CHAP. LIII. 1808. ment, and possessed the immense advantage of tried merits and long experience. Such had been the consumption of human life during the late campaigns, that every conscript who 20. survived a few years was sure of becoming an officer; and Their discipwhile this certainty of promotion to the few survivors line, equipkept alive the military spirit of the whole population, it efficiency. insured for the direction of the army the inestimable basis of tried valour and experienced skill. Every military man knows, that if the officers and non-commissioned officers are experienced and brave, it is no difficult matter, even out of the most unpromising materials, to form an effective army. The examples of the Portuguese and Hindoos, under British, and the northern Italians, under French officers, were not required to establish a fact illustrated by the experience of every age from the days of the Romans. This advantage appeared not merely in the field of battle; desperate valour, fortunate accident, can sometimes there supply the wants of experience and organisation. But in the long run, in undergoing the fatigues of a campaign, in discharging its multifarious duties, and facing its varied difficulties, the superiority of veteran armies, or even new levies incorporated with a veteran frame, soon becomes conspicuous. The Spaniards never were a match for the French, either in regular combats or in the conduct of a campaign; and although the native courage of the English, even in the outset, uniformly gave them the advantage in pitched battles, yet it was long before they became at all equal to their opponents in the general conduct of a campaign. It augments our admiration for the illustrious chief and his able lieutenants who ultimately led them to victory under such disadvantages, that they were compelled not only to lead, but in a manner to educate their troops in presence 1 Foy, i. 80, of the enemy; and that it was while struggling to main- 81. Jom. ii. tain their ground against superior bands of a veteran foe, 157, 158. that they imbibed in many respects even the rudiments of the military art.1 The English army, however, at this period was far from being in the inefficient state, either with respect to discipline or experience, which was generally presumed on the Continent and the French government, which judged from recent events, and were ignorant of the vast efforts VOL. XII. B 36. Hard. xa CHAP. 1808. 21. Force and the British army. in the military department which had been made since the commencement of the war, were equally mistaken as to the courage and capacity of the regular forces, and the extent to which a warlike spirit had imbued the nation. character of The British regular troops in the spring of 1808 consisted of nearly two hundred thousand men, of whom twentysix thousand were cavalry: besides nearly eighty thousand militia, equal in discipline and equipment to the troops of the line, though not bound to serve beyond the British isles; and two hundred and ninety thousand volunteers, of whom twenty-five thousand were cavalry, in a very considerable state of efficiency.* Great part of this immense force, without doubt, was absorbed in the defence of the numerous and extensive colonies which formed part of the English dominions. But the official returns proved that a hundred thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, were disposable in the British isles and in a minute made out by the Duke of York, it was proved, that "in 1808, sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign in Spain without detriment to any other service." Of this force it is not going too far to say that it was all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; and that not only was it equal for a pitched battle to any body of men of similar amount which could be brought against it, but, if all assembled, was adequate to the encounter of the largest army ever yet collected in a single field under the standards of Napoleon.1 1 Parl. Re turns, July 1807. Parl. Deb. ix. 3d App. and Napier, i. 81. : But it was not so much from underrating the numerical strength, as mistaking the spirit which animated Of this force of regulars, 81,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry were at home in the British isles, and of course disposable. In the muster-rolls of the English army, sabres and bayonets are alone estimated, which is not the case in the French and Continental services: a peculiarity which made the real strength of the English regular army about 200,000 men.-Parl. Deb. ix. iii. App. With The CHAP. 1808. 22. Admirable fell spirit with animated and war, regarded by the people. which it was of the British army, and the degree of interest which its exploits excited in the country, that the French government was led to regard too lightly the chances of success which it possessed in a continental struggle. all his information and sagacity, Napoleon here into error in judging of the present by the past. English soldiers had achieved so little during the that it was generally supposed they were incapable doing any thing: their navy had done so much, that it was taken for granted the whole interest and pride of the nation were centred on its triumphs. In the interim, however, the general arming of the people, the excitement produced by the threats of invasion, the profound interest kept alive by the continental war, the triumphs of Maida and Alexandria, had awakened a most extraordinary degree of military ardour, and diffused no inconsiderable amount of military information throughout the people. The warlike establishments which pervaded the country were admirably calculated to foster this growing enthusiasm, and turn it to the best account in augmenting the numbers and increasing the spirit of the regular army. The militia served as an invaluable nursery for the line; the volunteers, changed soon after into local