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better able to resist the Romans, or can believe, that they will con fine their conquests to my country? I know you are powerful in men, in arms, and in treasure; it is for that reason we desire to strengthen ourselves by your alliance; they, to grow rich by your spoils. For the rest, it is the intention of Tigranes to avoid drawing the war into his own country, that we shall go with all my troops, which are certainly well disciplined, to carry our arms far from home, and attack the enemy in person in their own country. We cannot therefore either conquer or be conquered, without your being in danger. Do you not know, that the Romans, when they found themselves stopped by the ocean in the west, turned their arms this way? that to look back to their foundation and origin, whatever they have, they have from violence; home, wives, lands, and dominions? A vile herd of every kind of vagabonds, without country, without forefathers, they established themselves for the misfortune of the human race. Neither divine nor human laws restrain them from betraying and destroying their allies and friends, remote nations or neighbours, the weak or the powerful. They reckon as enemies all that are not their slaves; and especially whatever bears the name of king. For few nations affect a free and independent government; the generality prefer just and equitahle masters. They suspect us, because we are rivals with them for dominion, and may in time take vengeance for their oppressions. But for you, who have Seleucia, the greatest of cities, and Persia, the richest and most powerful of kingdoms, what can you expect from them båt deceit at present, and war hereafter? The Romans are at war with all nations; but especially with those from whom the richest spoils are to be expected. They are become great by boldly enterprising, betraying, and by making one war bring forth another. By this means, they will eihter destroy all others, or be destroyed themselves. It will not be difficult to ruin them, if you, on the side of Mesopotamia, and we on that of Armenia, surround their army, which will be without provisions or auxiliaries. The prosperity of their arms has subsisted hitherto solely by our fault, who have not been so prudent as to appreciate the views of this cominon enemy, and to unite ourselves in confederacy against him.
tuo possuinus. An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem oce mnus fecit, arına huc convertisse? Neque quicquam à principio nisi raptum habere , dimun, conjuges, agros, imperium? Convenas, olim sine panii, sine parentibus, peste conditos orbis terrarum: quibus non huniana ulla neque divina obstant, quin socios, amicos, procul juxtàque sitos, inopes, potentesque trahant, excidantque; omniaque non Surva, et maximè regna, hostilia ducant. Namque, pauci libertatem, pars magna justos dominos volunt. Nos suspecti sumus æmuli, et in tempore vindices affinuri. Tu verò, cui Seleucia maxima urbium, regnumque Persidis inclytis divitiis est, quid ab illis, nisi dolum in præsens, et postea bellum expectas ? Romani in omnes arma habent, acerrima in eos quibus spolia maxima sunt. Audendo et fallendo, et hella ex bellis serendo, magni facti. Per hunc morem extinguent omnia, aut occident: quod difficile non est, si tu Mesopotamia, nos Armenia, circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine auxiliis. Fortuna a:item nostris vitiis adhuc incolumis. Teque illa fama sequenir, auxilio pro fectum magnis regibus latrones gentium oppressisse. Quod uti facias monec hortorque seu malis pernicie nostrà unum imperium prolatare, quàin societate victor fieri.
A. M. 3936. Ant. J. C. 68.
It will be for your immortal glory to have supported two great kings, and to have conquered and destroyed these robbers of the world. This is what I earnestly advise and exhort you to do; by warning you to choose rather to share with us, by a salutary alliance, in the conquest of the common enemy, than to suffer the Roman empire to extend itself still farther by our ruin."
It does not appear that this letter had the effect upon Phraates which Mithridates might have hoped from it. So that the two kings contented themselves with their own troops.
One of the means made use of by Tigranes to assemble a new army,* was to recall Megadates from Syria, who had governed it fourteen years in his name; to him he sent orders to join him with all the troops in that country. Syriat being thereby entirely ungarrisoned, Antiochus Asiaticus, son of Antiochus Eusebes, to whom it of right appertained, as lawful heir of the house of Seleucus, took possession of some part of the country, and reigned there peaceably during four years.
