LI. 1807. 22. the islands Aug. 25. CHAP. isles of Rugen and Danholm, which not only completely blockaded the harbour, but neutralised all the advantages otherwise consequent on the possession of this extensive Capture of fortress. Marshal Brune showed great activity in the of Danholm measures adopted to root them out of this their last and Rugen. stronghold on the German shore. Three days after the capitulation, two hundred boats and small craft were assembled, chiefly by means of land carriage, in the harbour of Stralsund, with which, on the night of the 25th, a descent was effected on the isle of Danholm, which fell into the hands of the French, with twenty pieces of cannon, and its little garrison of a hundred and eighty men. Still the isle of Rugen, with the bulk of the Swedish forces, remained in the possession of the King; but the troops, wearied of a fruitless contest which they deemed foreign to the real interests of the monarchy, and strongly impressed with the idea that the military excitement of their sovereign bordered on insanity, murmured so loudly against the further continuance of the contest that he was obliged to yield. A convention was concluded on the 7th September, by which the island was to be given up to the French troops, and the King, with the whole garrison and fleet, was to withdraw to the Swedish shore. This capitulation relieved Napoleon from all anxiety in the North of Germany, and put the finishing stroke to the Continental war in that part of the world; but it was far from answering the expectations of the French Emperor, who had calculated on the capture of the Swedish king, or at least the whole of his garrison; 161, 165. and it was the occasion of Marshal Brune falling into a disgrace from which he never afterwards was able to recover.1 Sept. 7. 1 Jom. ii. 456, 457. Dum. xix. Thiers, viii. 10, 14. 23. Reasons which led to While the last flames of the Continental war were thus expiring around the walls of Stralsund, a blow of the the Copen- highest importance to the future prospects of the marihagen expe- time contest was struck by the vigour and decision of the British cabinet. Notwithstanding all the precautions LI. 1807. Ante, ch. taken by the two Emperors, in their negotiations at Tilsit, CHAP. to bury their designs in profound secresy, the English government were possessed of a golden key which laid open their most confidential communications. They were made aware of the determination of the imperial despots to seize the fleets of Denmark and Portugal, not only before the design was reduced to a regular treaty, but almost as soon as it was formed; and the vast forces at the disposal of the French Emperor left no room for doubt that he possessed ample means to carry his intentions into effect. Not a moment was to be lost; for in the final treaty, as already noticed,' the 1st November was fixed xlvi. § 79. as the period when the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon were to be summoned to place their fleets at the disposal of the combined powers, and enter into the general confederacy against Great Britain. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry, when Napoleon directed Talleyrand to write to the Danish government that the time had now arrived when they must take a decided part; that the cause of France was their own, and that of all neutral powers-especially the least powerful, hitherto so cruelly tyrannised over by the British power and he made offer of a powerful French force, and a numerous train of artillery, to enable them to make head against the English fleet. At the same time the French forces, under Bernadotte and Davoust, began to defile in such numbers towards Holstein, and assumed so menacing a position, that it was evident that Denmark would speedily lose her whole continental possessions, if she resisted the demands of the combined Emperors. Nor did there appear any reason to believe that the cabinet of Copenhagen would incur any such hazard to maintain their neutrality. On the contrary, there were the strongest 2 Ann. Reg. grounds for concluding that they would readily embrace 1807, 249. so favourable an opportunity of contending, with the aid x. 402. of such powerful allies, for those maritime changes which 16. had long constituted the ruling objects of their ambition." Parl. Deb. Thiers, viii. CHAP. 1807. 24. Uniform hostility of Denmark to Great Britain. In 1780, they had been the first to join the Northern Confederacy against England and proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality; in 1801, they had exposed themselves for the same object, in the front rank, to the cannon of Nelson and all the terrors of the English navy. More lately, their conduct had savoured still more strongly of aversion to the English and partiality for the French alliance. The Berlin decree of 21st November, which inflicted so unexampled and fatal a wound on neutral commerce, had drawn forth no complaints from the Danish government; but no sooner was the British Order in Council of 7th January issued, which provided only a mild, and, as it proved, ineffectual measure of retaliation, by putting a stop to the coasting trade of neutrals from one French harbour to another, than the 1 March 17, Danish minister made loud complaints, which drew forth c. 50,$ 19, the able and unanswerable reply from Lord Howick, Deb. x. 402. which has already been quoted. No remonstrances had 1807. Ante, and Parl. been made by the Danish government against the threatening accumulation of forces on the frontier of