The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis
Columbia University Press, 1 ott 2010 - 304 pagine
The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective.
In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity.
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Ch 2 Incumbent Governments and the Politics of Crisis Management
Ch 3 Crisis Political Change and Economic Reform
Ch 4 The Politics of Financial and Corporate Restructuring
Safety Nets and Recrafting the Social Contract
A New Asian Miracle
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administrative Anwar Asia ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS assets authoritarian banking sector bankruptcy billion bumiputra business-government relations capital central bank chaebol chapter Chinese Chuan CLOB coalition controls corporate governance corporate restructuring corruption countries country’s crises CRISIS MANAGEMENT Danaharta debt democracies democratic Development Eastern Economic Review ECONOMIC REFORM effects efforts elections electoral finance companies financial and corporate financial institutions financial sector firms fiscal foreign funds Golkar government’s groups growth Habibie Hanbo IBRA important incentives increase INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS Indonesia industrial initial interest investment investors issues Jomo Kim Dae Jung Kim Young Kim Young Sam labor legislative liberalization Mahathir Malaysia ment moral hazard National opposition particularly party percent Philippines POLITICAL CHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMY president private sector problems recapitalization region regulatory Renong ringgit risk role rule share social contract South Korea state-owned strategy substantial Suharto Table Thai Thailand tion transparency UMNO urban vulnerable World Bank