CHAP. LIV. 1808. that the forts and points of defence which it contained were hardly tenable against an army of thirty thousand English troops; and that to attempt a retreat through Portugal, intersected as it was by mountain torrents and almost inaccessible ridges, in the face of an insurgent population, and pursued by a victorious army, could not fail to be attended with the greatest disasters. In these circumstances, it was unanimously agreed that enough had been done for the honour of the imperial arms, and that to endeavour to obtain by negotiation a convention which might restore the army to the French soil, and ultimately to renewed operations in the north of Spain, was the most prudent course which could be adopted. General Kellerman was selected for this delicate mission, and it could not have been intrusted to abler or more § 27. skilful hands. Enjoying a European reputation, not 2 Ante, c. less from the glory of his father, the hero of Valmy,18 Nap. i. 220, than his own invaluable achievements on the field of iv. 105, 116. Marengo,2 he was at the same time possessed of all the Thieb. 204. tact and finesse in which the French diplomatists excel 344. all those of Europe, with the exception of those of Russia. 3 1 Ante, c. x. xxxi. § 93. 225. Gurw. 206. Foy, iv. 75. of Cintra. Perceiving from some hints dropt in conversation by the English general, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and his brother officers, who were not aware that he understood their Convention language, that they were far from possessing the confidence of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the results to be expected from immediate and decisive operations, he began by representing, in the most favourable colours, the strength of the French army and the magnitude of its resources, especially from the aid of the sailors and artillery of the Russian fleet, as well as the resolution of its commander, whom he described as determined to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon rather than submit to any conditions derogatory to the honour of the imperial arms. Having thus effected his object of producing an impression as to the protracted and doubtful nature of the contest which awaited them if hostilities were persisted in, he gradually opened the real object of his mission, which was the conclusion of an armistice preparatory to a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. The terms proposed were, that the French army CHAP. 1808. Aug. 23. should not be considered as prisoners of war, but be sent back to France by sea, with their artillery, arms, and baggage; that their partisans in the country should not be disquieted on account of their political opinions, but, so far as they desired it, be permitted to withdraw with their effects; and that the Russian fleet should remain in Lisbon as in a neutral harbour. The two first conditions were acceded to without any difficulty by all the English generals; but Sir Arthur Wellesley strenuously opposed the last, and it was at last agreed to refer it to the decision of Sir Charles Cotton, who positively refused to agree to it. Foiled in this attempt to extricate the Russian fleet from their awkward situation, the French general was obliged to leave them to their fate, and a separate convention was some days afterwards concluded 1 Nap. i. 220, 229. Gurw. With Admiral Siniavin, the Russian commander, in virtue iv. 105, 116, of which the whole fleet was to be conducted to England 117. Foy, iv. 343, 345. and retained in deposit till the conclusion of a general 160. Thieb.' peace, and the officers and crews to be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government, without any restriction as to their future service.1 * Lond. i. 152, 204, 209. 76. Senseless clamour in England on Posterity will scarcely be able to credit the universal burst of indignation with which this convention was received, both in the Peninsular nations and the British islands. Totally incapable of appreciating the real imthe subject, portance of the acquisition of Portugal at one blow on Court of In- the future progress of the war, the inhabitants of all these countries united in condemning a treaty which was thought to step between them and the glory which they leads to a quiry. Its result. *The Convention of Cintra excited such a clamour at the time, both in the British and Peninsular nations, that a short summary of its leading provisions is indispensable. It was provided that the French should evacuate the forts of Lisbon and whole kingdom of Portugal, and be conveyed to France, with their artillery and sixty rounds of ammunition to each gun, and with liberty to serve again; all other artillery, arms, and ammunition, to be delivered up to the British army and navy; the French army to carry with them all their equipments, the cavalry their horses, and the individuals their property; the sick and wounded to be intrusted to the care of the British government, and returned to France when convalescent: the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmela to be delivered up as soon as British detachments can be sent forward to take possession of them; all subjects of France to be protected who are domiciliated in Portugal; all their property of every description to be guaranteed to the French citizens in Portugal; no inhabitants of that country to be disquieted on account of their political conduct or opinions; the Spanish troops in the custody of the French armies to be liberated. By the supplementary convention in regard to the Russian fleet, it was stipulated that it should be conveyed to Great Britain, to remain in deposit with all its stores till six months after the conclusion of a general peace and the officers and men meanwhile to be returned to Russia, without any restriction as to their future service.