was at the highest when he arrived there. He took advantage of the occasion, ordered the assault to be given, took the city; and after having seized all the king's treasures, abandoned it to be plundered by the soldiers; who, besides other riches, found in it eight thousand talents of coined silver (about one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling.) Besides this plunder, he gave each soldier eight hundred drachmas,* which, with all the booty they had taken, was not sufficient to satisfy their inordinate avidity.

As this city had been peopled by colonies which had been car· ried away by force from Cappadocia,† Cilicia, and other places, Lu cullus permitted them all to return into their native countries. They received that permission with extreme joy, and quitted it in so great numbers, that from one of the greatest cities in the world, Tigranocerta became in an instant almost a desert.

If Lucullus had pursued Tigranes after his victory, without giving him time to raise new troops, he would either have taken or driven him out of the country, and the war would have been at an end. His having failed to do so was very ill taken both in the army and at Rome, and he was accused, not of negligence, but of having intended by such conduct to make himself necessary, and to retain the command longer in his own bands. This was one of the reasons that prejudiced the generality against him, and induced them to think of giving him a successor, as we shall see in the sequel.

After the great victory he had gained over Tigranes, several nations came to make their submissions to him. He received also an embassy from the king of the Parthians, who demanded the amity and alliance of the Romans. Lucullus received this proposal favourably, and sent also ambassadors to him, who, being arrived at the Parthian court, discovered that the king, uncertain which side to take, wavered between the Romans and Tigranes, and had secretly demanded Mesopotamia of the latter, as the price of the aid he offered him. Lucullus, informed of this secret intrigue, resolved to leave Mithridates and Tigranes, and to turn his arms against the king of the Parthians; flattered with the grateful thought, that nothing could be more glorious for him, than to have entirely reduced, in one expedition, the three most powerful princes under the sun. But the opposition this proposal met with from the troops, obliged him to renounce his enterprise against the Parthians, and to confine himself to the pursuit of Tigranes.

During this delay, Mithridates and Tigranes had been indefati gable in raising new troops. They had sent to implore aid of the neighbouring nations, and especially of the Parthians, who were the nearest, and at the same time in the best condition to assist them in the present extremity. Mithridates wrote a letter to their king,

* About twenty pounds. Cass. 1. xxxv p 1.

† Strab. 1. xi. p. 532, & l. xii. p. 539

Dion

which Sallust has preserved, and which is te be found amongst his fragments. I shall insert a part of it in this place.

LETTER OF MITHRIDATES TO ARSACES,* KING OF the Parthians.

"All those who, in a state of prosperity, are invited to enter as confederates into a war, ought first to consider whether peace be at their own option;† and next, whether what is demanded of them is consistent with justice, their interest, safety, and glory. You might enjoy perpetual peace and tranquillity, were not the enemy always intent upon seizing occasions of war, and undeterred by any crimes. In reducing the Romans, you cannot but acquire the highest reputation. It may seem inconsistent in me, to propose to you either an alliance with Tigranes, or that you, powerful as you are, should join a prince in my unfortunate condition. But I dare assert, that those two motives, your resentment against Tigranes upon account of his late war with you, and the disadvantageous situation of my affairs, if you judge rightly, far from opposing my demand, ought to support it. For as to Tigranes, as he knows he has given you just cause of complaint, he will accept, without diffculty, whatever conditions you shall think fit to impose upon him; and for me, I can say that fortune, by having deprived me of almost all I possessed, has enabled me to give others good counsel, and, which is much to be desired by persons in prosperity, I can, even from my own misfortunes, supply you with examples, and induce you to take better measures than I have done. For, do not deceive yourself; it is with all the nations, states, and kingdoms of the earth, that the Romans are at war; and two motives, as ancient as powerful, put their arms into their hands; the unbounded ambition of extending their conquests, and the insatiable thirst of riches." Mithridates afterwards enumerates at large the princes and kings whom they had reduced one after another, and often by means of one another. He repeats also his first successes against the Romans, and his late misfortunes. He goes on to this effect: "Examine now,‡ I beg you, whether, when we are finally ruined, you will be

* Arsaces was a name common to all the kings of Parthia.

