HERMATHENA.

ARISTOTLE'S PARVA NATURALIA.'

De Sensu.

RISTOTLE states very clearly, at the beginning of the

De Anima, his reason for undertaking the investigation of ψυχή, namely, that δοκεῖ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν. ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων (402, 4-6). And in Book II. iv. (415, 7-20) he says fuxʼn is not only ἀρχή, but αἰτία, τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος, an assertion which he there explains and confirms in detail. vxí being the one common attribute of all the forms which constitute organic nature-the meaning of rǹv þúow above-it seemed to him that the study which he was about to make of all living forms should commence with a tract περὶ ψυχῆς. ψυχή was for him the principle of life as well as of mind. Accordingly, his work was intended to cover the whole ground now divided between Biology, Physiology, and Psychology. As was to be expected, this dual view of uxí, as principle of life (vegetable or animal), and as principle of mind in all its manifestations, proved fatal to his attempt at a systematic treatment of his subject. From the outset

VOL. IX.

B

of the De Anima a tendency may be observed on his part to pursue now one, now the other, of two more and more divergent lines, the first leading him to Metaphysics, the second to Physiology. For a while he struggles against this tendency, but in the end yields, more or less completely, to the metaphysical bias. In De An. III. we find him largely engaged, and with all the fervour of a First Philosopher,' in speculating on the subject of a 'vovç which thinks itself' the crowning conception of his Metaphysics. Having, in the De Anima, dwelt with preponderating interest on the mental side of fux, he declares (De Sensu, ad. init.) that, while the conclusions there attained must be allowed to stand, he will now occupy himself solely, or chiefly, with its physical side. Hitherto, although the functions of body in psychical experience were continually referred to, still, on the whole, the interest of the discussion was made to turn on such questions as-of what activities, if any, is ux, apart altogether from oua, capable? In the De Sensu and following tracts all this is changed. Aristotle announces his intention of henceforth discussing only rà κοινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα. Thus he makes Psychology a stage in the direction of Biology or Physiology. Accordingly several of the little works which make up the Parva Naturalia are (as far as the writer's intention goes) contributions to empirical psychology, the essential mark of which is that it treats mind as given in experience equally with body; in other words, treats only of the phenomena of mind-of the processes and events of sensation or reflection, in which experience or knowledge is progressively acquired by the individual or the species. Important though these tracts are, not only to the philologist, but to the psychologist, they have not in modern times been much studied. The text is very unsettled, and the interpretation presents many difficulties. In this paper

ψυχή,

I shall confine myself to the De Sensu, with Alexander's Commentary thereon.

Thurot's splendid edition of Alexander's Commentary on Aristotle's De Sensu is an indispensable auxiliary in any exhaustive study of the De Sensu itself. I shall therefore presume that this edition is familiar to my readers, and forbear from offering any further observations on it, save those arising in connexion with Aristotle's text. In an appendix to his edition Thurot gives a list of passages in which Alexander's Commentary is useful for the rectification of the text of the De Sensu. To this part of Thurot's work I shall most often have occasion to refer.

The title of the tract, as given by Bekker, is-Пɛpì αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν. In three MSS. αἰσθήσεων is found for αἰσθήσεως. Thurot says that Alexander read αἰσθήσεων. The words of Alexander (p. 6, line 12 seqq., Thurot's Ed.)

are:

Λεγὼν δὲ περὶ αἰσθητηρίων τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, περὶ αἰσθή σεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἐπέγραψεν αὐτό, ὡς καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων λόγου εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων συντελοῦντος θεωρίαν (κοινὴ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος), ἢ αἰσθήσεων ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίων (αἰσθήσεις γὰρ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καλοῦσιν).

Here Alexander cites the title as Bekker prints it. Thurot's assertion that alo0nows, in line 12, is corrupt, seems quite arbitrary. He gives no reason for it, but seems to think it manifest from the words in which Alexander attempts to account for the title. Alexander himself is silent about any variation in the text of his authorities as to the title of the tract. He has already (lines 3-11) declared his opinion that the De Sensu treats of the αισθητήρια καὶ alooŋrá, and that the title conveys this. All that he still deems needful to be explained is why Aristotle, in this title, uses αἰσθήσεως rather than αἰσθητηρίων. In answer to this he makes the two suggestions above quoted,

viz. (a) that the discussion of the air0nrúpia will contribute to complete the theory of the αισθήσεις, αἴσθησις being a function of body and soul in common, and the aio@nrýρia being bodily organs; in which case the tract would be implicitly, or virtually, a treatise Tepi aio@nows. The alternative suggestion (b) is that alo@hotwv is here, in accordance with a common practice, used by Aristotle for aloonTnpiwv. This (Thurot must think) proves that Alexander read αἰσθήσεων: yet αἰσθήσεων may be interpreted as a quite general expression = 'The several aio@nous being spoken of instead of their several aio@nrúpia,' an interpretation which might as well have been given by Alexander for αἰσθήσεως as for αἰσθήσεων. Indeed the fact that there is a varia lectio alonτnpíov in three MSS. of Alexander, referred to by Thurot, seems to make it doubtful whether both these last words, αἰσθήσεων and αἰσθητηρίων, should not be genitives singular instead of genitives plural. The genuine title appears to be that printed by Bekker. It is in keeping with the actual plan of the De Sensu. For this the interpretation of aio@noews as = αἰσθητηρίων, given by Alexander, is too narrow. It would suit the opening chapters 2-5, but breaks down as applied to chapters 6 and 7 (in which the theory of alonos, given in De Anima, seems to be intentionally supplemented), and in which the subject is no longer τὰ αἰσθητήρια, but ἡ αἴσθησιςthe faculty of sense-perception. Alexander, however, is so convinced that Aristotle here only intends to treat of the aio0nrúpia and aloŋrá, that on page 15, line 3 (Thurot's Ed.), he refers to the tract De Sensu as τὸν περὶ αἰσθητηρίων τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν λόγον. No one that I am aware of has, however, at least in recent times, argued from this, that Alexander had before him a variant αἰσθητηρίων for alonows in the title of the work. He did not perceive the special propriety of aio@noews, including, as it does,

1 Cf. Arist. De Mem, ad init.