-See GURWOOD, iv. 113, 117. The CHAP. 1808. had earned, or the vengeance which was their due. Portuguese, though they had been in no hurry to confront the invader in the field, and were strangers to the glories of Roliça and Vimeira, were yet loud in their complaints of the capitulation which had been granted; and bitterly inveighed against the clauses which, under the specious veil of protecting private property, in effect gave the public robbers the means of securely carrying off the stores of private and ecclesiastical plunder which they had amassed. The Spaniards re-echoed the same sentiments, and with some appearance of reason; contrasted the surrender of Dupont's corps at Baylen with the unhappy convention, which tended only to remove the French army from a situation where it was detached from the remainder of the imperial forces, and ran the most imminent hazard of being made prisoners of war, to one where it might be more advantageously and securely employed in forming the right wing of the army with which the invasion of the Peninsula was again to be attempted. Roused to the very highest pitch of enthusiasm by the early and decisive successes which had attended their arms-panting for their full share of the glories which had been won-and nothing doubting that an unconditional surrender would immediately follow, and that they should soon see a marshal of France and twenty thousand men arrive as prisoners of war at Spithead, the British people abandoned themselves 272, 274. to unbounded vexation when the capitulation was announced which was to convey them, without that last 235, 239. disgrace being incurred, to swell the invader's ranks at Rochfort and L'Orient.1 1 South. ii. Tor. ii. 57, 58. Gurw. iv. In vain were the Park and Tower guns fired on this as on other triumphs of our arms; the public voice re- 77. fused to join in the acclamations; the press, both in the A court of inquiry is metropolis and the provinces, loudly condemned the con- held, and its vention as more disgraceful than even those of the Helder results. and Closter-seven, where the British troops had been constrained to sue for terms of accommodation. Many of the public journals refused to stain their pages by the obnoxious articles, others appeared with their columns in mourning, as in a season of national calamity; public meetings were held in most parts of England, to CHAP. 1808. express the general indignation, and call for the punishment of the guilty parties; and to such a length did the outcry proceed, that it was deemed indispensable by government to consent to a court of inquiry. Such a court was accordingly appointed, consisting of highly respectable, though somewhat antiquated officers, who, after a full investigation, arrived at the conclusion that, considering the extraordinary manner in which three successive commanders had been invested with the direction of the army after the battle of Vimeira, it was not surprising that that victory had not been more vigorously followed up; that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals; and that, in the whole circumstances of the case, no further proceedings were necessary. The general odium attached to Sir Hew Dalrymple, as the senior officer in command at the time the convention was signed; though it was evident that the chief fault in the case, if there was fault at all, lay with Sir Harry Burrard as the commander-in-chief when the decisive march to Torres Vedras was declined. Such was the universal discontent, that neither of these two generals, notwithstanding the acquittal of the courtmartial, were again employed in any considerable command in the British army; and it required all the family influence and early celebrity of the hero of Assaye and South. ii. 272, Vimeira to save the future conqueror of Napoleon from being cut short on the threshold of his career, for no fault whatever of his own, by the very people upon whom he had conferred an inestimable benefit.1* 1 Court of Inquiry, Gurw. iv. 235, 239. 276. Lond. i. 157, 165. Tor. ii. 57, 58. 78. Its expedi juncture. The English people in general arrive in the end at more sober and rational opinions on political subjects than any other of whom history has preserved a record. ence at that But they are prone, in the first instance, in a most extraordinary degree, to common delusions or frenzies, which almost amount to national insanity. The cruel injustice with which they persecuted Sir Robert Calder for having gained a victory, perhaps the most momentous in its ultimate consequences, and most vital to the safety of the * At the meeting of parliament, the public thanks of both Houses were voted to Sir Arthur Wellesley for the battle of Vimeira. But he had a narrow escape, notwithstanding all his glory and the influence of his brother, Marquis Wellesley, from the obloquy consequent on the Convention of Cintra-See GURWOOD, iv. 239, 241. 1 LIV. 1808. Ante, c xxxix. § 78. country of any recorded in the British annals,1 is an CHAP. instance of such delusion; the universal and senseless clamour raised about the Convention of Cintra, an example of such frenzy. There cannot be a doubt, not only of its expedience at the juncture when it was concluded, but of its having been the means of acquiring the basis on which the whole future successes of the British arms were rested. Having missed, perhaps through an excess of caution, the opportunity of following up, according to Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice, the brilliant success of Vimeira on the evening of the battle, nothing remained but to close with the highly advantageous offer, which at once liberated Portugal from its oppressors, and secured the best possible base for future operations. The sea, sterile and unproductive if in the rear of the forces of any other power, is the source of strength and vigour to the British armies; to them every tide is fraught with plenty, every wind wafts the sinews of war on its gales. Thenceforward Lisbon became the great place d'armes to the English army, the stronghold of defence in periods of disaster, the reservoir from whence all the muniments of war were drawn in prosperous times. To have missed the opportunity of at once, and in the outset of the campaign, acquiring such a position, for the vain glory of possibly compelling a French corps and marshal, after a bloody siege of several months' duration, to lay down their arms in Lisbon, Elvas, or Almeida, would have been sacrificing the solid advantages of war for its empty honours. The restoration of twenty thousand defeated and dispirited soldiers to the standards of the enemy, was a matter of little consequence to a sovereign who had seven hundred thousand disciplined men at his command; the loss of a whole kingdom, of a chain of strong fortresses, of an admirable harbour, of ten sail of the line to his ally, of the prestige of victory to 2 Thieb. 472. himself, was a calamity of a very different description.2 79. Napoleon showed clearly in what light he viewed the acquisition of such advantages to the French arms, when, in the outset of his career, he stipulated only, in return Napoleon's for his glorious successes in the Maritime Alps, the cession views on that subject. of the Piedmontese fortresses from the cabinet of Turin ; 3 3 Ante, c. xx. § 67. and when, after the triumph of Marengo, he at once |