Omnes, qui secundis rebus suis ad belli societatem orantur, considerare debent, liceatne tum pacem agere: dein quod quæritur, satisne pium, tutum, gloriosum, an indecorum sit. Tibi perpetuâ pace frui liceret nisi hostes opportuni et scelestissim. Egregia fama, si Romanos oppresseris, futura est. Neque petere audeam societatem, et frustrà mala mea cum tuis bonis misceri sperem. Atqui ea, que te morari posse videntur, ira in Tigranem recentis belli, et meæ res parùm prosperæ, si vera æstumare voles, maximè hortabuntur. Ille enim obnoxius, qualem tu voles societatem accipiet: mihi fortuna, multis rebus ereptis, usum dedit bene suadendi, et quod florentibus optabile est, ego non validissimus præbeo exemplum, quo rectius tua componas. Namque Romanis cum nationibus, populis, regibus cunctis, una et ea vetus causa bellandi est, cupido profunda imperii et divitiarum.

Nunc quaso, considera, nobis oppressis, utrùm firmiorem te ad resistendum, an finem belli futurum putes? Scio equidem tibi magnas opes virorum, armorum, et auri esse; et eâ re nobis ad societatem, ab illis ad prædam peteris. Cæterùm consilium est 'Tigranis, regno integro, meis militibus belli prudentibus, procul ab domo, parvo labore, per nostra corpora bellum conficere: quando ncque vincere neque vinci sine periculo VOL. VIII.

I

better able to resist the Romans, or can believe, that they will con fine their conquests to my country? I know you are powerful in men, in arms, and in treasure; it is for that reason we desire to strengthen ourselves by your alliance; they, to grow rich by your spoils. For the rest, it is the intention of Tigranes to avoid drawing the war into his own country, that we shall go with all my troops, which are certainly well disciplined, to carry our arms far from home, and attack the enemy in person in their own country. We cannot therefore either conquer or be conquered, without your being in danger. Do you not know, that the Romans, when they found themselves stopped by the ocean in the west, turned their arms this way? that to look back to their foundation and origin, whatever they have, they have from violence; home, wives, lands, and dominions? A vile herd of every kind of vagabonds, without country, without forefathers, they established themselves for the misfortune of the human race. Neither divine nor human laws restrain them from betraying and destroying their allies and friends, remote nations or neighbours, the weak or the powerful. They reckon as enemies all that are not their slaves; and especially whatever bears the name of king. For few nations affect a free and independent government; the generality prefer just and equitable masters. They suspect us, because we are rivals with them for dominion, and may in time take vengeance for their oppressions. But for you, who have Seleucia, the greatest of cities, and Persia, the richest and most powerful of kingdoms, what can you expect from them but deceit at present, and war hereafter? The Romans are at war with all nations; but especially with those from whom the richest spoils are to be expected. They are become great by boldly enterprising, betraying, and by making one war bring forth another. By this means, they will eihter destroy all others, or be destroyed themselves. It will not be difficult to ruin them, if you, on the side of Mesopotamia, and we on that of Armenia, surround their army, which will be without provisions or auxiliaries. The prosperity of their arms has subsisted hitherto solely by our fault, who have not been so prudent as to appreciate the views of this common enemy, and to unite ourselves in confederacy against him.

tuo possumus. An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem oceanus fecit, arma huc convertisse? Neque quicquam à principio nisi raptum habere, domuun, conjuges, agros, imperium? Convenas, olim sine patria, sine parentibus, peste conditos orbis terrarum: quibus non huniana 'ulla neque divina obstant, quin socios, amicos, procul juxtàque sitos, inopes, potentesque trahant, excidantque ; omniaque non serva, et maximè regna, hostilia ducant. Namque, pauci libertatem, pars magna justos dominos volunt. Nos suspecti sumus æmuli, et in tempore vindices affuturi. Tu verò, cui Seleucia maxima urbium, regnumque Persidis inclytis divitiis est, quid ab illis, nisi dolum in præsens, et postea bellum expectas ? Romani in omnes arma habent, acerrima in eos quibus spolia maxima sunt. Audendo et fallendo, et bella ex bellis serendo, magni facti. Per hunc morem extinguent omnia, aut occident: quod difficile non est, si tu Mesopotamia, nos Armeniâ, circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine auxiliis. Fortuna autem nostris vitiis adhuc incolumis. Teque illa fama sequetur, auxilio profectum magnis regibus latrones gentium oppressisse. Quod uti facias monee hortorque, Beu malis pernicie nostrâ unum imperium prolatare, quàin societate victor fierì.

It will be for your immortal glory to have supported two great kings, and to have conquered and destroyed these robbers of the world. This is what I earnestly advise and exhort you to do; by warning you to choose rather to share with us, by a salutary alliance, in the conquest of the common enemy, than to suffer the Roman empire to extend itself still farther by our ruin."

It does not appear that this letter had the effect upon Phraates which Mithridates might have hoped from it. So that the two kings contented themselves with their own troops.

