1807. 25. tive blame each party. whether, in this great controversy, England or France was CHAP. the real aggressor. And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found that there were faults Comparaon both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant viola- attaching to tion of the law of nations was committed by Napoleon; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British Islands in a state of blockade—a proceeding similar to what it would have been had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strassburg or Magdeburg. Most certainly also the resolution of the French Emperor to reduce England by means of a Continental System, had been formed long before the proclaiming the blockade of the French coasts in April 1806, by Mr Fox; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the British historian must lament that the government of this country had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only, by decreeing, in May 1806, the blockade of the whole French coasts of the Channel. True, this was something more than a mere paper blockade; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence; true, it was so effective that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their batteries. Still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war, and one which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the retaliatory measures which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account, as the French Emperor. In regard to the policy of the Orders in Council, there 1807. CHAP. affects alike its opponent and neutral states, and they L. submit without resistance to this novel species of hostility, either from a feeling of terror or a desire of profit, they necessarily come under obligation to be equally passive in regard to the measures of retaliation which the party so assailed may think it necessary to adopt. If they act otherwise, they lose the character of neutrality, and become the disguised, but often the most effective and the most valuable, allies of the innovating belligerent. 24. was the But was the Berlin decree the origin of the commercial Which party warfare? or was it merely, as Napoleon and the French aggressor? writers assert, a retaliation upon England, by the only means at the disposal of the French Emperor, for the new and illegal species of warfare which, in the pride of irresistible maritime strength, its government had thought fit to adopt? That is the point upon which the whole question-so far as the legality of the measures in question is concerned-really depends; and yet, though put prominently forward by Napoleon, it was scarcely touched on by either party in the British parliament. Nor is it difficult to see to what cause this extraordinary circumstance was owing. Both the great parties which divide that assembly were desirous of avoiding that question. The Whigs did so because the measure complained of by Napoleon, and on which the Berlin decree was justified by the French government, had been mainly adopted by Mr Fox, and subsequently extended by Lord Howick ; the Tories, because they were unwilling to cast any doubt on the exercise of maritime powers, in their opinion of essential importance to this country, and which gave them the great advantage of having their political adversaries necessarily compelled to support the general principle on which the measures in question had been founded. History, however, must disregard all these temporary considerations, and in good faith approach the question, CHAP. 1807. 25. tive blame each party. whether, in this great controversy, England or France was the real aggressor. And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found that there were faults Compara on both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant viola- attaching to tion of the law of nations was committed by Napoleon; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British Islands in a state of blockade-a proceeding similar to what it would have been had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strassburg or Magdeburg. Most certainly also the resolution of the French Emperor to reduce England by means of a Continental System, had been formed long before the proclaiming the blockade of the French coasts in April 1806, by Mr Fox; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the British historian must lament that the government of this country had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only, by decreeing, in May 1806, the blockade of the whole French coasts of the Channel. True, this was something more than a mere paper blockade; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence; true, it was so effective that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their batteries. Still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war, and one which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the retaliatory measures which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account, as the French Emperor. In regard to the policy of the Orders in Council, there 1807. 26. on the policy in Council. CHAP. is perhaps less difficulty in forming a decided opinion. L. It was foretold at the time, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that, in the mutual attempt Reflections to starve each other out, the manufacturing state, the of the Orders commercial emporium, would of necessity be more exposed to suffering than the widespread circle of nations with whom she carried on mercantile transactions; on the same principle on which a besieged town must, in the end, be always reduced by the concentric fire of a skilful assailant. The ruin and suffering on the one side is accumulated on a single spot, or within a narrow compass; on the other, it is spread over an extensive surface. The sum-total of distress may be, and probably will be, equal on both sides but how wide the difference between the garrison which sustains it all on a single breach, or in a few hospitals, and the army without, which repairs its losses by the resources of a great empire! Sound policy, therefore, recommended, on the commencement of this novel and dangerous species of hostility, the adoption of a system on the part of Great Britain which should bind more closely the cords which united her to the few remaining neutrals of the world; and which, by opening up new markets for her produce in states beyond the reach of the French Emperor, might enable her to bid defiance to the accumulated hostility of all the nations who were subject to his control. The very reverse of all this was the consequence of the Orders in Council, and thence the chief part of the national suffering in Great Britain during the latter years of the war. It is worthy of observation that the able argument of Lords Grenville and Howick on the inexpedience of the Orders in Council, as tending to exclude British industry out of the markets opened by the activity and skill of neutral traders, received no sort of answer on the part of administration. Nor, indeed, could it do so; for it was obvious that any satisfactory reply was impossible. This important subject, however, will more properly come under L. 1807. consideration in a subsequent volume, when the practical CHAP. operation of the Continental System and the Orders in Council for several years is to be developed; and the able arguments on the part of the English Opposition are recounted, which, together with the multiplied complaints of the neutral powers, and the abandonment of the Continental System by Napoleon, at length brought about their repeal. 27. Bark Bill 1808. There is, however, one measure on the part of the British government connected with commercial transactions, Jesuit's on which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be in England. hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr Perceval, April 7, and which passed both houses of parliament,* for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took with it a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance on the part of the enemy, no measures on their side, how violent soever, should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war, not on the French Emperor, but on the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Salvation had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed,+ which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilised warfare. But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the 1 Parl. Deb. dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an over-1168-70. whelming, and in some instances mistaken feeling of * In the Lords, by a majority of 110 to 44; in the Commons, by 92 to 29. Parl. Deb. x. 1170 and 1325. + Ante, Chap. XVI. § 56, note. VOL. VIII. K 1323, |