finite fpace, which is poffeffed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby diftinguished from the reft of expanfion; though this may more properly be called extension than place. Within these two are confined, and by the obfervable parts of them are measured and determined the particular time or duration, and the particular extension and place, of all corporeal beings.

§ 7. Sometimes for fo much of either, as we design by Measures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies. SECONDLY, Sometimes the word time is ufed in a larger fenfe, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for figns and for feasons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our measures of time: but fuch other portions, too, of that infinite uniform duration, which we upon any occafion, do fuppofe equal to certain lengths of measured time; and fo confider them as bounded and determined. For if we should fuppofe the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly enough, and should be underftood, if we faid, it is a longer time fince the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by 7640 years; whereby we would mark out fo much of that undistinguished duration, as we fuppofe equal to, and would have admitted 7640 annual revolutions of the fun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we fometimes fpeak of place, distance, or bulk, in the great inane beyond the confines of the world, when we confider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive, a body of any affigned dimenfions, as a cubic foot or do fuppofe a point in it at fuch a certain diftance from any part of the universe.

§ 8. They belong to all Beings.

WHERE and when, are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from fome known parts of this fenfible world, and from fome certain epochs marked out to us by the motions obfervable in it,~ Without fome fuch fixed parts or periods, the

order of things would be loft to our finite underftandings, in the boundlefs invariable oceans of duration and expanfion; which comprehend in them all finite beings,. and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are apt not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do fo often find our thoughts at a lois, when we would confider them either abftractly in themselves, or as any way, attributed to the first incomprehenfible Being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extenfion of any body is fo much of that infinite fpace, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the pofition of any body, when confidered at a certain distance from fome other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an iden of that portion of infinite duration, which paffes during the existence of that thing; fo the time when the thing exifted is the idea of that fpace of duration which paffed between fome known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows the diftance of the extremities of the bulk or exiftence of the fame thing, as that it is a foot square, or lafted two years; the other fhows the distance of it in place, or existence, from other fixed points of space or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-Inn-Fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period: all which diftances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of fpace and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c..

$9. All the Parts of Extenfion, are Extenfion; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration. THERE is one thing more wherein Space and duration have a great conformity; and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our fimple ideas, yet none of the diftinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of compofition; it is the very nature of both of

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*It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if space con fifts of parts, as it is confeffed in this place, he fhould not have reckoned it in the number of fimple ideas; be-caule it feems to be inconfiftent with what he fays elfe

them to confift of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst

where, that a fimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not diftinguishable into different ideas. It is farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the 11th chapter of the 2d book, where he begins to speak of fimple ideas, an exact definition of what he underftands by the word fimple ideas. To thefe difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus: to begin with the laft, he declares, that he has not treated his fubject in an order perfectly fcholaftic, having not had much familiarity with thofe fort of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions, regularly placed at the beginning of each new fubject. Mr. Locke contents himfelf to employ the principal terms that he uses; fo that, from his use of them, the reader may easily comprehend what he means by them. But with respect to the term fimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reason to supply that de fect. The question then is to know, whether the idea of extenfion agrees with this definition? Which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the fenfe which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that compofition which he defigned to exclude in that definition, was a compofition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compofition of the fame kind in a thing whofe effence confists in having parts of the fame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compofition. So that if the idea of extension confifts in having partes extra partes (as the schools speak) it is always, in the fenfe of Mr. Locke, a fimple idea; be caufe the idea of having partes extra partes, cannot be refolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with refpect to the na ture of extenfion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be feen in § 9. chap. 15. of the 2d book, where he fays,

fimple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to fo small a part of extension or duration, as excluded divifibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit, or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But fince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts: inftead thereof it makes use of the common meafures, which, by familiar use in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet or cubits and parafangs; and fo feconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration): the mind makes use, I fay, of fuch ideas as thefe, as fimple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occafion, makes by the addition of such

that the leaft portion of fpace or extenfion, whereof we have a clear and diftinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be confidered by us as a fimple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of fpace and extenfion are made up. So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a fimple idea, fince it is the leaft idea of space that the mind can form to itfelf, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any lefs, whereof it has. in itself any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one fimple idea; and that is fufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the defign of Mr. Locke, in this place, to difcourfe of any thing but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not fufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extenfion is. fo peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition that he has given of thofe fimple ideas, fo that it dif fers in fome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there exposed to this difficulty, than to make a new divifion in his favour. It is. enough for Mr. Locke, that his meaning can be underftood. It is very common to obferve intelligible difcourses spoiled by too much fubtility in nice divifions... We ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrinæ caufâ; but, after all, feveral things will not be bundled up together under our terms, and ways of speaking.

known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other fide, the ordinary fmalleft meafure we have of either, is looked on as an unit in number, when the. mind by divifion would reduce them into lefs fractions. Though on both fides, both in addition and divifion, either of fpace or duration, when the idea under confideration becomes very big or very fmall, its precife bulk becomes very obfcure and confufed; and it is the number of its repeated, additions or divifions, that alone remains clear and diftinct, as will eafily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loofe in the vaft expanfion of fpace, or divifibility of matter. Every part of duration, is duration too: and every part of extenfion, is extenfion, both of them capable of addition or division in în-finitum. But the leaft portions of either of them whereof we have clear and distinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be confidered by us, as the fimple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of fpace, extenfion, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diftinctly refolved. Such a fmall part in duration may be called a moment, and is the time of one alea in our minds in the train of their ordinary fucceffion there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a fenfible point, meaning thereby the leaft particle of matter or space we can difcern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the fharpeft eyes feldom lefs than thirty feconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.

6. 10. Their Parts infeparable:

EXPANSION and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both confidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not feparable one from another, no, not even in thought: though the parts of bodies from whence we take our meafure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the fucceffion of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by reft, and the other is by fleep, which we call reft too..

§ 11. Duration is as a Line, Expanfion as a Solid. BUT yet there is this manifeft difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expansion, are turned every way, and fo make figure, and breadth,,