The author sometimes takes upon himself the character of a Stoic; sometimes that of an Epicurean; or again, that of a Peripatetic. The object of this is to explain, with more semblance of authority, the different doctrines of each sect; and besides that, to show by what arguments those who differ from himself can each confute the other. When he puts off this mask, and appears in his own person of an Academic, he disputes against them all collectively. Hence he has been accused of broaching contradictory sentiments, from the occasions not having been carefully noted when he has set up an argument only to knock it down. It must be distinctly understood, if we mean to assist our own powers of reasoning, or in any way to profit by this branch of his writings, that when he treats any subject professedly, or gives a judgment on it deliberately, either in his own person or in that of an Academic, he is to be held responsible for all opinions there brought forward. In scenes where he does not introduce himself, he generally lets us know to which of the interlocutors he consigns the maintenance of the party he in his own mind espouses and that interlocutor is usually the principal speaker in the dialogue. Thus Crassus represents Cicero in the treatise De Oratore; Scipio, in that De Republica; Cato, in that De Senectute.

He seems to have thought with Socrates, that a minute and curious attention to natural philosophy, so as to make it an ultimate object of scientific investigation, is attended with little profit, and an inadequate employment further than as a relax

ation.

On the great subject, the immortality of the soul, and its separate existence after death, in a

state of happiness or misery, he probably carried the belief of the doctrine as far as a person unenlightened by revelation could push it. If he went no further than inference, and stopped at a point far short of what we consider as the proof, it was the misfortune of his age, not the fault of his mind. The opinion of the Stoics was, that the soul is a subtilised fiery substance, which survives the earthy particles of the body, and subsists for a long time after it but that it was not capable of resisting the expected final destruction of all things by the rage of its own element. Cicero, on the contrary, treated it as an unmixed and indivisible essence. If it could not be separated by any external force, he argued that it could not perish. All its All its powers and faculties he considered, both in their nature and extent, as favourable to the supposition of immortality. The principle of voluntary self-originating motion, memory, invention, wit, comprehension; all these seemed to him incompatible with the inertness of matter. He laid much stress also on the thirst of immortality so ardent in the best and the most elevated minds: he felt the destiny of man to be indicated, not by the coarse pleasures of the multitude, but by the sublime aspirations of nature's noblest master-pieces. The doctrine of God, providence, and immortality, was the basis of Cicero's religion, on which, as a measure of prudence, he professed to raise the superstructure of the Roman Dii Minorum Gentium: but the heaven of his secret breast was not peopled with such inhabitants. His opinions and conduct on the subject of augury, on which Appius dedicated a treatise to him, are worthy of remark. He did not altogether agree with the notions either of his

dedicator or of Marcellus. His belief was, that augury might possibly be first instituted on a persuasion of its divinity. The improvement of arts and learning in succeeding ages had exploded that opinion in all but the vulgar mind: but state-craft retained the establishment for the political purpose of influencing and overawing that vulgar mind; and Cicero himself was glad to be an augur, at the risk of laughing in the faces of his colleagues.

To return to his esoteric opinions. He considered the system of the world, as exposed to the view of man, to be the promulgation of God's law, the sensible announcement of his will to mankind. Hence we may collect his being, nature, and attributes, and in some degree ascertain the principles and motives on which he acts. By observing what he has done, we may learn what we ought to do `: by tracing the operations of divine reason, we may learn how to discipline our own. The imitation of God he makes to constitute the perfection of man. From the will of God manifested in his works, he derives the origin of all duty and moral obligation. The fitness and relation of things displayed throughout all creation, constitute the prototype of our propriety, consistency, and rationality. God is the inventor, propounder, and enactor of his own law. Whosoever will not obey it, throws off his allegiance, and renounces the nature of man. Though he escape the tortures of material punishment as commonly believed, Cicero thinks that conscience will be his severest tormentor. Nothing but the study of this law, he says, can teach us this important lesson prescribed by the Pythian oracle, to know ourselves. He explains this pithy precept

in detail; and makes its fulfilment to consist in the knowledge of our own nature and rank in the general system; the relation we bear to other things; and the purposes for which we were sent into the world. When a man has carefully observed the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the things in them; has scrutinised their origin, their apparent tendency, and their probable end; has separated the divine and eternal from the perishable: when he has almost found his way into the divine presence, and feels himself an unconfined citizen of the world: with such enlarged prospects, then will he begin to know himself, and to despise what the vulgar esteem most glorious. On these principles as laid down in his writings did Cicero build his religion and morality. His treatise on Government and Laws illustrated, explained, and enlarged them. His Book of Offices made the scheme complete.

The elder Pliny bears testimony to the merit of these works:-"Scito enim conferentem auctores me deprehendisse a juratissimis et proximis veteres transcriptos ad verbum, neque nominatos: non illa Virgiliana virtute, ut certarent; non Ciceroniana simplicitate, qui in libros de Republica, Platonis se Comitem' profitetur in Consolatione filiæ, Crantorem, inquit, sequor:' item Panætium de Officiis:' quæ volumina ejus ediscenda, non modo in manibus quotidie habenda,

nosti."

The treatise De Republica, the greatest of these works, was lost, with the exception of a few fragments.* He had here given so full and fair a

* Some further portions have been recently recovered.

transcript of his inward mind, that he tells Atticus, those six books are so many hostages given to his country for his good behaviour. Were he ever to go backward from his integrity, he could never again dare to open those volumes.

Is it to be inferred, that these great discoveries of a heathen lessen the necessity of revelation? Cicero is a standing proof of the direct contrary. St. Paul says that there is a law taught by nature, and written on the hearts of the Gentiles, to guide them through their self-regretted ignorance and darkness, till a more perfect revelation of the divine will should be vouchsafed. The scheme professed by Cicero was unquestionably the most perfect ever divulged to the heathen world: the greatest effort of unassisted nature towards attaining the supreme good of which it is capable, and the proper end of created beings.

Erasmus could not help exclaiming, that the mind from which such sublime truths proceeded, must have been under the influence of something more than natural suggestions. Yet these glorious sentiments were rather the visions of his hope, than the convictions of his reason. These were the ebullitions of his enthusiasm: other passages of his works furnish us with the misgivings of his melancholy moments, the diffidence of his timid calculations, the doubts which the Sceptic too successfully proposed to the Academic. Insulated quotations will establish in the mind of a reader not thoroughly acquainted with his works, a disbelief in the immortality of the soul, a negative on a future state of rewards and punishments.

In his political capacity he was invariably the friend of peace and liberty. He was constantly