SECOND REASON OF REMONSTRANCE.

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Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper."

Mr. Justice McLEAN: "The acknowledged police power of a State extends often to the destruction of property. A nuisance may be abated. It is the settled construction of every regulation of commerce, that no person can introduce into a community malignant diseases, or any thing which contaminates its morals, or endangers its safety. Individuals in the enjoyment of their own rights, must be careful not to injure the rights of others."

Mr. Justice CATRON: "I admit as inevitable, that if the State has the power of restraint by licences to any extent, she has the discretionary power to judge of its limit; and may go to the length of prohibiting sales altogether, if such be her policy; and that if this court can not interfere in the case before us, neither could we interfere in the extreme case of entire exclusion."

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Mr. Justice DANIELS said, of imports that are cleared of all control of the government," "They are like all other property of the citizen, whether owned by the importer or his vendee, or may have been purchased by cargo, package, bale, piece, or yard, or by hogsheads, casks, or bottles. If, then, there was any integrity in the objection urged, it should abolish all regulations of retail trade, all taxes on whatever may have been imported." In answering the argument, that the importer purchases the right to sell when he pays duties to government, Mr. Justice DANIELS continues to say: "No such right is purchased by the importer; he can not purchase from the government

that which it could not insure him—a sale independently of the laws and polity of the State.”

And Mr. Justice GRIER said: "It is not necessary to array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism, and crime, which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which is exclusively in the States, is alone competent to the correction of these great evils; and all the measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose, are within the scope of that authority. All laws for the restraint or punishment of crime, lie at the foundation of social existence. They are for the protection of life and liberty, and necessarily compel all laws on subjects of secondary importance, which relate only to property, convenience, or luxury, to recede, when they come in contact or collision."

"For this reason, quarantine laws, which protect public health, compel mere commercial regulations to submit to their control. They seize the infected cargo, and cast it overboard! These things are done, not to interfere with the regulations of Congress, but because police laws for the preservation of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the public welfare must, of necessity, have full and free operation, according to the exigency that requires their interference. If a loss of revenue should ac crue to the United States from a diminished consumption of ardent spirits, she will be the gainer a thousand fold in the health, wealth, and happiness of the people."

"Thus all the judges of the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed and corroborated the decisions of each subordinate State court, that the entire control of the sale

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of intoxicating drinks is within the legitimate province of the State legislature. And this control is not limited to any mere regulations or partial restrictions, but extends to the entire prohibition, whenever the legislature of any State think such legislation essential to the public welfare."-Extracts from the New York Comet.

Now, let this legally-settled, constitutional fact, be applied to the very existence of the Liquor Statute of Maine, by a logical, incontrovertible conclusion, thus: If the constitutional police laws of each and every State of the American Confederate Union, were not intrinsically and necessarily sovereign and independent in the uncontrolled right of their formation and designed execution, as statutes for the preservation of health, prevention of crime, promotion of public morals, and encouragement of virtue, irrespective of any confederate national controlling power; why, then, were not objections made to the enactment of the statute Liquor Law of Maine? That there were no such objections made, and legally ratified against the enactment nor execution of the Liquor Law of Maine, which is now in successful operation, is demonstrative proof that the alleged remonstrative reason, in this case, is totally fallacious, and without foundation. And hence, all alleged contravention, or implied encroachment of the remonstrative claims of the "natural and indefeasable RIGHT" to manufacture and traffic in alcoholic poison, evidently falls under the control and condemnation of police statute law, to be abandoned as a business liquor-craft monopoly, for the accumulation of wealth, at the enormous expense and inevitable result of all the concomitant woes, degra

dation, waste of health, destruction of morals, multipli cation of crime, burdensome taxes for the support of pauperism, orphanage, arrests, imprisonments, trials of court, execution of criminals worthy of death, and ten thousand times ten thousand degrading, time-wasting, God-provoking, hell-deserving, soul-destroying fruits of Intemperance!

The above fallacious claim of "Right" has been fully answered in previous arguments, and especially in the foregoing united and decisive opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, agreeing, for incontestible reasons, in one concentrated amount of national authority, and in substance is so recorded. That each State in the American Union has the uncontrolled right to enact its own police laws for the preservation of health, prevention of crime, and promotion of public morals, according to the exigencies and demand of circumstantial occurrences. And that such police laws, enacted in statute authority, in any State of the Federal Union, are, in the very nature and necessity of the circumstantial facts and occurrences which gave them existence, to be considered, in all cases, in full force and virtue, irrespective and independent of any controlling power of existing laws of the General Confederation of National Government. Thus the Second Reason of the Remonstrance will be dismissed with the following remark: That the Three First Reasons of the Remonstrance afford incontestably convincing arguments in favor of the Maine Law statute, for the abolition of the curse of Intemperance

CHAPTER IV.

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Reasons of Remonstrance against the Statute of the Liquor Law of Maine, in the State of New York, Analyzed and Logically answered by Appropriate Conclusions.

FOURTH AND FIFTH REASONS OF REMONSTRANCE.

THE fourth reason of remonstrance against the legis lative enactment of the Liquor Law of Maine, as a statute of the Empire State, is in the following words: "Because we believe, that the accustomed beverages of civilized men, interdicted and rendered unobtainable by this threatened law, are essential to the health and comfort, the social enjoyment, and the beneficial intercourse of a large number of persons in every community, and who now use them unobjectionably, and worthily for these desirable purposes."

The fifth reason is as follows: "Because man, as a superior, social, and moral being, exercising a rational intelligence and choice as to what is most beneficial and agreeable to himself, can no more be confined by restrictive legislation to the drink of the inferior animals, than to their food and clothing; and requires neither medical nor legislative prescriptions for the ordinary preservation of his health, and recuperation of his strength, nor the example, either of drunkards or reformed drunkards, to protect their morals."

The amount of the above reasons, connectively, will ร