LV. CHAP. ready for immediate operations, within a circumference of twenty miles round his headquarters at Vittoria, besides nearly an equal force at a greater distance in Biscay and Navarre. 1808. 23. Espinosa. The plans of the French Emperor were immediately formed. Blake, whose eyes were at length opened to the Actions at perilous situation in which he was placed, so far in advance, and cut off from all communication with the other Spanish armies, had retired to ESPINOSA, where he had concentrated nearly all his troops, including those which had come with Romana from the Baltic, in a very strong position; while his reserves and park of artillery were stationed in the rear at Reynosa. He had now rejoined his artillery and reserve parks, and had collected twenty-five thousand men; but his troops, half-naked and in great part without shoes, were shivering from the inclemency of the weather, and exhausted by incessant marching and counter-marching, often without food, for fourteen days. In this state they were attacked on the forenoon of the 10th by Marshal Victor with twenty-five thousand men, while Lefebvre, with fifteen thousand, marched upon the Spanish line of retreat. Romana's infantry, posted in a wood on the right, made a gallant resistance, and not only was the action prolonged till nightfall, without any disadvantage, by those steady veterans, but the Spanish centre, who were protected by the fire of a battery well posted, to which the French had no guns to oppose, had gained ground upon the enemy. Next morning, however, the result was very different. Victor, who had changed his columns of attack during the night, renewed the action at daybreak, and directed his efforts against the left, where the Asturian levies were posted. These gallant mountaineers, though almost starving, and but recently embodied, stood their ground bravely as long as their chiefs, Quiron, Acevedo, and Valdes, remained to head them. But the French, perceiving the influence which they exercised over the minds 98. Nap. i. of their followers, sent forward some sharpshooters under cover of the rocks and thickets in front of the position, who speedily killed the first and severely wounded the two latter.1 Nov. 11. 1 Jom. ii. 97, 391, 392. Tor. i. 126, 130. Disheartened by this loss, the Asturians broke and fled. CHAP. LV. 1808. Total defeat nosa. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to support them, but instead of doing so, they were themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of fugitives, and swept along; in a short time the whole army disbanded, and rushed in the wild- 24. est disorder towards the river Trueba, which encircles the of the Spanirear of the position.* Great numbers perished in the ards at Reystream, which was deeply swollen with the rains of Nov. 13. winter; those who reached the fords dispersed, and made the best of their way into their own provinces, carrying dismay into all parts of Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, where Romana afterwards contrived to rally ten thousand men. With difficulty Blake collected seven thousand men, with whom he fell back to Reynosa, where he endeavoured to make a stand, with the aid of his reserve artillery which was still stationed there: but this ineffectual attempt only rendered his defeat in the end more complete. Soult, who, as well as Lefebvre, was now upon his traces, despatched a large body of troops on the 10th, to cut him off from his retreat towards Leon: and upon the 13th he was attacked by the advanced guard of the former marshal, who displayed even more than his wonted vigour on the occasion, completely routed, with the loss of his whole artillery and ammunition, and driven, with a few thousand miserable and Tor. ii. 126, spectre-looking followers, into the heart of the Asturian 391, 393. mountains. Meanwhile, Bilboa, Santander, and the Jom. ii. 97, whole line of the intermediate sea-coast, with great stores ii. 389, 393. landed at the latter port by the British, fell into the hands of the enemy.1 While these decisive blows in a manner annihilated 135. Nap. i. 98. South. defeat of the centre. the Spanish right, an equally important stroke was de- 25. livered by Soult, who had now taken the command of Battle of the second corps, against the centre. It consisted of the Burgos, and army of Estremadura, under the Count de Belvidere, Spanish with which were united some of the bravest regular Nov. 10. troops in Spain; in particular, the Spanish and Walloon Guards, two of the best appointed regiments of the line, and the Royal Carabineers; and the whole were completely equipped and clothed by the English government. *Great part of the disasters of this defeat were owing to the injudicious selection of a position for battle with a river in the rear-another example, like that of the Russians at Friedland, of one of the most fatal errors which a general can commit. CHAP. LV. 1808. It made, however, even less resistance than the undisciplined levies of Asturias and Galicia. The Spanish soldiers, eighteen thousand strong, of whom eleven thousand were regulars, were posted at Gamonal, in front of Burgos, with twenty pieces of cannon disposed along their front; the right occupied a wood, the left the walled park of Villemer. The action commenced by General Lasalle, with the French horse, driving in the Spanish right, and threatening its flank, while Mouton, with a division of veterans, charged rapidly through the trees, and assailed their front; Bonnet followed closely with another division immediately in his rear. But such was the vigour and effect of Mouton's attack, that before his support came up the enemy broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, pursued all the way by Bessières' heavy dragoons, who did dreadful execution among the fugitives, and took all the guns which had been saved from the first attack. Don Juan de Henestrosa, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, to cover the retreat, charged this dreadful body of horse with more gallantry than success; his dragoons, led by youths of the best families in Spain, were unable to withstand the shock of the French cuirassiers, and shared in the general rout. Two thousand Spaniards fell on the field, or in the 1 Nap. i. 389, pursuit; all the artillery, consisting of twenty guns, with 96. Tor. ii. eight hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. The whole ammunition and stores of the army were taken in Burgos, which was given up to pillage, and the dispersion of the defeated troops was complete.1 390. Jom. ii. 131, 132. South. ii. 395, 396. 