CHAP. LIV. 1808. Arragonese who had escaped, having received reinforcements, again stood firm on the following day at Gallur, still nearer Saragossa, and were again overthrown. Upon this Palafox himself marched out of the capital, at the June 13. head of five thousand undisciplined burghers and peasants, and moved to reinforce the wreck of the former army at Alagon-an advantageous position, four leagues from the capital of the province, on the banks of the Jalon, near its confluence with the Ebro, where the whole took post. But the undisciplined crowd, discouraged by the pre- June 14. ceding defeats, was now in no condition to make head against the French legions. The burghers, at the first sight of the enemy, broke and fled; and though Palafox, with a few pieces of artillery and three companies of regular troops, contrived for long to defend the entrance of the town, they too were at last compelled to yield, and retire in disorder into SARAGOSSA; and the French troops appeared before the heroic city. In the first tumult of alarm the gates were feebly defended, and a battalion of 1 Foy, fii. French penetrated by the Corso as far as Santa Engracia; 291, 292. but being unsupported, it was compelled to retire, and Tor. i. 307, the inhabitants, elated with this trifling advantage, i 457. crowded to the walls and prepared seriously for their defence.1 308. South. 5. of Saragossa. Saragossa, which has now, like Numantia and Saguntum, become immortal in the rolls of fame, is situated on the right bank of the Ebro, in the midst of a fertile plain, Description abounding in olive groves, vineyards, gardens, and all the marks of long-continued civilisation. It contained at that period fifty thousand inhabitants, though the sword and pestilence consequent on the two memorable sieges which it underwent, have since considerably reduced its numbers. The immediate vicinity is flat, and in some places marshy; on the southern or right bank of the river it is bounded by the little course of the Huerba, the bed of which has been converted into a canal, while on the northern, the clearer stream of the Gallego, descending from the Pyrenean summits, falls at right angles into the Ebro. On the southern side, and at the distance of a quarter of a league, rises Monte Torrero, on the side of which is conducted the canal of Arragon-a noble work, commenced by the Emperor Charles V., forming a water LIV. 1808. CHAP. communication without a single lock from Tudela to Saragossa. This hill commands all the plain on the left bank, and overlooks the town; several warehouses and edifices, constructed for the commerce of the canal, were intrenched and occupied by twelve hundred men. The city itself, surrounded by a low brick wall, not above ten or twelve feet in height, and three in thickness, interrupted in many places by houses and convents which were built in its line, and pierced by eight gates, with no outworks, could scarcely be said to be fortified. Very few guns were on the ramparts in a state fit for service; but the houses were strongly built, partly of stone, partly of brick, and in general two stories in height, with each flat vaulted in the roof, so as to render them nearly proof against fire; while the massy piles of the convents, rising like castles in many quarters, afforded strong positions, if the walls were forced, to a desperate and inflamed population. Few regular generals would have thought of Foy, fii. 293, making a stand in such a city; but Florus has recorded 294. Nap. i. that Numantia had neither walls nor towers when it 65, 66. Cavallero, Siege de Saragossa, 29, 33. 1 Tor. ii. 1, 4. 6. General concurrence of June 15. resisted so long and heroically the Roman legions; and Colmenar had said, nearly a century before, with a prophetic spirit, "Saragossa is without defences; but the valour of its inhabitants supplies the want of ramparts." 1 The resolution to defend Saragossa cannot with justice be ascribed to any single individual, as the glory belongs to the whole population, all of whom, in the all classes in first movements of confusion and excitement, had a the defence. share in the generous resolution. When Palafox retired after his repeated defeats into the town, he either despaired of being able to defend it, or deemed it necessary to collect reinforcements for a prolonged resistance from other quarters, and accordingly set out with a small body of regular troops for the northern bank of the river, leaving the armed population nearly unsupported to defend the walls. This measure was well adapted to increase the ultimate means of resistance which might be brought to bear upon the invader, if the town, when left to its own resources, could make head against the enemy; but it exposed it to imminent hazard of being taken, if, in the first moments of alarm consequent on the removal of the captain-general and regular forces, the besiegers CHAP. LIV. 1808. should vigorously prosecute their operations. This accordingly happened. On the day after the repulse of his first attack, Lefebvre presented himself in greater force before the gates, and commenced an immediate assault. June 16. But the people, though without leaders, with surprising energy prepared to repulse it. In the first moment of assault, indeed, a column of the enemy penetrated to the street Santa Engracia; the citizens, though violently excited, were without leaders or concert, and a few additional battalions would have made the enemy masters of Saragossa. But at this critical moment a desultory fire from some peasants and disbanded soldiers arrested the advance of the French, and the inhabitants, regaining hope from the hesitation of the assailants, exerted themselves with such vigour, that the enemy again retired beyond the gates. Instantly the whole population were 1 Cavallero, in activity: men, women, and children flew to the ram- 46,4 r. parts; cannons were dragged to the gates; loopholes i. 6, 7. Napier, ii. struck out in the walls; fascines and gabions constructed 66, 67. with astonishing celerity, and in less than twenty-four hours the city was secure from a coup-de-main.1 7. Palafox to relieve the defeated, and The loss sustained by Lefebvre in these unsuccessful assaults was very severe, and sufficient to convince him that operations in form would be requisite before the Operations of town could be reduced. He withdrew to a little distance, therefore, from the