CHAP. LIV. 1808. 68. Battle of the British centre, first came in contact with the 50th regiment. Its light troops were driven in with great vigour, and the French mounted the hill to the north-east of Vimeira with loud cries and all the confidence of victory; but when they reached the summit, they were shattered by a well-directed fire from the artillery, disposed along the front of the English line on the edge of the steep; and their troops were arrested by the effect of the shrapnell shells, then first used against them, which, after striking down by a point-blank discharge whole files of soldiers in front, exploded with all the devastation of bombs in the rear. While yet breathless with their ascent, they received a discharge within pistol-shot from the 50th, and were immediately charged with the bayonet with such vigour, that ere the rush took place they broke and fled.* At the same time Fane's brigade repulsed, with equal success, an attack on the village of Vimeira in the centre, and, after a desperate contest, seven pieces of cannon were taken in that quarter; while the few horsemen with the army who were there stationed 1 Gurw. iv. broke forth among the retreating lines with great execution. But pursuing their advantage too far, they were Foy, ii. 230. assailed when in disorder, by the superior troops of the French cavalry, and almost cut to pieces.1 93, 95. Thieb. 195. While these successes were achieved in the centre, a most severe conflict was going on in the hills to the left, * Colonel Walker, of the 50th regiment, finding his battalion, which had only 700 bayonets in the field, unable, by a direct resistance in front, to withstand the assault of above 2000 men in column, whom Laborde led on, most skilfully drew it up obliquely to their advance, with the left, against which they were directed, thrown back. The effect of this was to expose the flank as well as front of the French column to the British fire, almost every shot of which told on their crowded ranks, while a small number only could return the discharge, and the numerous ranks in rear were perfectly useless. When the command to charge was given, the British regiment in line came down in compact order on the French column, partly in front and partly in flank, and in the attempt to deploy and form line to withstand the levelled steel, they almost unavoidably broke and fled. This method of resisting the French attack in column was very frequently afterwards employed by Wellington, and always with the same success. It can hardly fail of proving successful, if the part of the line menaced by the head of the column can be relied on to withstand the shock till the fire of the other parts on the flank of the column has produced the desired effect ; but unless this is the case the column will break the line, and, deploying against the oblique line, now itself taken in flank, soon drive it off the field. Of all the European troops the British are the only ones by whom this hazardous, but, if successful, decisive mode of resisting the attack in column was habitually practised. General Loison, who witnessed this able movement, desired, after the Convention of Cintra, to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and, with true military frankness, congratulated him on the steadiness and talent with which he had, with a battalion in line, withstood the formidable attack of the French column.-See SCOTT's Napoleon, vi. 235. CHAP. LIV. 1808. 69. the left. where the road to Lourinha ascends the steep heights to the north of Vimeira. Brennier and Solignac commanded in that quarter; and as Junot perceived that their attack did not at once prove successful, they were Desperate supported in the end by the whole reserve of infantry conflict on under Kellerman. The French, under Solignac, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came on with the utmost impetuosity, and first encountered Ferguson's brigade on the summit of the ridge. Several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged between these dauntless antagonists with extraordinary execution on both sides, as the fire-arms, almost within pistol-shot, told with murderous effect on the dense array of either line. At length, however, the three English regiments which had hitherto singly maintained the combat, (the 40th, 56th, and 71st,) being supported by three others, levelled their bayonets, Sir A. Wellesley's and rushing forward with irresistible impetuosity, drove Despatch. the French line headlong down the steep, with the loss Gurw. iv. 93, of all their artillery. So dreadful was the execution by 195, 201. the bayonet on this occasion, that the whole front line of Foy, ii. 330, one of the French regiments went down like grass before iii. 71, 72. the scythe, and three hundred men lay dead as they had stood in their ranks.1 95. Thieb. 339. Jom. 70. French. Brennier's brigade, however, still remained, as well as the reserve under Kellerman-the flower of the French army—and with these choice troops Junot made a gallant Defeat of the attempt to regain the day. Forming his men under the cover of the rocks and woods which concealed them from the enemy, Brennier, with his columns in admirable order, came suddenly upon the victorious British as they were lying on the ground, in loose array in the valley, reposing after their success, and, suddenly charging, drove them back, and retook the guns. But his triumph was only momentary. The surprised troops rallied upon the heights in their rear, to which they had been driven, and, facing about, poured in a destructive volley upon their pursuers; and immediately charging back again with a loud shout, not only again captured the artillery, but made Brennier himself prisoner, and drove the enemy a second time in utter confusion down the hill. So complete was the rout, that Solignac's brigade was driven off the ground in a different direction from Brennier's; the СНАР. spatches. former general was desperately wounded, and his troops would all have been made prisoners had not an unex1808. pected order from Sir Harry Burrard obliged Ferguson to 1 Sir A. Wel- halt in the midst of his success. The broken French upon lesley's Dethis rallied and reunited, and the whole fell back to the Gurw. iv. 93, heights on the opposite side of the valley, considerably to 96. Nap. i. 212, 216. the north of the ground from which they had commenced their attack in the morning-leaving in the hands of the victors thirteen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and four hundred prisoners, besides two thousand who had fallen on the field. The English had to lament the loss of nearly eight hundred men in killed and wounded.1 Lond. i. 142, 144. Foy, iv. 330, 339. Thieb. 195, 201. Jom. iii. 71, 72. Scott, vi. 234, 235. 