26. Movement against Castanos and Palafox. Burgos now became the centre of the Emperor's operations: headquarters were established there on the 12th, and ten thousand light troops were despatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. Such was the consternation produced by their advance, that they traversed the open fields in every direction, without experiencing the slightest opposition. They swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benevente, Toro, and Tordesillas, spreading every where the triumphant proclamations of the Emperor, and boasting that, notwithstanding their utmost exertions, the French horsemen could not overtake the English army, which, abandoning its allies without striking a blow, was CHAP. LV. 1808. flying in disgrace to its ships. But while, by these incursions, the attention of the enemy was drawn to the side of Salamanca, the eyes of Napoleon were, in reality, turned in a different quarter; and it was against Castanos and Palafox that the weight of his forces was directed. The position of the French army seemed to expose them to certain destruction; for Ney's corps, which had been destined to act against the army of Estremadura at Burgos, being rendered disposable by its sudden destruction, was in a situation to make a circuit round their position, and cut them off from the line of retreat to New Castile and Madrid. That brave marshal, accordingly, reinforced by a division from the reserve, was directed to move from Aranda by Soria to Agreda, which was directly in their rear; while Lannes was despatched from Burgos, with two divisions of infantry and one of heavy cavalry from the reserve, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps, and attack them in front.* Meanwhile, Castanos, finding himself separated both from Belvidere and Blake's armies, with the destruction of which he was unacquainted, had adopted the extraordinary plan of forcing a passage Nov. 21. through the French forces in his front, and marching by 160, 161. Concha-de-Hara and Soria to Burgos, where he was to Tor. ii. 138, annihilate the Emperor's reserves and rearguard, and 395, 401. thence pass on to Vittoria to co-operate with Blake in the destruction of the two corps in Biscay.1 1 Thib. vii.. 139. Nap. i. 27. the French before the In the midst of these extravagant projects, the hand of fate was upon him. Marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, entered Soria on the 21st, upon which Castanos Positions of retreated towards TUDELA, which he reached on the even- and Spanish ing of the 22d. There his army formed a junction with armies that of Arragon under Palafox, and their united forces battle of amounted to thirty-nine thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, with forty guns. The generals of the armies of Andalusia and Arragon could not concur in any plan of common operations; Palafox contending strongly for the defence of Arragon, Castanos for the more prudent plan of retiring before the enemy. Nothing was as * In crossing a mountain range near Tolosa, the horse of Mashal Lannes fell with him, and he sustained several severe and dangerous bruises. He was cured in a very singular manner by being wrapped in a warm skin of a newly slain sheep, and was able in two days to resume the command of the army.-LARREY, Memoires et Camp. iv. 237. Tudela. LV. 1808. CHAP. yet decided between these conflicting opinions, when it was announced from the outposts that the enemy were already upon them. In haste, the troops were drawn up nearly on the ground which they occupied at the moment, which was along a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly six miles long, stretching from Tudela to Tarazona. The Arragonese, with Palafox, were on the right, leaning on Tudela; the Valencians and Castilians loosely scattered in the centre; the veterans of Andalusia, proud of the laurels of Baylen, on the left, stretching to Tarazona, which they occupied with three divisions, the flower of the army. Lannes, who commanded the French, and had concentrated thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, instantly perceived the weakness of the enemy's line, and prepared to 140. Jom. pierce the long and feebly guarded front in the centre, where it was weakest, and composed of the most inexperienced troops, so as to separate altogether the army of Arragon from that of Andalusia.1 1 Tor. ii. 138, ii. 98, 99. Nap. i. 401, 404. This well-conceived plan proved entirely successful. General Maurice Mathieu, with a strong body of infantry, Total defeat and the whole cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, at of the 28. Spaniards. tacked the Valencians and Castilians in the centre with great vigour, and soon compelled them to give ground. But they were in their turn charged by the Spanish Guards, whom Castanos despatched to their assistance from the left, who threw the assailants into confusion; and the Spanish line in that quarter was gaining ground, when they were taken in flank by General Morlot, who had beaten back the Arragonese on the right, and now turned fiercely upon the enemy's centre. Aided by such powerful auxiliaries, Maurice Mathieu and Lefebvre Desnouettes regained the advantage, and, in their turn, drove back and threw into confusion the Valencians and Castilians, who had fallen into disorder from the length of the combat. The centre was speedily routed, and Lefebvre, charging the right with vigour, drove them entirely off the field in confusion towards Saragossa. Meanwhile, La Pena with the victors of Baylen, on the extreme left, had routed the French under La Grange, by whom he was opposed; but when following up their success in some disorder, and already confident of victory, the vic |