for instance, as different branches of natural history, or mere narrative of events; if we are content to learn the facts they disclose as facts only, isolated and barren, we do but scan the table of contents of the book of knowledge; but of the knowledge itself we acquire little or none. That is to be found in the connection only of those facts, in the laws they enounce, and the general principles they develope; and it must be gained by reflection, by the exercise of reason and thought, in perceiving those connecting principles. "Tous les faits," remarks J. B. Say,* *"sont dans la nature, mais ils y sont comme les mots dans un dictionnaire, ce ne sont point encore des vérités ; il faut qu'ils s'enchainent, qu'ils soyent liés entre eux; pour qu'il en sorte des idées." If we are not at the trouble of tracing that chain we no more gain true knowledge than we should acquire eloquence by learning the words in a lexicon.

"Reading," says Locke, "furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enongh that we cram ourselves with a great load of collections; unless we chew them over again they will not give us strength and nourishment. There' are, indeed, in some writers, visible instances of deep thoughts, close, acute reasoning, and ideas well pursued. The light these would give would be of great use, if their reader would observe and imitate them; all the rest at best are but particulars fit to be turned into knowledge; but that can be done only by our own meditation, and examining the reach, force, and coherence of what is said! and then, as far as we apprehend and see the connection of ideas, so far is it ours; without that it is but so much loose matter floating in our brains. The memory may be stored, but the judgment is little better, and the stock of knowledge not increased by being able to repeat what others have said, or reproduce the arguments we have found in them. Such a knowledge as this is but knowledge by hearsay, and the ostentation of it is at best but talking by rote, and very often upon weak and wrong principles."+

But enough has been said on the duty and necessity of forming our own opinionst both with regard to their influence on life and character, and as a part of that single-minded search after truth, which is the great object of our intellectual existence. We need here only make a few remarks on the mode in which our judgment requires to be exercised in study.

*Cours d'Economie Politique.

+ Essay on the Conduct of the Human Understanding, Sec. 20.

See Chap. v.

In reading every book, there are two distinct provinces for this exercise; the one, the critical examination of its merits as to style, correctness, the cogency of the arguments, the manner in which they are put, and in which the whole subject is treated; the other, the comparison of it with what we knew before, or with other authorities, in order to judge how far it agrees with them, or where and why it differs, and to ascertain what attention it deserves as regards the confirmation or modification of previous opinions. It is evident that both these operations require extreme care and caution, and can only be very imperfectly performed by the young reader. As the formation of sound opinions is the great object of all study, so, also, to be able to form them belongs only to the experienced student, one whose faculties are inured to labour, and judgment ripened by habitual exercise. But it is by that exercise alone, slow, laborious, imperfect, and often failing, that the young can learn this difficult art; if they wait to exercise judgment on what they read, till they are competent to judge, it will be much the same as waiting to walk till the limbs have acquired their full growth.

The same care in comparing references and quotations, and collating different passages, which is sometimes required, as we have seen, to obtain a clear comprehension of an author, is necessary to test his correctness. It is possible that much of this labour may be impracticable to us from want of the necessary books to refer to; this will especially be the case with women who seldom have access to good libraries, and can seldom, therefore, study any subject thoroughly. But when all has been done which circumstances admit, the object is gained, so far as the influence on the student's mind is concerned, provided the unavoidable omission is carefully remembered. That our knowledge should be imperfect, is only the common lot of all, in different degrees; the really important point is, that we should know it to be imperfect.

If a writer's argument be very long, or involve much explanation or illustration, the reader will find it useful to write out the heads, so as to keep the connection more immediately before him. And if the style be wordy, or the subject one which admits of the aid of rhetoric, the same precautions that we recommended to help in acquiring a clear apprehension, will be necessary here, that the argument, being stripped of adventitious ornament, the mind may form its judgment on the reasoning alone, unaffected by the eloquence of the exposition. Critical judgment will next inquire into the arrangement of the whole work, the connection of its parts, the excellence or defects of its style; and the young reader should render to herself a strict account of her reasons for approving or disapproving on any of these points. It may also be of use

occasionally to record those reasons in writing, especially if they seem doubtful, or if the observations that have occurred to us are such as had not occurred before, in order to refer to them on reading the same work again, or other writings on the same subject. The observations may be utterly worthless,-what seems new to us, may be, in fact, trite or exploded,—but it is in this as in all our early endeavours to study, it is not the intrinsic value of what we acquire that is of most importance, but the labour of the mind, and its gradual training to sound habits of thought.

When first beginning to study any subject, we can have no opinion concerning it at all; that must be slowly built up as our ignorance is dispelled, and fresh knowledge gives us more and more means of judging. Each day's reading and reflection will create or strengthen impressions, and suggest thoughts, which gradually shape themselves into definite opinion. These as they arise should be carefully noted,—in writing, if the memory is not very accurate, and subsequently compared with later views,re-examined by the light of further knowledge, till we feel ourselves competent to pronounce a judgment. One who studies thus, will ponder over one book, while another perhaps runs through several, but his profit will be in proportion to his apparent tardiness. The second reading of the same work is also better for beginners than going on to a new one; it enables the mind to make a certain portion of knowledge more firmly its own, either by waking again the same train of reflection, or, if a different one, by exciting comparison between the two. It facilitates our taking that wide grasp of a subject which only a well-trained and exercised mind takes rapidly or at once.