walls, and sent for heavy artillery city. He is from Pampeluna and Bayonne, with a view to the com- re-enters it. mencement of a regular siege. Meanwhile Palafox, who had issued into the plain on the left bank of the Ebro, moved to Pina, where he crossed the river and advanced to Belchite, and there joined the Baron Versàge, who had assembled four thousand new levies. Uniting every where the volunteers whom he found in the villages, he at length gained, by a circuitous route, the river Xalon, in the rear of the French army, with seven thousand infantry, a hundred horse, and four pieces of cannon. Some of his officers, seeing so respectable a force collected June 23. together, deemed it imprudent to hazard it by attempting the relief of Saragossa, and proposed that they should retire to Valencia. Palafox assembled the troops the moment that he heard of this proposal, and, after describing in energetie colours the glorious task which. LIV. 1808. CHAP. awaited them of delivering their country, offered to give passports to all those who wished to leave the army. Such was the ascendency of his intrepid spirit that not one person left the ranks.* Taking advantage of the enthusiasm excited by this unanimous determination, the Spanish general led them against the enemy, but before they could reach him night had fallen. They took up their quarters accordingly at Epila, where they were unexpectedly assailed, after dark, by Lefebvre with five thousand men. The Spanish levies, surprised and unable to form their ranks during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, were easily dispersed: although a few fought with such obstinacy that they only effected their retreat to Calatayud the following morning. Despairing, from 1 Tor. i. 11, the issue of this conflict, of being able to keep the field, 12. Cav. 49, Palafox became sensible that Saragossa must be defended within its own walls, and, making a long circuit, he at length re-entered the city on the 2d July.1 July 2. 50. Nap. i. 67, 68. 8. tions of the siege. Meanwhile the besieging force, having received heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pampeluna, were First opera- vigorously prosecuting their operations, which were in the first instance chiefly directed against Monte Torrero, on the left bank of the river. Destitute at this critical moment of any noble leaders, the people of Saragossa did not sink under their difficulties. Calvo de Rozas,, to whom the command had been devolved in his absence by Palafox, was a man whose calm resolution was equal to the emergency; and he was energetically supported by a plebeian chief, Tio Martin, to whom, with Tio Jorge, of similar rank, the real glory of resolving on defence, in circumstances all but desperate, is due. *Colonel Napier, who is seldom favourable to aristocratic leaders, says, that "Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge, (an urban chief of humble origin,) expressed his determination to fight," but he did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, as he must have fled early and reached Calatayud in the night, though many of the troops arrived there unbroken next morning." Neither the words in italics, nor any corresponding words, are to be found in Cavallero, whom he refers to as his authority, nor in any Spanish historian with whom I am acquainted. Toreno, though an avowed liberal, after recounting Palafox's speech on this occasion, says, "Such is the power which the inflexible resolution of a chief exercises in critical circumstances." There is not the least reason to suspect the distinguished English author of intentional misrepresentation, but the insinuations here made are fatal to the character of Palafox; and as there is no ground for them, at least in the author quoted by him, it is desirable that the authorities on which they are made should be given in the next edition of that able work.-See CAVALLERO, Siège de Saragosse, 49; TORENO, ii. 11; and NAPIER, i. 67. CHAP. LIV. 1808. Encouraged by the intrepid conduct of their chiefs, the people assembled in the public square, and with the magistrates, officers, and troops of the garrison, voluntarily took an oath "to shed the last drop of their blood June 25. for the defence of their religion, their king, and their hearths." They had need of all their resolution, for the means of attack against them were multiplying in a fearful progression. Verdier, whose talents had been fatally felt by the Prussians and Russians in the Polish campaign, was appointed to the command of the siege; the troops under his command were strongly reinforced, and Lefebvre was detached to act under the orders of Bessières against the insurgents in Leon. At the end of June, the June 26. besieging force being augmented to twelve thousand men, and the battering train having arrived, an attack was made on the convent of St Joseph, situated outside of the walls, which at first failed, though the besieged had no other defence than loopholes struck out in the rampart. But being resumed with greater force, the defences were carried, and the brave garrison, after obstinately contesting the possession of the church, refectory, and cells, set fire to the edifice, and retreated to the city. Monte Torrero was June 27. the next object of attack, while a tremendous fire, kept up with uncommon vigour on other parts of the town, diverted the attention of the besieged from the quarter where the real assault was to be made. The commander, despairing of success with the undisciplined crowd under his command, and not aware of the difference between fighting 1 Nap. i. 67, with such troops behind walls and in the open field, 53. Tor. i evacuated that important post; for which, though it was 15, 16. perhaps inevitable, he was remitted to a council of war, condemned and executed.1 Having gained this vantage-ground, Verdier commenced 1 68. Cav. 52, 9. a vigorous bombardment of the city, and battered its feeble walls furiously from the advantageous position which had Progress of the besiegers. so unexpectedly fallen into his power. Amidst the terror and confusion thus excited, repeated attacks were made on the gates of El Carmen and Portillo; but such was the ardour and tenacity of the defence, and the severity of the fire kept up from the windows, walls, and roofs of the houses, that he was on every occasion, after desperate struggles, repulsed with severe loss. These repeated |