71. lesley pro poses to victory. Like the Allied sovereigns at Austerlitz, Junot had made his attack by a flank-march directed in échelon Sir A. Wel- athwart the front, against the left of the British in position; and his disaster, like theirs, was in a great measure follow up the owing to that cause, which brought his different columns not simultaneously, but at successive periods into action. Sir Arthur Wellesley had as decisive success in his power as Napoleon at the close of the day; for not only had the three brigades under Hill on the right, and the Portuguese, never fired a shot, but two other brigades had suffered very little. The entire army was in excellent order and the most enthusiastic spirits; the shouts of victory, the triumphant clang of trumpets, was heard along their whole line; and from the direction which the broken French had taken after their defeat, they were entirely cut off from the retreat to Lisbon. On the other hand, the British, who had repulsed their oblique attack, and driven them off in a north-easterly direction, were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. This situation of things promised the greatest results to immediate activity. Sir Arthur was fully aware of the vast advantages thus placed within his grasp, and prepared, by immediate and decisive operations, instantly to turn them to the best account. He proposed with the five brigades on the left, about nine thousand men, and the Portuguese, five thousand more, to follow up his success against the retreating columns of the enemy, now blended together in great confusion on the opposite heights, and drive them as far as possible CHAP. LIV. 1808. back in a north-easterly direction over the Sierra da Baragueda, away from the capital; while the brigades of Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, six thousand strong, should make straight for the defile of Torres Vedras, which lay open to the south, and thence push on to Montachique, and cut off all retreat by the French to Lisbon. Considering that Junot had lost two-thirds of his artillery, and great part of his reserve park of ammunition, there can be no doubt 1 Gur. iv. 99, that this operation would have proved successful, and that dence, iv. not only would Lisbon have fallen an easy prey to the 207. Lord victors, but Junot himself, driven to an eccentric and Evidence, Ib. disastrous retreat through an insurgent and mountainous iv. 214. country almost destitute of roads, would have been too 146. happy to find shelter under the cannon of Almeida with half his forces.1 and Evi Burghersh's Lond. i. 145, Sir Harry Orders to that effect were already given, and the army was preparing to execute them, when the assumption of 72. the command by Sir Harry Burrard at once arrested the But is precareer of victory. That officer, who had arrived on the vented by field with his staff early in the day, had with generous Burrard. forbearance declined to take the command from Sir Arthur during the battle; but after it was over, considering the responsibility of ulterior operations as resting on himself, he gave orders to halt at all points, and remain in position at Vimeira till the expected reinforcements under Sir John Moore joined the army. Sir Arthur, in the strongest terms and with military frankness, represented to his superior general, on the field of battle, the inestimable importance of instantly following up the beaten enemy, driving him still further to the north-east, and interposing between his disordered columns and the strong defiles of Torres Vedras, the real gates of the capital. But all was in vain. Sir Harry Burrard, though a respectable and gallant veteran, had none of the vigour or daring requisite for decisive success; he belonged to the old school, by whom one battle was considered sufficient work for one week, and deemed it imprudent, when the artilleryhorses were fatigued, and the cavalry destroyed, to hazard any thing by a further advance, the more especially as ultimate success without any risk was certainly to be looked for upon the arrival of Sir John CHAP. Moore's division. lesley's Despatches. Gurw. iv. 99, He persisted, accordingly, in his resolution not to move from his ground: the precious 1808. moments were lost, never to be regained; the disordered 1 Sir A. Wel- French, seeing with astonishment that they were not pursued, re-formed their ranks. Junot that very night, and Evid. by a forced and circuitous march, regained the defiles Ibid. iv. 207, of Torres Vedras, and secured his retreat to the capital; Burghersh's while Sir Arthur, seeing the opportunity was lost, and Ibid. iv. 214. concealing the bitterness of his disappointment under Lond. i. 145, an affected gaiety, said to the officers of his staff, "Gentle146. Nap. i. men, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot red-legged partridges.”1* 208. Lord Evidence, 216, 217. 73. Sir Harry Burrard's tenure of the supreme direction of affairs was of short duration. Early on the morning An armistice of the 22d, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar, is concluded. and immediately landed and assumed the command; Aug. 23. 2 Gurw. iv. 104. Nap. i. 220. Foy, iv. 340. 74. Reasons which led to so that within thirty hours a pitched battle had been fought, a decisive operation rejected, and three successive commanders called to the direction of the army. After consulting with Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, and getting the best information he could, he resolved to advance on the 23d against Junot, now in position at Torres Vedras, and orders to that effect had already been issued, when information was brought that a French flag of truce had reached the outposts. It proved to be General Kellerman, with a proposal from Junot for a suspension of arms, with a view to the evacuation of Portugal.2 In truth, the situation of Junot since the battle of Vimeira had been such, that he had no longer any alternative to adopt. Early on the morning of the 22d, an armistice a council of war was held at Torres Vedras; and the on both sides. proverb almost invariably holds good, that such a council never fights. The French generals were aware that a powerful reinforcement, under Sir John Moore, was on the eve of landing; that a city containing three hundred thousand agitated and hostile citizens was in the rear; *Lord Burghersh, in his evidence before the court of inquiry, declared,"I recollect, that on the evening of 21st August, Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard to advance, giving as a reason that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon, and that, in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon."-Evidence, Court of Inquiry: GURWOOD, iv. 214. |