Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata, Junʼichi Kawata Ashgate, 2006 - 227 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-3 di 36
Pagina 49
... voters , and perhaps , by each other . - VOTERS Party Leaders Rank - and - File Legislators OPPOSITION Figure 3.1 Monitoring corrupt political rent - seeking To proceed , one must specify the objective functions of these political ...
... voters , and perhaps , by each other . - VOTERS Party Leaders Rank - and - File Legislators OPPOSITION Figure 3.1 Monitoring corrupt political rent - seeking To proceed , one must specify the objective functions of these political ...
Pagina 51
... voters , the media , and citizens groups , on the one hand , and challengers , on the other . " This discussion suggests that in terms of uncovering corrupt rent - seeking , monitoring the leadership is relatively more important under ...
... voters , the media , and citizens groups , on the one hand , and challengers , on the other . " This discussion suggests that in terms of uncovering corrupt rent - seeking , monitoring the leadership is relatively more important under ...
Pagina 52
... voters . Because it is precisely the leadership that needs to be monitored in CLPR , voters can identify those politicians most subject to corrupt incentives for personal enrichment . Of course , it is not sufficient to identify those ...
... voters . Because it is precisely the leadership that needs to be monitored in CLPR , voters can identify those politicians most subject to corrupt incentives for personal enrichment . Of course , it is not sufficient to identify those ...
Sommario
Neostructuralism | 1 |
A Typology of Corrupt Networks | 23 |
Theoretical | 45 |
Copyright | |
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