CHAP. of France and Russia, offered at Erfurth ; LVI. 1809. Jan. 15. *and the same courier, who, on the 1st January 1809, brought this important state paper to Napoleon, conveyed at the same time decisive intelligence in regard to the hostile preparations and general movement in the Austrian states. He immediately halted, as already mentioned, at Astorga; returned with extraordinary expedition to Valladolid, where he shut himself up for two days with Maret, his 1 Ante, c. liv. minister for foreign affairs; despatched eighty-four mesvii. 200, 202. sengers in different directions, with orders to concentrate Hard. x. 297, his forces in Germany, and call out the full contingents of the Rhenish confederacy; and returned himself without delay to Paris.1 § 47. Thib. 298. Pelet. i. 45, 48.. 7. Austrian cabinet on the war. The Austrian cabinet, meanwhile, notwithstanding their hostile preparations, were as yet undecided as to Division of the course which they should finally adopt. The exopinion in the treme peril which the monarchy had already undergone in the wars with Napoleon, as well as the uncertain nature of the diversion which they could expect from so tumultuary a force as the Spanish insurrection, naturally excited the most anxious solicitude, and induced many of the warmest and wisest patriots to pause before they engaged in a contest, which, if unsuccessful, might prove the last which the country might ever have to sustain. Opinions were much divided, not only in the cabinet but the nation, on the subject. At the head of the party inclined to preserve peace, was the Archduke Charles, whose great military exploits and able administration as director of the war department, necessarily gave his opinion the greatest weight, and who had felt too frequently the weight of the French arms not to appreciate fully the danger of again provoking their hostility. On the other hand, the war party found an able and energetic advocate in Count STADION,† the prime minister, "If, among the nations who maintain against France a precarious and doubtful independence, there are any who, at this moment, hesitate between the ruin which will result from a prolonged inaction and the contingent dangers which may arise from a courageous effort to escape from it, the deceitful prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be singularly disastrous. The vain hope of a return of tranquillity might suspend their preparations, or the fear of being abandoned to their own resources shake their resolution."-16th Dec. 1808, King's Speech, Parl. Deb. Philippe, Count de Stadion, was born at Mentz on the 18th June 1763, of an old and distinguished family of Upper Rhætia, whose members had for generations been in the public service of the House of Austria. He received the rudiments of his education at Gottingen, and entered the Imperial diplomatic service at a who was cordially seconded by the majority of the nobility, and ardently supported by the great body of the people. It was known also that the Emperor himself inclined to the same opinion. The question was vehemently argued, not only in the cabinet but in all the private circles of the metropolis. CHAP. 1809. 8. used on both On the one hand it was argued that the military preparations of the monarchy were still incomplete, and its finances in the most deplorable state of confusion; that Arguments Prussia, whatever her inclination might be, was incap- sides. able of rendering any efficient assistance, and Russia too closely united with the French Emperor for any hope to remain of her co-operation; that the Spanish insurgents could not be expected long to hold out against the immense forces which Napoleon had now directed against them, and accordingly had been defeated in every encounter since he in person directed the movements of his troops; and the English auxiliaries, deprived of the solid base of Peninsular co-operation, would necessarily be driven, as on former occasions, to their ships. What madness, then, for the sake of a transient and uncertain success, to incur a certain and unavoidable danger, and expose the Austrian monarchy alone and unaided, as it would soon be, to the blows of a conqueror too strongly irritated to very early age, under the auspices of the veteran Kaunitz, who sent him, at the age of twenty-four, to Sweden, with the power of Imperial plenipotentiary. In 1792, he was sent by Baron Thugut, then prime-minister of the cabinet of Vienna, to London with the same appointment; but as the more important duties of the English embassy were at the same period entrusted to M. Merey d'Argenteau, Stadion took offence, and resigning his appointment retired to his estates in Swabia. He was there made grand-treasurer of the Bishopric of Wurtzburg; and he represented the elector of Mentz at the congress of Rastadt in 1802, when the principle of confiscating the ecclesiastical property for the benefit of the secular princes was so largely acted on. He there defended the interests of his master the Bishop of Wurtzburg, who was threatened with spoliation, with so much ability and judgment, that the cabinet of Vienna, which ever has its eye on rising ability for the diplomatic service, again took him into its employment, and he was sent as ambassador to Berlin in 1801. He discharged the duties of that situation with so much ability that, after holding it for two years, he was sent on the still more important mission of ambassador to St Petersburg. In that capacity he had the principal share in conducting at that capital the formation of the grand alliance, which terminated so fatally for Austria by the battle of Austerlitz and treaty of Presburg. After that he was appointed to the important situation of minister of foreign affairs at Vienna-an office of difficulty at all times, but peculiarly so at that juncture, from the depressed condition of Austria among the European powers. He conducted himself in that responsible and thorny situation with equal judgment and ability; and when Austria again took up arms in 1809, he acquired the principal lead in the important measures which attended the contest. He was a minister of a firm and intrepid character; devoted to his country, ardent in his disposition, and on that account a decided opponent through life of the grasping and domineering ambition of France. See Biographie Universelle, xliii., 389, STADION. LVI. 1809. CHAP. allow the hope that, after disaster, moderate terms would again be allowed to the vanquished! On the other hand it was strongly contended, that so favourable an opportunity of reinstating the empire in the rank it formerly held in Europe could never again be looked for, and was in fact more advantageous than could possibly have been expected; that the great majority of the French veteran troops had been directed to the Peninsula, and