The Logical Basis of MetaphysicsHarvard University Press, 1991 - 355 pagine Michael Dummett's new book is the greatly expanded and recently revised version of his distinguished William James Lectures, delivered in 1976. Dummett regards the construction of a satisfactory theory of meaning as the most pressing task of contemporary analytical philosophy. He believes that the successful completion of this difficult assignment will lead to a resolution of problems before which philosophy has been stalled, in some instances for centuries. These problems turn on the correctness or incorrectness of a realistic view of one or another realm--the physical world, the mind, the past, mathematical reality, and so forth. Rejection of realism amounts to adoption of a variant semantics, and often of a variant logic, for the statements in a certain sector of our language. Dummett does not assume the correctness of any one logical system but shows how the choice between different logics arises at the level of the theory of meaning and depends upon the choice of one or another general form of meaning-theory. In order to determine the correct shape for a meaning-theory, we must attain a clear conception of what a meaning-theory can be expected to do. Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base camp." |
Sommario
Metaphysical Disputes over Realism | 1 |
Semantic Values | 20 |
Inference and Truth | 40 |
Theories of Truth | 61 |
Meaning Knowledge and Understanding | 83 |
Ingredients of Meaning | 107 |
Truth and MeaningTheories | 141 |
The Origin and Role of the Concept of Truth | 165 |
Circularity Consistency and Harmony | 200 |
Holism | 221 |
ProofTheoretic Justifications of Logical Laws | 245 |
The Fundamental Assumption | 265 |
Stability | 280 |
TruthConditional MeaningTheories | 301 |
Realism and the Theory of Meaning | 322 |
353 | |
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accepted accordance anti-realist appeal applied ascription assertoric atomic sentences Beth trees canonical argument central notion characterisation classical logic complex sentence condition consequences consists constitutes correct counterfactual deductive reasoning depends derived disjunction disputed class elimination rules example explain expression fact formula Frege Frege's fundamental assumption given grasp ground harmony hence hold holism initial premisses instance introduction rules intuitionistic logic involves justification procedure kind knowledge language linguistic practice logical constants logical laws mathematical statements meaning-theory ment merely metalanguage metaphysical negation notion of truth object object-language observation operator philosophers possible principle of bivalence proof proof-theoretic justification proposition quantifier quantum logic question realist recognise reductive class reference rule of inference schema semantic theory semantic value sense sequent someone speaker specific straightforward stipulations suppose tence theory of meaning thesis thought tion true or false truth-value two-valued semantics understanding utterance valid verificationist verified word