militia, corresponding very nearly to the German landwehr, provided a never-failing supply of recruits, tolerably instructed in the rudiments of discipline, for the militia. Numbers of young men of all ranks, caught by the animation, the idleness, or the dress of soldiers, embraced the military profession: thenceforward to the end of the war there was no difficulty whatever experienced in finding adequate supplies of recruits for the army, and filling up all the fearful chasms which war and disease made in its ranks. Thus, while the French were deluded with the idea that the English were altogether contemptible by land, they had already made 1 Foy, i. 210, great progress in the formation of a powerful army; Hard. x. 158. and while their enemies were talking about sea-wolves 159. and maritime skill, the spirit was engendered destined to produce the triumphs of Vittoria and Waterloo.1 1 The vast ameliorations effected by the Duke of York in the discipline and organisation of the army, and the improved military education which the younger officers 212, 220, 221. CHAP. 1808. 23. Character of the British soldiers. had now for some years received, had at the same period afforded increased advantages for the successful display of that physical strength and undaunted moral resolution which in every age has formed the great characteristic of and qualities the British soldiers. This invaluable quality gave them a very great advantage: it is the true basis of a powerful army. Skill, experience, discipline, can be superadded by practice, or acquired by exercise; but if this one moral quality be wanting, all such acquisitions will prove of little avail. How inferior soever to their antagonists in experience, or that dexterity in the varied duties of a campaign which actual service alone can give, the English soldiers, from the very first, had the animating conviction that they were their equals, possibly their superiors, in actual combat; and that all the advantages of their veteran opponents would be at an end if once they engaged in a regular battle. And so it proved even from the outset ; and it is inconceivable how soon this one quality of dogged resolution in the field came to neutralise all the superiority of acquired skill and veteran discipline. The military is essentially a practical art; its wants and necessities are soon brought home by actual experience and suffering to an army in the field. If it possesses the resolution to fight, and the discipline to obey, a very short time will supply the rest. There is no education so rapid and effectual as that which takes place in the presence of an enemy. 24. of various natural and acquired excellence, it is hard to say whether, in the Peninsular war, the British or French soldiers, after a few years, were the most admirbetween the able. In the service of light troops; in undergoing with Parallel British and French troops. cheerfulness the fatigues of a campaign; in dexterity at making themselves comfortable under privation ; in rapidity of firing, care of their horses by the cavalry, and enthusiastic gallantry at the first onset, the French troops for a long period had the advantage; and this, joined to their almost invariable superiority of numbers, had ordi-narily turned the general issue of the campaign in their favour. But when the hostile lines actually met, and the national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers from the very beginning successfully asserted their superiority. Splendid in appearance, overflowing with courage, irresistible in a single charge, their cavalry could hardly be said to be equal-at least for general service, or the protracted fatigues of a campaign -to that of Napoleon: a remarkable circumstance, when the great attention bestowed on horses in England is taken into consideration. But their artillery, superior to any in the world in the admirable equipment of the guns and ammunition train, was second to none in the coolness and practice of the gunners; and in the steadiness and precision of their fire, the constancy which they displayed under danger, their calmness in anger, and the terrible vehemence of their charge with the bayonet, the 227. British infantry was beyond all question the first in Europe.1* CHAP. LIII. 1808. 1 Foy, i. 226, effect of their taken from ranks. In one important particular the English army was formed upon an entirely different principle from the 25. French. In the latter the officers constituted in no Important degree a separate class from the soldiers; the equality, officers being which was the object of universal desire at the outset of exclusively the Revolution, and the conscription, which reached in- the higher discriminately all ranks in its later stages, alike forbade any such line of demarcation. Thus, not only had all the marshals and generals in the service originally entered on the military career in the ranks, but to such as survived the rapid consumption of life in the imperial wars, promotion was still certain from the humblest station to the highest grades in the army. In the former, again, a line, in practice almost impassable, separated the private soldier from the officer; they were drawn from different classes in society, accustomed to different habits, instructed by a different education, actuated by different desires. To the French conscript, glory, promotion, the prospect of ultimate greatness, were the chief stimulants to exertion; in the English army, though the influence of such desires was strongly felt by the officers, yet the efforts of the common men were principally excited by a different set of motives. sense of military duty, the wish to win the respect of their comrades, an instinctive principle of courage, an anxious desire to uphold the renown of their regiment, A "Le soldat Anglais," says General Foy, "possède la qualité la plus précieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère."-Foy, i. 227. |