CHAP. LIV. 1808. 31. Singular manner in came inter- Instead of this, he divided his force, and thereby exposed it to destruction. Vedel received orders to lead back to Baylen his own division and that of Gobert, while the general-in-chief himself continued fronting Castanos at Andujar. But meanwhile Generals Dufour and Leger Belair, who had been left at Baylen, were so much disquieted by the forces under Reding and Coupigny, which had now united together, and threatened them with an attack, that they retired towards Carolina, on the road to the Sierra Morena; and Vedel, finding, on his arrival at Baylen, that it was entirely evacuated by the French troops, followed them to the same place, with the design of securing the passes of the mountains in their rear. By this fatal movement the two divisions of the French army were irrevocably separated; and Reding and Coupigny, finding no enemy to oppose them, entered in great force 1 Foy, iv 67, into Baylen, and established themselves there. Thus the two hostile armies became interlaced in the most extraordinary manner: Castanos having Dupont between him and Reding, and Reding being interposed between the French general and his lieutenant Vedel.1 July 18. 77. Tor. i. 363, 364. Nap. i. 122. 61. 32. the battle of Baylen. In such a situation a decisive advantage to one or other party is at hand; and it generally falls to the commander Movements who boldly takes the initiative, and brings his combined which led to forces to bear on the isolated corps of his opponent. Dupont, sensible of his danger, broke up from Andujar late on the evening of the 18th, and marched towards Baylen, on his direct line of retreat; while Reding and Coupigny, finding themselves relieved of all fears from Vedel and Dufour, who had moved to Carolina, in the entrance of the mountains, turned their faces to the southward, and early on the following morning marched towards Andujar, with the design of co-operating with Castanos in the attack upon Dupont. Hearing, soon after their departure, of his approach towards them, they took post in a strong position, intersected with ravines and covered by olive woods, in front of Baylen ; and soon the French outposts appeared in sight. Their forces, 61, 62. Nap. Widely scattered and coming up in disorder, resembled i. 122. Tor. i. rather a detachment guarding an immense convoy than a 364. Foy, iv. corps equipped for field operations ;2 so heavily were they encumbered with five hundred baggage-waggons, which 2 Jom. iii. 77. conveyed along the artillery and ammunition stores, and the ill-gotten plunder of Cordova. CHAP. LIV. 1808. 33. Great was the dismay of the French troops when, in the obscurity of the morning, an hour before sunrise, they suddenly came upon the Spanish array right in their Battle of Baylen. front, occupying this advantageous position. There was July 19. no time, however, for deliberation; for Castanos, having heard of their departure from Andujar, had shortly after entered that town, and, passing through it with the bulk of his forces, was already threatening their rear. Dupont immediately made his dispositions for forcing his way, sword in hand, through the barrier of steel which opposed his progress; and had his troops been concentrated, there can be little doubt that he would have succeeded in doing so, and either thrown Reding back towards Vedel, or opened up his own communication with that general. But at this decisive moment the sack of Cordova proved their ruin. The troops were scattered along a line of march of three leagues in length, encumbered with innumerable waggons; the best were in rear to guard the precious convoy from the assaults of Castanos. Hastily assembling such troops as he could collect in front, Dupont, with three thousand men, commenced an attack when the day broke, at four in the morning; but his troops, fatigued by a long night-march, and discouraged by the unexpected and dangerous enemy which obstructed their advance, could make no impression on the Swiss regiments and Walloon guards, the flower of the Spanish 1 Jom. iii. army, which there awaited their approach. After a gal- i. 364, 366. lant struggle, in which they sustained severe loss, they Foy, iv. 77, were driven back, and lost not only some guns which in 122, 123. the commencement of the action they had taken from the enemy, but even their own.1 61, 62. 80. Nap. i. 34. French. Tor. As brigade after brigade successively came up to the front, they were brought forward to the attack, but with no better success. The French troops, wearied by a night- Defeat of the march, choked with dust, disordered by the encumbrance of baggage-waggons, overwhelmed by the burning sun of Andalusia in the dog-days, were no match for the steady Swiss and Walloon guards, who had rested all night coolly under the shade, in a strong position, or even for the new levies, to whom Reding had imparted his own invincible LIV. 1808. CHAP. spirit. Their guns, which came up one by one in haste and confusion, and never equalled those which the enemy had in battery, were speedily dismounted by the superior force and aim of the Spanish artillery. Two thousand men had already fallen on the side of the invaders, while scarce a tenth of the number were disabled on that of their enemies. Heat and thirst overwhelmed even the bravest soldiers; and that fatal dejection which is the forerunner of disaster, was rapidly spreading among the young conscripts, when two Swiss regiments, which had hitherto bravely maintained the combat on the right, came to a parley with their brethren in the Spanish lines, and passed over to the side of Reding. At the same time a loud cannonade was heard in the rear; and disordered fugitives, breathless from running, and almost melting with heat, burst through the ranks, and announced that a large body of the Spaniards under La Pena, the advanced guard of Castanos, was already menacing the rear. Despairing now of extricating himself from his Nap. i. 122, difficulties, ignorant of the situation of Vedel or Dufour, 123. Jom. iii. and deeming a capitulation the only way of preserving the army from destruction, Dupont sent to Reding to propose a suspension of arms, which was at once agreed to.1 1 Foy, iv. 77, 84. Tor. i. 364, 367. 