were now either buried in the mountains of Galicia, or inextricably involved in the heart of Spain; that sixty thousand French conscripts alone remained in Germany, and the Rhenish confederates could not be relied on to adhere to the stranger when the standards of the Fatherland were openly unfurled; that the confusion of the finances was of no importance, when the subsidies of England might with certainty be expected to furnish the necessary supplies, and the incompleteness of the military preparations of little moment, when the now awakened fervour of the nation was attracting all ranks in crowds to the national standard; that it was in vain to refer to the long dreaded prowess of the French armies, when the disaster of Baylen and the defeat of Vimeira had dispelled the charm of their invincibility; that there could be no question that the hour of Europe's deliverance was approaching; the only question was, whether Austria was to remain passive during the strife, and bear no part either in the glories by which it was to be achieved, or the spoils with which it would be attended. These considerations, speaking as they did to the generous and enthusiastic feelings of our nature, and supported by the great influence of the Emperor, the ministry, and the principal nobility, at length prevailed over the cautious reserve and prudent foresight of the Archduke Charles, and war was resolved on. In truth, the public fervour 1 Erz. Johan. had risen to such a height, that it could no longer be Feld. 1809, delayed; and, like many other of the most important steps in the history of all nations, its consequences, be they good or bad, were unavoidable.1 24, 27. Pelet, i. 59, 61. The French forces in Germany, when the contest was thus renewed, were far from being considerable; and it was chiefly an exaggerated impression of the extent to which they had been reduced, which led the cabinet of CHAP. LVI. 1809. 9. Amount and forces in Vienna, at that period, to throw off the mask. The total amount, in September 1808, on paper, was one hundred and sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were cavalry; but the number actually present with the eagles did not exceed a hundred and forty thousand, distribution of whom only a hundred and ten thousand were native of the French French, the remainder being Poles, Saxons, and Dutch. Germany, in After the departure of three divisions of Soult's corps for spring 1809. the Peninsula in the end of October, the remainder, eighty thousand strong, assumed the name of the army of the Rhine, and were quartered at Magdeburg, Bayreuth, Hanover, and Stettin, and in the fortresses on the Oder. But to this force of Imperial France there was to be added nearly one hundred thousand men from the Rhenish 1 Stutterconfederacy; so that, after making every allowance for heim, Feld. detachments and garrisons, a hundred and fifty thousand Pelet, 43, 44. men might be relied on for active operations on the Inn or in the valley of the Danube.1 1809, 19, 20. Austria to Russia to the The Imperial cabinet made the utmost efforts to obtain the accession of Russia to the new confederacy; and for 10. this purpose despatched a young officer of diplomatic Efforts of talent, engaging address, and noble figure, reserved for obtain the exalted destinies in future times, PRINCE SCHWARTZ- accession of ENBERG, to St Petersburg. Stadion had been previously confederacy. made aware, by secret communications from Baron Stein, the Duke de Serra Capriola, and others, that, notwithstanding Alexander's chivalrous admiration of Napoleon, he still retained at bottom the same opinions as to the necessity of ultimately joining in the confederacy for the deliverance of Europe; and he was not without hopes that the present opportunity, when so large a portion of the French armies were engaged in the Peninsula, would appear to the cabinet of St Petersburg a fair one for taking the lead in the great undertaking. But all the efforts of Schwartzenberg were in vain. Alexander had given his word to the French Emperor; and though capable of the utmost dissimulation so far as the mere obligations of cabinets were concerned, the Czar was scrupulously faithful to any personal engagements which he had undertaken. He was occupied, moreover, with great schemes of ambition both on his northern and southern frontier, and little inclined to forego present LVI. 1809. CHAP. and certain conquests in Finland and Moldavia, for the problematical advantages of a contest in the heart of Germany. All attempts to engage Russia in the confederacy, therefore, proved abortive; and the utmost which the Austrian envoy could obtain from the imperial cabinet, was a secret assurance that Russia, if Pelet, i. 67, compelled to take a part in the strife, would not at least 24, 58. bring forward any formidable force against the Austrian legions.1 1 Hard. x. 299, 302. 68. Bout. i. 11. solves to remain neutral. 2 Ante, c. li. § 14. The cabinet of Berlin had no objects of present ambition to obtain by remaining quiescent during the approaching Prussia re- conflict; and the wrongs of Tilsit were too recent and serious not to have left the strongest desire for liberation and vengeance in every Prussian heart. No sooner, therefore, had it become manifest that Austria was arming, than public feeling became strongly excited in all the Prussian states, and the government was violently urged by a powerful party, both in and out of the cabinet, to seize the present favourable opportunity of regaining its lost provinces, and resuming its place among the powers of Europe. Scharnhorst, the minister at war, strongly supported the bolder policy; and offered to place at the disposal of the King, by his admirable system of temporary service,2 no less than one hundred and twenty thousand men, instead of the forty thousand which they were alone permitted to have under arms. But the government was restrained from giving vent to its wishes, not merely by prudential considerations, but by a sense of gratitude. The visit of the King and the Queen to St Petersburg in the preceding spring, had renewed the bonds of amity by which they were united to the Emperor Alexander: they had obtained a considerable remission of tribute, and relaxation of the hardships of the treaty of Tilsit, from his intercession ;3 and they felt that, though they never could be indifferent spectators of the Austrian efforts, they could not with safety take a part in them, until the intentions of Russia were declared. They resolved, therefore, to remain neutral; and thus had Napoleon again the extraordinary good fortune, through his own address or the jealousies or timidity of the other potentates, of engaging a fourth time in mortal conflict with one of the great European Jan. 1809. 3 Ante, c. lv. § 11. 4 Hard. x. 299. Pelet, i. 65, 67. |