a reliance on common sense alone in building, nor the musician in music, to the neglect of those systems of rules which, in their respective arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning, aided by experience. And the induction might be extended to every department of practice. Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted common sense only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he -possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously, and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments."* Now, to apply this to the case of women: men are necessarily ignorant in great measure of the difficulties or trials of their position; often strangely indifferent to some of their most important duties-and thoughtlessly satisfied of the happiness of a condition to which they cannot themselves be subjected; they judge, therefore, on the subject as the sailor judges concerning medical practice, and the medical man concerning navigation; and thence pronounce that " common sense" is quite sufficient for women. The decision is echoed by such among the latter, who, assuming they possess common sense, are ignorant of the nature of that cultivation which they reject as superfluous. They decide that common sense is a sufficient guide in the education of their children, and in meddling with the moral and religious instruction of their inferiors; but it may be doubted if they would keep a cook who proceeded on the same principles to make a pudding.

APPENDIX B.

WE did not attempt entering into the subject of evidence when speaking (chap. v.) of the various degrees of probability and proof, as we considered it too wide and abstruse a question to be discussed within such narrow limits; but in speaking of the study of Scripture evidences, we think it may not be useless to point out very briefly the general method of collecting and examining evidence, in order to show the young reader what kind and degree of caution and critical discrimination are necessary, not only in this all-important question of religion, but in every question depending on the correctness of facts, and on the validity of testimony.

In the first case, that is when our conclusion depends on the correctness of facts, the principal points to be attended to are these:-1st, The careful collection and examination of all the facts bearing upon the question, attending particularly to the character of the facts, so as to admit none that do not so bear upon it. 2ndly, The separation of

* Preface to Elements of Logic.

adventitious or unimportant circumstances in the facts, from what is uniform and essential, and which, therefore, may be safely reasoned upon. 3rdly, The comparison of facts, so as to trace their relation to each other, whether of resemblance, of analogy, or of cause and effect. 4thly, From the comparison of a large number of facts to arrive at a general principle or relation common to them all;-this last is generalisation, or the inference of principles or general laws from the induction of particulars. This process must be gone through equally in moral as in scientific reasoning; but the latter has this advantage, that we can at each step test its accuracy by actual experiment or observation, the chief basis of the mixed sciences. If the result of the experiments do not bear out our reasoning, we are certain that the latter is fallacious in itself, or that we have left out of account some essential data, and we are saved from the danger of grounding further conclusions upon it. With regard to moral reasoning, experiment is out of the question. We cannot place human beings in certain given circumstances, and test by the result the accuracy of our theoretical reasoning; we are forced to content ourselves with the imperfect test afforded by circumstances similar to those we have reasoned upon, and by the probabilities resting on general principles of human nature,―that human beings, placed so and so, would act in such and such a manner; but the whole train of reasoning may be invalidated by some accidentally disturbing cause, which it is equally impossible to foresee or wholly to account for. This at once explains why so many moral and political questions are yet surrounded with doubt and difficulty, while physical science is triumphantly sweeping from its path every obstacle to the dominion of man over the material world.

When the conclusions to be examined rest upon testimony, then our reasoning must be directed to ascertain the value of the testimony, independently of any opinions concerning the value of the conclusions themselves. In receiving a statement on testimony, the first point to examine is the character of the witness. If we have any personal knowledge of him, we decide according to what we know of his general accuracy, regard for truth, and power of conveying distinctly the facts he professes to bear witness to, what value is to be attached to the correctness of his statement. We must then take into account the possible sources of error, the prejudices most likely to bias his perceptions, the motives he may have for speaking or concealing the truth, the opportunities of knowledge he possesses, and draw our conclusion accordingly. If the witness be a stranger to us, or a writer of some former period, of course the difficulty of ascertaining the value of his testimony is increased tenfold. In the latter case,which includes almost all historical evidence,-we must supply the deficiency of personal knowledge by the general testimony of the writer's contemporaries, as to his character, credibility, &c., and seek in the state of opinions and the manners of the period for the causes likely to affect his statement. In all cases where we receive facts on

* For a beautiful example of this process in scientific reasoning, we refer our readers to Sir J. Herschel's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, p. 159.

testimony, we must take into account the intrinsic probability of the fact itself. A probable event may be received on testimony quite insufficient to prove an improbable one. The accordance of a fact with other facts or general laws previously known, is in itself strong evidence of its truth.* We require, for instance, very much stronger evidence of a miracle than of an event in accordance with the ordinary laws of nature; and it is a most important exercise of reason, to decide on this evidence what it would be scepticism to reject, or credulity to admit.

In most subjects we rest partly on facts, partly on testimony; hence, both must be inquired into, and the result of each investigation will influence our conclusion from the other. We must, however, take great care not to allow this influence too much weight. For instance, the facts alleged may be proved false, and yet the character of the witness, on whose authority they rest, may remain unimpeached. Thus Pascal testified to the truth of the miracles of Port-Royal, which have since been proved completely false; but we cannot therefore doubt the honesty of Pascal, nor the force of his genius, when unclouded by religious superstition. In the same manner conclusions may be proved utterly absurd, without invalidating the truth of the facts on which they rest, because the facts themselves may have been correctly observed, though the observer's mind was incapable of reasoning justly upon them. The changes of the seasons, and the alternations of day and night, were matters of daily correct observation, while the theories built on them were wholly untenable; so it is in many less obvious instances, when we are too apt to throw a subject aside altogether, because some speculation concerning it has been proved erroneous, as, for example, in some questions of political economy, and in the researches upon mesmerism.

In examining writings, internal evidence is sometimes the strongest we can obtain. This is found in the general tone of a work, in the agreement of its several parts with each other, in the general character of truth which pervades it, the impressions of which we gain from numerous small particulars that seem to attest the writer's fairness and intentional accuracy. A large portion of the argument in Paley's "Hora Paulina" depends on this kind of evidence, and the moral evidence of Christianity, which, as we have said, bears so much weight in itself as to be almost independent of external testimony, is founded in great measure on an appeal to the same principles. A fact cannot, indeed, be directly proved upon such evidence, but we acquire a moral certainty of its truth, which is equivalent in the mind to positive proof. Facts of a supernatural kind may rest upon testimony so strong that we acquire a moral certainty of their truth, because it would seem more impossible that such testimony should be false than that the fact should actually have occurred. Circumstantial evidence, which carries so much weight in our courts of law, produces, in the same manner, moral certainty, though direct proof cannot be obtained; a number of facts are verified, and, in the absence of

See chap. v., sec. 2, and chap. 14, on "Evidences of Religion."

APPENDIX.

379 the conclusive fact which would constitute the direct proof, these are considered sufficiently correct premises to justify a verdict.

The young reader must remember that it is not only in judging such difficult points as we have instanced, that the rules we have pointed out require to be observed. They are applicable more or less strictly to every question on which we have to form a judgment. Whenever we are required to act on certain grounds, or to judge of the actions of others, to form an opinion on any of the numberless statements, public and private, which daily come before us, something of the same process must be gone through, to ascertain the truth or probability of the facts, or the accuracy of the inferences drawn from them. Well or ill, we all do this; we all carry on an operation we call reasoning, and are too apt to give the name of conclusions to our assumptions, or of convictions to our credulity; but the soundness of our judgments in such matters will depend on the care with which we have trained and exercised our reason. It cannot be too often repeated to the young, especially those of our sex, that accuracy of reason is not a bright weapon to be handled only on days of parade, or on occasions of pressing danger, but an instrument of daily use, and which, by that daily use, is best perfected against occasions of signal trial.

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