61, 62. Lond. i. 94, 95. 35. of Vedel, who disgrace. While Dupont, with the corps under his immediate command, not ten thousand strong, was thus maintaining a Tardy arrival painful and hopeless struggle with the concentrated shares in the masses of the Spaniards, more than double the amount of his troops, the remainder of his army, of equal force, under Vedel and Dufour, was occupied to no purpose at a distance from the scene of action. The whole of the 18th was spent by these generals at Carolina in allowing the soldiers to repose, and repairing the losses of the artillery. But as the enemy, whom they expected to find at the entrance of the passes, had disappeared, and a loud cannonade was heard the following morning on the side of Baylen, they rightly judged that it was there that the decisive point was to be found, and set out in that direction. The distance from Carolina to Baylen was only eight miles; that from Andujar to the same place was sixteen: by a little activity, therefore, Vedel might have reached the rear of Reding sooner than Castanos could that of Dupont, and then the fate which CHAP. LIV. 1808. the Spanish generals designed for the French trrops must have overtaken themselves. When he arrived at Guaroman, however, nearly half way, the troops were so much exhausted by the heat that Vedel, though he heard the cannonade, now only five miles distant, hourly increasing, had the weakness to allow them some hours of repose. This halt proved decisive: while it continued, Dupont's troops, whom he might with ease have reached in two hours, were reduced to desperation. At noon the firing suddenly ceased, and the soldiers flattered themselves that the danger had passed: it was the suspension of arms, which was about to bring unheard-of disgrace upon them all. When they resumed their march, at two in the afternoon, they soon came upon the rear of Reding, and, discrediting the statement of an armistice, which was immediately made known to them, commenced an attack, made prisoners a battalion of Irish in the service of Spain, captured some guns, and dispersed the new levies which defended them. They were within a league of their comrades in distress, when an officer from Dupont arrived with the mournful intelligence that a suspension of arms had been agreed to, and that they had no alternative but submission. It was all over; the halt of a few hours! Tor. i. 367, 368. Foy, iv. at Guaroman had ruined the expedition: twenty thou- 85, 91. Nap. sand men were about to lay down their arms; Europe i 122, 124, was to be electrified, the empire of Napoleon shaken to 63. its foundation. Such is the importance of time in war.1 Dupont in the outset proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole French troops were to be allowed to retire, with their artillery and baggage, out of Andalusia; Capitulation and Castanos was at first inclined to have acceded to the of Dupont. proposal, deeming it an immense advantage to clear that province of the enemy, and gain time in this way for completing his preparations. But at this critical moment the despatches were intercepted and brought to headquarters, which announced the approach of Cuesta to the capital, and recalled Dupont to aid in its defence. A convention would no longer be listened to an absolute surrender of arms was required, under condition only of the troops being sent to France by sea. After many fruitless efforts to avoid so hard a fate, this was agreed to by Dupont; but he insinuated to Vedel that Jom. ii. 62, 36. CHAP. 1808. : he might endeavour to extricate himself from the toils. That general accordingly retired to Carolina; but the Spaniards threatened to put Dupont and his whole division to the sword if this movement was not stopped, and Vedel included in the capitulation. Intimidated by these menaces, orders to this effect were despatched by Dupont and so completely was the spirit of the French officers broken, that, out of twenty-four whom Vedel assembled to deliberate on the course they should pursue at this crisis, only four, including that general himself, voted for disregarding the capitulation, and continuing their retreat, which was now open, to La Mancha. Nay, to such an extent did the panic extend, that a Spanish detachment crossed the mountains, and made prisoners, upon the strength of the capitulation of Baylen, all the French depots and insulated bodies as far as Toledo, which, with those who laid down their 1 Nap. i. 12, arms on the field, swelled the captives to twenty-one thousand. Two thousand had fallen in the battle-a thousand in the previous operations, or from the effect of sickness twenty-four thousand men were lost to France ! 1 124. Foy, iv. 97, 106. Tor. i. 370, 372. Jom. ii. 64, 64. 37. Immense sen Language can convey to future ages no adequate idea of the impression which this extraordinary event produced in Europe. Nothing since the opening of the sation which revolutionary war had at all approached to it in imporit produces in Spain and tance. Hitherto the career of the French armies had over Europe. been one of almost unbroken success; and even though the talents of the Archduke Charles and the firmness of the Russians had for a time arrested the torrent, yet it had been suspended only to break out shortly after with accumulated force, and sweep away every obstacle which courage, combination, or genius could oppose to its progress. Even at their lowest point of depression, disgrace had never sullied the Republican ranks; victorious or vanquished, they had ever commanded the respect of their enemies; no large bodies had laid down their arms; their retreat had ever been that of brave and honourable men. Now, however, a disaster such as France had rarely experienced since the battle of Pavia, had overtaken their standards: twenty thousand men had surrendered; the imperial eagles had found in Anda |