ARISTOTLE'S TREATISE ON RHETORIC, LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK, WITH COPIOUS NOTES. NEW EDITION, TO WHICH IS ADDED, AN ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC, BY THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMSBURY. ALSO ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS. LONDON: HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN. TO THE READER. In this third edition, the translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric has been again carefully compared with the Greek, and revised and corrected throughout. Numerous explanatory and illustrative notes have also been added; as well as a marginal analysis, which it is presumed will be found of much service to the reader. The famous Thomas Hobbes' Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, "containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his three books on that subject," and forming the best summary of this noble science, has been again reprinted from the scarce edition published at London in 1681. A body of Analytical Questions, for self-examination, has also been appended. With these improvements, the Editor confidently hopes that the present volume will be found to contain, not only the most faithful version of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, but the best helps for the due understanding and retaining the sense thereof. Oxford, November, 1846. 847 TIS. undue ap perly within the sphere of the art, but other points are merely adscititious. On the subject of enthymems, Neglect of however, which in point of fact is the very body of the Tioproof, these men say not a word; while on points foreign to the subject they busy themselves most mightily. Now the feeling of ill-will, pity, and anger, 4. Hence and the like emotions of the mind, appertain not to the peals to case, but refer to the judge; so that if, in regard to all the pasjudicial processes, matters were regulated as they now sions. are in some states, (and more particularly in such as are well constituted,) these spokesmen would not have a word to say. And every one [approves the regula- 5. tion], whether they think that the law should hold this language, or whether they avail themselves of the rule, and positively forbid to speak irrelevantly to the case; just as they do in the Areopagus, observing this usage properly enough. For it is not right that an orator should bias the judge by winning him on to anger, or pity, or jealousy; since it is equally absurd as though one were to make a ruler crooked which he is about to use 9. It is further evident that the 6. pleader's business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case; that it has, or has not happened. But as to the question whether it be important or trifling, just or whereas Aristotle designates by the word Tiotis, every thing which has a tendency to persuade the will. It is not, however, meant to be denied that proof (properly such) frequently has, and always ought to have, a tendency to persuade; but, at the same time, it would be too much to say that it is the only thing which is qualified to do so. Vide Mitchell's Aristoph. vol. i.; Pal. Diss. p. 72; ibid. p. 75. 8 For a similar use of the word diaßoλn, cf. Thucyd. lib. i. c. 127.—οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. 9 Κριτὴς τοῦ νόμου κάνων. Aristotle employs the same metaphor in his Ethics :-τοὺ γὰρ αορίστου, αόριστος καὶ ὁ κακών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς, ὁ μολύβδινος κανών πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κατ vwv. Lib. v. c. 10. See Lucretius, iv. 516.— Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima, * * * * Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc. |