It is not every book that it is desirable to read in this laborious manner. We are here speaking of real study, and if any subject is considered worth serious study at all, it is worth the utmost labour to form sound opinions and to obtain accurate knowledge concerning it. Moreover, it is the labour itself which is valuable from its effect in strengthening the faculties, and fitting them for use, and its good results will be felt in all subsequent reading. On the other hand, the harm the mind receives from the habit of resting satisfied with hasty and imperfect information, is in some ways greater than that caused by complete ignorance. What Lord Bacon says of the evil done to science by the too early framing of methods, "whereby a compact body being erected, there was a form of perfectness, and men sought for no further progress," applies with the same force to hasty conclusions and ill-digested theories in each individual mind. These crude notions, formed on imperfect grounds, or the mere result of ignorant admiration of some brilliant paradox, bear also a "form of perfectness,” a sem

blance of complete knowledge, which leads the mind to contemplate its acquisition with fondness, and closes up the avenue to correotion and improvement. Although, therefore, in exercising our judgment in study, it is inevitable that some opinion should be formed before we are really perhaps competent to form one, let it not, we repeat, be allowed to assume a higher character than is warranted by the grounds on which it rests. This caution will save us at least from cheating ourselves. We shall not call our ignorance of difficulties, clearness of discernment, nor take, as too many are apt to take, the glimmer of our own farthing candle for the ray of truth's guiding star.

We come now to the third great point to be considered in study, namely, Retention," the custody of knowledge," as Lord Bacon expresses it. No argument is required to prove the importance of retaining the knowledge which it has cost so much labour to acquire; but only those who have attentively considered the subject know how much the method in which the acquisition was made influences its retention. The advantage of a naturally good memory, which facilitates almost beyond calculation the labour of study, is not to be commanded; it is a gift beyond our reach; the great point then to consider, is how a bad memory can be turned to the best account, by what means its weakness can be assisted, and its feeble powers drawn out to the utmost.

We have already spoken of the influence of different habits of association upon the memory, and remarked that the most valuable kind of memory is trained by connecting our information according to principles of philosophical association; in other words, according to the real relations of facts, in order to link each new acquisition with whatever is analogous to it in our previous knowledge. Each new fact so added, not only retains additional hold on the memory, but prepares the latter for the reception of further knowledge by bringing into view a still greater number of relations and analogies, which serve again as so many links between fresh information and that already stored in the mind. Suppose, for instance, an ignorant person, or a mere careless reader taking up an historical work, unless his memory is peculiarly good he will probably find it difficult even to remember the succession of events, while their causes and consequences will be wholly forgotten. But if a person already possessed of historical knowledge, reads the history of some period with which he is unacquainted, the events do not follow each other to his apprehension, as isolated facts, for he perceives their analogy to other historical events; he examines the points of difference and of resemblance,—how far the causes were alike,-how far the consequences were the same, or were altered by difference in the state

CULTIVATION OF MEMORY.

275

of the times, or of national character,—and thus the facts become linked in his mind, and with each fresh link obtain additional hold on the memory. They no longer stand as mere words in a chronological table, but form part of a series illustrating a truth or principle.

To the same cause may be referred the advantage which a weak memory derives from connecting in some measure any two or more subjects of study, with which it may be occupied; that is, in carrying on relative pursuits, or such as involve inquiries relative to the same class of objects. These throw light upon each other; the facts one study presents, are referred to facts already learnt in the kindred pursuit, and tend to illustrate the same, or closely allied principles. For instance, if we are much engaged with some branch of natural philosophy, we shall find that we can at the same time more easily read and remember a work on any other scientific subject than one on history or politics; while, on the other hand, if we are studying the latter, our attention will be more easily turned to questions of moral philosophy or legislation, than to science. In these cases the train of association is extended, not disturbed; the newly acquired knowledge bears relation to that already possessed, and the work of memory is proportionably facilitated.

There is so much connection between subjects of the same class, that it is easy for the young student to avail himself of the advantages thus offered by the influence of association. Nor is this advantage confined to assisting the memory; such a method of study also calls forth more thought, and preserves the mind at once from the one-sidedness of exclusive devotion to a single subject, and from the vagueness and confusion of desultory reading. Even among subjects of the same class, one should be chosen as the chief subject of study, to which others should be kept in subordination; one leading idea is thus kept prominent in the mind, and this is an essential feature of an efficient system. No doubt some general information on science may be gained by reading successively upon chemistry, mechanics, geology, &c., without in any way connecting these studies; but the effect on the mind, as well as the character of the knowledge acquired, will be very different if one of these subjects be made the principal object, the centre to which the others are to be referred. Method at once introduces order, memory is assisted instead of being burdened, and the attempt to trace the various relations presented by these different subjects, the labour of classifying the facts, and following out the general principles they tend to develope, leads to further knowledge, and gives a degree of exercise to the various faculties of the mind, which serve to invigorate and increase its power.