The armys of Tigranes and Mithridates was
at last formed. It consisted of 70,000 chosen men, whom Mithridates had trained well in the Roman discipline. It was about Midsummer before it took the field. The two kings took particular care, in all the movements they made, to choose an advantageous ground for their camp, and to fortify it well, to pre
vent Lucullus's attacking them in it; nor could all the stratagemo The used, engage them to come to a battle. Their design was to
reduce him gradually; to harass his troops on their marches, in order to weaken them; to intercept bis convoys, and oblige him to quit the country for want of provisions. Lucullus not being able, by all the arts he could use, to bring them into the open field, employed a new plan, which succeeded. Tigranes had
left at Artaxata, the capital of Armenia before the foundation of Tigranocerta, his wives and children; and there he had deposited almost all his trea
Lucullus marched that way with all his troops, rightly foreseeing that Tigranes would not remain quiet, when he saw the danger to which his capitai was exposed. That prince accordingly decamped immediately, followed Lucullus to disconcert his design; and, by four great marches, having got before him, posted himself behind the river.Arsamia,f which Lucullus was obliged to pass in his way to Artaxata, and resolved to dispute the passage with him. The Romans passed the river without being prevented by the presence or efforts of the enemy; a great battle ensued, in which the Romans again obtained a complete victory. There were three kings in the Armenian army, of whom Mithridates behaved the worst; for, not being able to look the Roman legions in the face, as soon as they charged, he was one of the first who fled; * Appian. in Syr. p. 118, 119
* Justin. lib. xl. c. 2 1 Plut. in Lucul A Or Arsania.
which threw the whole army into such a consternation, that it entirely lost all courage; and this was the principal cause of the loss or ti,e battle.
Lucullus, after this victory,* determined to continue his march to Artaxata, which was the certain means to put an end to the war. · But as that city was still several days' journey from thence, towards the north, and winter was approaching with its train of snows and storms, the soldiers,t already fatigued by a sufficiently rough campaign, refused to follow him into that country, where the cold was too severe for them. He was obliged to lead them into a warmer climate, by returning the way he came.
He therefore repassed mount Taurus, and entered Mesopotamia, where he took the city Nisibis, a place of considerable strength, and he put his troops into winter-quarters.
It was there that the spirit of mutiny began to show itself openly in the army of Lucullus. That general's severity, and tlie insolent liberty of the Roman soldiers, and still more the malignant practices of Clodius, had given occasion for this revolt. Clodius, so well known by the invectives of Cicero, his enemy, is hardly better treated by historians. They represent liim as a inan abandoned to all kind of vices, and infamous for his debaucheries, which he carried to such excess as to commit incest with his own sister, the wite of Lucullus; to these he added unbounded audacity, and uncommon cunning in the contrivance of seditions; in a word, lie was one of those dangerous persons, born to disturb and ruin every thing by the unhappy union in himself of the most wicked inclinations, with the talents necessary for putting them in execution. He gave a proof of this upon the occasion of which we are now speaking. Discontented with Lucullus, he secretly spread reports against him, wel) calculated to render him odious. He affected to lament extremely the fatigues of the soldiers, and to enter into their interests. He told them every day, that they were very unfortunate, in being obliged to serve so long under a severe and avaricious general, in a remote climate, without lands or rewards, whilst their fellow-soldiers, whose conquests were very moderate in comparison with theirs, had enriched themselves under Pompey. Discourses of this kind, attended with obliging and affable behaviour, which he knew how to assume occasionally without the appearance of affectation, made such an impression upon the soldiers, that it was no longer in the power of Lucullus to govern thein.
Mithridates, in the mean time, had re-entered Pontus with 4000 of his own troops, and 4000 given him by Tigranes. Several inhabitants of the country joined him again, as well out of hatred
* Hion. Cas. l. xxxvii. p. 3–7.
| Noster exercitus, etsi urbem ex Tigranis regno ceperat, et præliis usus erat secunais, tamen nimiâ longinquitate locorum, ac desiderio suorum commovebatur. leg. Man. n. 23.
1 Mithridates et suam manum jam confirmârat, et eorum qui se ex ejus regno collegerant, et magnis adventitiis multorum reguin et nationum copiis juvabatur. Hoc
A. M. 3937. Ant. J. C. 67.
to the Romans, who had treated them with great rigour, as through the remains of affection for their king, reduced to the mouruful condition in which they saw him, from the most splendid fortune and exalted greatness. For the misfortunes of princes naturally excite compassion, and there is generally a profound respect engraven in the hearts of the people for the name and person of kings. Mithridates, encouraged and strengthened by these new aids, and the troops which several neighbouring states and princes sent him, reEumed courage, and saw himself, more than ever, in a condition to make head against the Romans. So that not contented with being re-established in his dominions,* which a moment before he did not 80 much as hope ever to see again, he had the boldness to attack the Roman troops, so often victorious; beat a body of them, commanded by Fabius; and, after having put them to the rout, pressed Triarius and Sornatius, two other of Lucullus's lieutenants in that country, with great vigour.