One of the means made use of by Tigranes to assemble a new army,* was to recall Megadates from Syria, who had governed it fourteen years in his name; to him he sent orders to join him with all the troops in that country. Syriat being thereby entirely ungarrisoned, Antiochus Asiaticus, son of Antiochus Eusebes, to whom it of right appertained, as lawful heir of the house of Seleucus, took possession of some part of the country, and reigned there peaceably during four years.

A. M. 3936. Ant. J. C. 68.

The army of Tigranes and Mithridates was at last formed. It consisted of 70,000 chosen men, whom Mithridates had trained well in the Roman discipline. It was about Midsummer before it took the field. The two kings took particular care, in all the movements they made, to choose an advantageous ground for their camp, and to fortify it well, to pre-' vent Lucullus's attacking them in it; nor could all the stratagems he used, engage them to come to a battle. Their design was to reduce him gradually; to harass his troops on their marches, in order to weaken them; to intercept his convoys, and oblige him to quit the country for want of provisions. Lucullus not being able, by all the arts he could use, to bring them into the open field, employed a new plan, which succeeded. Tigranes had left at Artaxata, the capital of Armenia before the foundation of Tigranocerta, his wives and children; and there he had deposited almost all his treasures. Lucullus marched that way with all his troops, rightly foreseeing that Tigranes would not remain quiet, when he saw the danger to which his capital was exposed. That prince accordingly decamped immediately, followed Lucullus to disconcert his design; and, by four great marches, having got before him, posted himself behind the river Arsamia, which Lucullus was obliged to pass in his way to Artaxata, and resolved to dispute the passage with him. The Romans passed the river without being prevented by the presence or efforts of the enemy; a great battle ensued, in which the Romans again obtained a complete victory. There were three kings in the Armenian army, of whom Mithridates behaved the worst; for, not being able to look the Roman legions in the face, as soon as they charged, he was one of the first who fled;

Appian. in Syr. p. 118, 119 513-515.

Or Arsania.

↑ Justin. lib. xl. c. 2

Plut. in Lucul p

which threw the whole army into such a consternation, that it entirely lost all courage; and this was the principal cause of the loss of the battle.

Lucullus, after this victory,* determined to continue his march to Artaxata, which was the certain means to put an end to the war. But as that city was still several days' journey from thence, towards the north, and winter was approaching with its train of snows and storms, the soldiers, already fatigued by a sufficiently rough campaign, refused to follow him into that country, where the cold was too severe for them. He was obliged to lead them into a warmer climate, by returning the way he came.

He therefore repassed mount Taurus, and entered Mesopotamia, where he took the city Nisibis, a place of considerable strength, and he put his troops into winter-quarters.

It was there that the spirit of mutiny began to show itself openly in the army of Lucullus. That general's severity, and the insolent liberty of the Roman soldiers, and still more the malignant practices of Clodius, had given occasion for this revolt. Clodius, so well known by the invectives of Cicero, his enemy, is hardly better treated by historians. They represent him as a man abandoned to all kind of vices, and infamous for his debaucheries, which he carried to such excess as to commit incest with his own sister, the wife of Lucullus; to these he added unbounded audacity, and uncommon cunning in the contrivance of seditions; in a word, he was one of those dangerous persons, born to disturb and ruin every thing by the unhappy union in himself of the most wicked inclinations, with the talents necessary for putting them in execution. He gave a proof of this upon the occasion of which we are now speaking. Discontented with Lucullus, he secretly spread reports against him, well calculated to render him odious. He affected to lament extremely the fatigues of the soldiers, and to enter into their interests. He told them every day, that they were very unfortunate, in being obliged to serve so long under a severe and avaricious general, in a remote climate, without lands or rewards, whilst their fellow-soldiers, whose conquests were very moderate in comparison with theirs, had enriched themselves under Pompey. Discourses of this kind, attended with obliging and affable behaviour, which he knew how to assume occasionally without the appearance of affectation, made such an impression upon the soldiers, that it was no longer in the power of Lucullus to govern them.

Mithridates, in the mean time, had re-entered Pontus with 4000 of his own troops, and 4000 given him by Tigranes. Several inhabitants of the country joined him again, as well out of hatred

Dion. Cas. 1. xxxvii. P. 3-7.

† Noster exercitus, etsi urbem ex Tigranis regno ceperat, et præliis usus erat secunais, tamen nimiâ langinquitate locorum, ac desiderio suorum commovebatur. Cic. pre leg. Man. n. 23.

Mithridates et suam manum jam confirmârat, et eorum qui se ex ejus regno collegerant, et magnis adventitiis multorum reguin et nationum copiis juvabatur. Hos