the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor fhall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby ftinted to too fcanty a number of ideas, if we confider what an inexhaustible stock of fimple modes number and figure alone affords us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of various combinations of different fimple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and fcanty, we may eafily imagine. So that, before we have done, we fhall fee that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to fimple ideas received from fenfation or reflection, and their several combinations.

§ 10. Motion, Thinking, and Power have been most mod

ified.

It is worth our obferving, which of all our fimple ideas have been most modified, and had moft mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them; and those have been these three thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence thefe actions are conceived to flow. Thefe fimple ideas, I fay, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whofe modification have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converfant, it is no wonder that the feveral modes of thinking and motion fhould be taken notice of, the ideas of them obferved, and laid up in the memory, and have names affigned to them, without which laws could be but ill made,orvice and diforder repreffed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without fuch complex ideas, with names to them; and therefore men have fettled names, and fuppofed fettled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions dif tinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumftances; and alfo of their powers fitted for those actions, v. g, boldnefs is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the con

fidence of speaking by a peculiar name, raggia, which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the fame thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward and ready upon every occafion to break into action, we call it dif pofition. Thus teftiness is a difpofition or aptness to be

angry.

To conclude, let us examine any mode of action, v. g. confideration and affent, which are actions of the mind; running and fpeaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together; and we shall find them but fo many collections of fimple ideas, which together make up the complex ones fignified by thofe names.

§ 11. Several Words feeming to fignify Action, fignify but the Effect.

POWER being the fource from whence all action proceeds, the fubftances wherein thefe powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes; and the fubftances which thereupon are produced, or the fimple ideas which are introduced into any fubject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new fubftance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, action; but in the fubject wherein any fimple idea is changed or produced, it is called paffion; which efficacy, however various, and the effects almoft infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing elfe but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing elfe but modifications of motion. fay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but thefe two: for whatever fort of action, befides thefe, produces any effects, I confefs myself to have no notion or idea of, and fo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenfions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other fenfes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man ; and therefore many words. which feem to exprefs fome action, fignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with fome circumftances of the fubject wrought on, or caule

I

operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the caufe, and the thing done. And, when a countryman fays the cold freezes water, though the word freezing feems to import fome action, yet truly it fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid, is become hard and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

§ 12. Mixed Modes made alfo of other Ideas.

I THINK I fhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other fimple ideas, and their feveral combinations, are not excluded; much lefs, I think, will it be neceffary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been fettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and feveral other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is, to fhow what fort of ideas thofe are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compofitions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and reflection, which, I fuppofe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. Ideas of Subftances, how made.

HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with

the fenfes,as they are found in exterior things,or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of thefe fimple ideas go conftantly together; which being prefumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and made ufe of for quick difpatch, are called, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which by inadvertency, we are

apt afterward to talk of, and confider as one fimple
idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas to-
gether becaufe, as I have faid, not imagining how
thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themselves, we accuf-
tom ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they
do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which there-
fore we call fubftance. (1)

(1) This fection, which was intended only to fhow how
the individuals of diftinct fpecies of fubftances came to be
looked upon as fimple ideas, and fo to have fimple names,
viz. from the fuppofed fubftratum or fubftance, which was
looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, and from
which refulted that complication of ideas, by which it was
represented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the
idea of fubftance in general; and as fuch, hath been repre-
fented in these words; But how comes the general idea of
fubftance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abftracting
and enlarging fimple ideas? No: "But it is by a complica-
❝tion of many fimple ideas together: because, not imagining
"how these fimple ideas can fubfift by themfelves, we accuf-
"tom ourselves to fuppofe some substratum wherein they do
⚫ fubfift, and from whence they do refult; which therefore
we call fubftance." And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid
for the being of fubftance, That we accuftom ourselves to fup-
pose a fubftratum? Is that cuftom grounded upon true rea-
fon, or not? If not, then accidents or modes muft fubfilt of
themselves; and thefe fimple ideas need no tortoife to fup-
port them; for figures and colours, &c. would do well
enough of themselves, but for fome fancies men have accuf-
tomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcefter, our au-
thor*anfwers thus: Herein your lordship seems to charge
me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of
fubftance to be framed, not by abftracting and enlarging fam-
ple ideas, but by a complication of many fimple ideas togeth-
er: the other, as if I had faid, the being of fubftance had no
other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of thefe, I beg leave to remind your lord-
fhip, that I fay in more places than one, and particularly
Book 3. Chap. 3. § 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. 9. where,

* In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester.

§ 2. Our Idea of Subftance in general.

So that if any one will examine himfelf concerning his
notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no

ex profeffo, I treat of abftraction and general ideas, that they
are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be under-
ftood to mean, that that of fubftance was made any other
way; however my pen might have flipt, or the negligence
of expreffion, where I might have fomething elfe than the
general idea of fubftance in view, might make me seem to
fay fo.

That I was not fpeaking of the general idea of fubftance
in the paffage your lordfhip quotes, is manifeft from the title
of that chapter, which is, Of the complex ideas of fubftan-
ces: and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for
thofe words you have fet down.

In which words I do not obferve any that deny the gen-
eral idea of substance to be made by abftracting, nor any that
fay it is made by a complication of many fimple ideas togeth-
er. But speaking in that place of the ideas of diftinct fub-
ftances, fuch as man, horfe, gold, &c. I fay they are made up
of certain combinations of fimple ideas, which combinations
are looked upon, each of them, as one fimple idea, though
they are many; and we call it by one name of fubftance,
though made up of modes, from the cuftom of fuppofing a
fubftratum, wherein that combination does fubfift.
in this paragraph I only give an account of the Idea of dif
tin&t fubftances, fuch as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though
they are made up of diftinét complications of modes, yet they
are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as inaking dif
tin&t forts of substance.

So that

But that my notion of fubftance in general, is quite dif-
ferent from these, and has no fuch combination of fimple
ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words,
where I fay, The idea of pure fubftance in general, is on-
*ly a fuppofition of we know not what fupport of fuch qual-
ities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us And
thefe two I plainly diftinguifh all along, particularly where I
fay, "whatever therefore be the fecret and abftract nature of
"fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular dif-
"tinct fubftances, are nothing but several combinations of