Lucullus at length engaged his soldiers to quit
their winter-quarters, and to go to their aid. But they arrived too late. Triarius had imprudently ventured a battle, in which Mithridates had defeated him, and killed 7000 of his men; amongst whom were reckoned 150 centurions, and twenty-four tribunes, which made this one of the greatest losses the Romans had sustained for a great while. The army would have been entirely defeated, but for a wound Mithridates had received, which exceedingly alarmed his troops, and gave the enemy time to escape. Lucullus, upon his arrival, found the dead bodies upon the field of battle, and did not give orders for their interment; which still more exasperated liis soldiers against him. The spirit of revolt rose so high, that, without any regard for his character as general, they treated him no longer but with insolence and contemnt; ünü tilough he went from tent to tent, and almost from man to man, to conjure them to march against Mithridates and Tigranes, he could never prevail upon them to quit the place where they were. They answered him brutally, that as he had no thoughts but of enriching himself alone out of the spoils of the enemy, he might march alone, and fight them, if he thought fit. Jam ferè sic fieri solere accepimus; ut regum afflictæ fortunæ facilè multorum opere alliciant ad misericordiam, maximèque eorum qui aut reges sunt, aut vivunt in regno: quòd regale iis nonien magnum et sanctum esse videatur. Cic. pro leg. Manil. n. 24.
* Itaque tantum victus efficere potuit, quantum incolumis nunquam est ausus optare. Nam cùin se in regnum recepisset suum, non fuit eo contentus, quod ei præter sperm acciderat, ut eam, posteà quàm pulsus erat, terram unquam attingeret ; sed in exerein tuin vestruin clarum atque victorem iinpetum fecit. Cic. pro leg. Manil. n. 25.
t Quse calamitas tanta fuit, ut eam ad aures L. Luculli, non ex prælio nuptius, sed ex sermone rumor afferret. Cic. pro leg. Manil. n. 25.
Mithridates, taking advantage of the discord which had arisen in the Roman army,
recovers all his dominions. Pompey is chosen to succeed Luculitis. He overthrows Mithridates in several batiles. The laster fiies in vain to Tigranes, his son-in-law, for refuge, who is engaged in a war with his own son. Pomrey marches into Ar menia against Tigranes, who comes to lim and surrenders himseif. Weary of pus suing Mi:hidates to no purpose, he returns into Syria, makes himself master of that kingdom, and puts an end 10 the empire of the Selucida. He inarches back to Pontus. Pinarnaces makes the army revolt ajr his father Mithridates, who kills himself. Tai prince's chaiacier. Pompey's expeditions into Arabia and Juda, where he takes Je. usalem. After having reduced all the cities of Ponius, he returns to Rome, and receives the honour of a triumph.
Manins Acilius Glabrio and C. Piso had been elected consuls at Rome. The first had Bithynia and Pontus for his province, where Lucullus commanded. The senate, at the same time, disbanded Fimbria's legions, which were a part of his army. All this news augmented the disobedience and insolence of the troops towards Lucullus
It is true,* his rough, austere, and frequently haughty disposition, gave some room for such usage. He cannot be denied the glory of having been one of the greatest captains of his age; and of having had almost all the qualities that form a complete general. But one was wanting which diminished the merit of all the rest; I mean the art of gaining the affections, and making himself beloved by the soldiers. He was difficult of access; rough in commanding; carried exactitude, in point of duty, to an excess that made it odious; was inexorable in pinishing offences; and did not know how to conciliate good will by praises and rewards opportunely bestowed, or by an air of hindness and affability, and insinuating manners, still more efficacious than eithei gifts or praises. And what proves that the sedition of the troops was in a great measure his own fault, was their being very docile and obedient unver Pompey.
In consequence of the letters which Lucullus had written to the senate, in which he acquainted them, that Mithridates was entirely defeated, and utterly incapable of retrieving himself, commissioners had been nominated to regulate the affairs of Pontus, as of a king dom totally reduced. They were much surprised to find, upon their arrival, that, far from being master of Pontus, he was not so much as master of his army, and that his own soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt.
The arrival of the consul Acilius Glabrio still added to their licentiousness. He iafurined them,t that Lucullus had been accused at Rome of protracting the war for the sake of continuing his com
• Dion. Cass. 1. XXXV. p. 7.
* In ipso illo inalo gravissimâque belli offensione, L. Lucullus qui tamen aliqud ei parte iis incoinmodis mederi fortasse potuisset, vestro jussu coactus, qudd imperii diu turnitati modum statuendum, veteri exemplo, putavistis, partem militum, qui jain sti pendiis confectis erant, dimisit, partem Glabrioni tradidit. Cic. pro leg. Manil. a 26