Holstein; no advances to secure aid, in the peril which was evidently approaching, from the British or Swedish cabinets. On the contrary, although Napoleon had, previous to the battle of Friedland, made proposals to Gustavus, with a view to detach him from the Russian alliance, and actually offered, as an inducement, to wrest the kingdom of Norway from the Danish crown, and annex it to that of Sweden, yet even the generous refusal of this offer by that upright monarch, accompanied by its instant communication to the 1807, 249, cabinet of Copenhagen, had made no alteration in their Deb. x. 402, line of policy, and they declined all offers of assistance ii. 450, 451. against a power which had manifested so little scruple at entertaining the project of partitioning their dominions.2 In these circumstances the cabinet of Great Britain Resolution had a most serious duty to perform. They were menaced tish cabinet, with an attack from the combined navies of Europe, amounting to one hundred and eighty sail of the line; 2 Ann. Reg. 255. Parl. 407. Jom. 25. of the Bri LI. 1807. and of that immense force they were well aware that the CHAP. Baltic fleet would form the right wing. No time was to be lost; every hour was precious: in a few days an overwhelming French force would, to all appearance, be assembled on the shores of the Great Belt; and, if ferried over to Zealand, might enable the Danish government securely to comply with the requisition of the combined Emperors, and bid defiance to all the efforts of Great Britain. In these circumstances they took a resolution similar to that adopted by Frederick the Great in regard to Saxony, when he received authentic intelligence of the accession or probable accession of Saxony to the league of Russia and Austria against his existence; and resolved, by a vigorous stroke, not only to deprive the enemy of the prize he was so soon to seize, but to convert its ii. 450, 451. resources to their own defence.1 1 Ann. Reg. 1807, 255, 257. Jom. 26. ture of the expedition. Accidental circumstances gave the British government, contrary to the usual case with an insular power, the Equipment and deparmeans both with respect to land and sea forces of instantly acting on this vigorous resolution. The first division of the expedition which had been so long in preparation to aid the Allies on the shores of the Baltic was already in the isle of Rugen, and the remainder was in such a state of forwardness as to be ready to embark at a few days' notice. A large naval force was also assembled, to act as occasion might require, and this was speedily added to with extraordinary expedition. Such was the activity * General Jomini has given the following summary of the design of Napoleon and Alexander after the treaty of Tilsit to unite all the navies of Europe against England, and of the probable forces at their disposal. Speaking in the person of the French Emperor, he says, "After Russia had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her example; Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope alone required to be gained over, for we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our arms. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole maritime forces of the Continent were to be employed against her, and they could muster one hundred and eighty sail of the line. In a few years this force could be raised to two hundred and fifty. With the aid of such a fleet, and my immense flotilla, it was by no means impossible to lead a European army to London. One hundred ships of the line employed against her colonies in the two hemispheres, would have sufficed to draw off a large LI. 1807. CHAP. displayed by the new ministers, that in the end of July twenty-seven ships of the line, having on board twenty thousand land troops, set sail from the British harbours, besides other smaller vessels, amounting in all to ninety pendants, and stretched across the German Ocean for the shores of Denmark. Had this great expedition been prepared, as it might have been, two months earlier, by the preceding administration, it would, to all appearance, have averted the disaster of Friedland, determined the hesitation of Austria, and driven Napoleon to a disastrous retreat, for which he was already making preparations, to the Rhine. As matters now stood, it had a subordinate but still a very important duty to perform. They arrived off the Danish coast on the 3d August, and immediately stationed such a force under Commodore Keats, in the Great Belt, as effectually cut off all communication between the island of Zealand and the adja1 Ann. Reg. cent isles, or shores of Jutland. At the same time the Lord Cath- troops from Stralsund, ten thousand strong, arrived, under cart's Des Lord Cathcart, who immediately took the command of the whole expedition; and the formidable armament, 682. Thiers, spreading their sails before a favourable wind, passed the Sound, and cast anchor in appalling strength before the harbour of Copenhagen.1 Aug. 3. 1807, 257. patch, Aug. 14, 1807. Ibid. 681, viii. 187, 189. It was no part, however, of the design of the British government to precipitate the country into hostilities; on the contrary, they were on many accounts most desi portion of the British navy; while eighty more, assembled in the Channel, would have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outraged rights of nations. Such was at bottom my plan, which only failed of success from the faults committed in the Spanish war."—JOMINI, Vie de Napoléon, ii. 449. Vessels. |