Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
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Pagina 85
... Council . Elected by delegates at each DC party congress , the National Council acted as the chief governing body for the DC between congresses . Granted , the usual metric for party size is legislative seats , since in parliamentary ...
... Council . Elected by delegates at each DC party congress , the National Council acted as the chief governing body for the DC between congresses . Granted , the usual metric for party size is legislative seats , since in parliamentary ...
Pagina 96
... Council , PR seems to have strengthened the claims that all DC factions made for ministerial office . Data on junior ministers are somewhat spotty , but it can still be observed that independents were absent from junior ranks in the ...
... Council , PR seems to have strengthened the claims that all DC factions made for ministerial office . Data on junior ministers are somewhat spotty , but it can still be observed that independents were absent from junior ranks in the ...
Pagina 97
... council sr ministers jr ministers 1980 Figure 5.4a Percentage shares held by the DC's largest faction on the DC National Council and in the Italian Executive ( senior and junior ministers ) , 1963-1979 Whereas Figures 5.4a and 5.4b ...
... council sr ministers jr ministers 1980 Figure 5.4a Percentage shares held by the DC's largest faction on the DC National Council and in the Italian Executive ( senior and junior ministers ) , 1963-1979 Whereas Figures 5.4a and 5.4b ...
Sommario
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
Copyright | |
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