow in a similar manner certain states of the mind and feelings, of which they may be said to be the effects. They are no more free than our desires, from which they are not to be distinguished, except by unessential circumstances. The amount of it is, certain changes of mind precede certain changes of matter, and on the other hand, certain changes of matter precede certain changes of mind. The one class is not more efficient than the other. All causes, according to Doct. Brown, are equally efficient, all are alike physical. To the Almighty Cause himself, he attributes no other efficiency or power. God, he says, desired the existence of a world, and a world arose into existence, just such as he had desired. He spake,and it was done; and we doubt not that a similar effect will immediately and invariably follow every such desire of that great First Cause, who can truly be styled Almighty, since his every desire is immediately and invariably follow ed by its object. It is in vain and indeed absurd to inquire why the world arose when God desired it? or how he created it out of nothing There is no how or why to be inquired after in this case, or in any other instance of causation. Causation, power, efficiency, it is to be remembered,are only abstract terms, used to denote the fact of uniform antecedence, and have no such significance as men have supposed. Matter thus created, is the efficient cause of its own changes, and has no need of the continued energy of its Author, to carry forward its operations. In this theory of the Relation of Cause and Effect,' the Author agrees with Mr. Hume; but he differs wholly from that acute but sceptical philosopher, in respect to the origin of our belief of this relation; and consequently in respect to all the sceptical conclusions to which the latter arrived. The general prejudice against Mr. Hume's theory, and even the very general misapprehension of it, Doct. Brown ascribes to the important errors interwoven with it, and to the obscure, unphilosophical manner in which it is expressed. Those errors, our Author exhibits and confutes with great effect. Nothing, certainly, short of mathematical demonstration can surpass, in conclusiveness, the reasonings by which Doct. Brown exposes, even to ridicule, the sophistical arguments and sceptical conclusions of Mr. Hume. Were he living, he must, we think, acknowledge himself completely overthrown; and con feel compelled to crown as queror his triumphant antagonist. This he would be the more willing to do, as Doct. Brown invariably carries on the contest, not only according to the most honourable rules of warfare, but even with the delicate courtesy of chivalry. The passage in which he draws the character of Mr. Hume, as a philosopher, seems to us almost without a parallel, for the originality, justness and beauty of the execution. We give a part of it, as a specimen of our Author's plain or middling style. Before entering on the examination of be indulged in a few remarks, on the charthe Theory itself, however, I may, perhaps, acter of Mr. HUME's mode of writing, on the abstruse subjects to which some of his Essays on the philosophy of mind relate; not with a view to the consequences, or the truth or error, of the opinions delivered in those Essays, but simply with regard to their degree of clearness and precision, as expository of doctrines whether true or false. That he was an acute thinker, on those subjects to which the vague name of Metaphysics is commonly given, there was, probably, no one, even of his least candid antagonists, who would have ventured to deny. That he was also an exact and perspicuous metaphysical writer, has been generally admitted, but it has been admitted, chiefly as a consequence of the former praise, or from the remembrance of powers of style, which, in many other respects, he unquestionably possessed. We think of him, perhaps, as an historian, while we are praising him as a metaphysician; or, in praising him as a metaphysician, we think of qualities, necessary indeed for the detection of error, but different from those which the developement of the system of truths of an abstruse and complicated science peculiarly requires. In the Philosophy of Mind, where the objects are all dim and fleeting, it is the more necessary, to remedy as much as possible, by regular progressive inquiry, and methodical arrangement, and precis ion of terms, the uncertainty that otherwise might flow from the shadowy nature of the inquiry itself. The speculations of Mr. HUME, however, as I conceive, are far from being marked with this sort of accuracy. The truths, which his acuteness is quick to find and to present to us, rather fit before our eyes in gleamy coruscation, than fling on the truths which follow them that harmonizing lustre which makes each in progressive illumination more radiant by the brightness that preceded it, and |