CHAP. boats, besides two sail of the line and three frigates which had been destroyed as not worth the removal. LI. 1807. 31. tion excited by this ex pedition. The Copenhagen expedition excited a prodigious sensaGreat sensa- tion throughout Europe; and as it was a mortal stroke in Europe levelled at a neutral power, without any previous declaration of war, or ground for hostility then ascertained, it was generally condemned as an uncalled for and unjustifiable violation of the law of nations. "Blood and fire," said Napoleon, "have made the English masters of Copenhagen;" and these expressions were not only reechoed over all the Continent by all that great portion of the public press which was directly subjected to his control, but met with a responsive voice in those nations who, chagrined with reason at the refusal of the British government to lend assistance in men or money for the decisive struggle on the banks of the Vistula, were not sorry of this opportunity of giving vent, apparently on very sufficient grounds, to their displeasure. The Russians were loud in their condemnation of the English administration. The Emperor, with that profound dissimulation which formed so remarkable a feature in his character, affected to be deeply afflicted by the catastrophe, though none knew so well the reality of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit which had rendered it necessary. Even their long-established national rivalry with the Danes could scarcely induce the Swedes to receive with satisfaction the intelligence of so serious an invasion of neutral rights. Thus, on all sides and in all countries, a general cry of indignation burst forth against this successful 422, 423, enterprise; and the old jealousy at the maritime power of England revived with such vehemence, as for a time to extinguish all sense of the more pressing dangers arising from the military power of France.1 1 Hard. x. 42, 45. Bign. vi. Parl. Deb. x. 211. Thiers, viii. 124, 127. 32. But whatever might be at first the general impression Justification of Europe as to the Copenhagen expedition immediately after it occurred, Napoleon was not long of affording it a complete vindication. It has been already mentioned of it soon Napoleon. LI. 1807. that it was stipulated in the treaty of Tilsit that, in the CHAP. event of England declining the proffered mediation of Russia, the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon should be summoned to join the Continental League, and unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia.* On the 12th August, a note was transmitted to the French Aug. 12. minister at Lisbon, peremptorily requiring that the Portuguese fleet should co-operate with the French and Danish in the maritime war, and that the persons and property of all Englishmen in Portugal should be forthwith seized. And it soon after appeared, that on the same day similar orders had been transmitted to the cabinet of Copenhagen. In a public assembly of all the ambassadors of Europe at the Tuileries, the Emperor Aug. 16. Napoleon demanded of the Portuguese ambassador whether he had transmitted to the court of Lisbon his orders to join their fleet to the general maritime confederacy against England, and confiscate all English property within their dominions? And having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish ambassador, and asked him, whether he had done the same? The note addressed to the Portuguese government was immediately communicated by its ministers to the British cabinet that to the Danish was concealed, and its existence even denied. Thus, at the very time that the English expedition was, unknown to France, approaching the Danish shores,+ the diplomatic papers and public lesley's words of Napoleon were affording decisive evidence of his Statement. preconceived designs against the Danish fleet, while the x. 345, conduct of their government was equally characteristic of Hawkesan inclination to slide, without opposition, into the x. 371. required hostility against this country.1 But these diplomatic communications, little understood or attended to at the time by the bulk of the people, pro *Ante, Chap. XLVI., § 79. + The British expedition landed at Copenhagen on the 16th August, the very day when Napoleon put this question to the Portuguese minister.-See ante, Chap. LI., § 28. VOL. VIII. R 1 Lord Wel Parl. Deb. and Lord bury's, Ibid. 1807. 33. General feeling in CHAP. duced no general impression in England; and a very LI. painful division of opinion existed for a considerable time, both as to the lawfulness of the expedition, and the justice of retaining the prizes which had been made. England on Whatever violence might have been meditated by the the subject. French Emperor, it was very generally said, it would have been better to have suffered him to perpetrate it, and then made open war on his vassals, than to forestall his iniquity in this manner by its imitation. This feeling was as creditable to the public mind, and the severe principles of morality which religious faith and longestablished habits of freedom had produced in Great Britain, as the conception of the measure itself was honourable to the government. It was a memorable thing to see the people of England repudiate a triumph won, as it was thought, by injustice; disregard security purchased by the blood of the innocent; and look with shame on the proudest trophy of maritime conquest ever yet brought to a European harbour, so long as a doubt existed as to the justice of the means by which it had been acquired. Contrasting this honourable feeling with the utter confusion of all moral principle which in France resulted from the Revolution, and the universal application to public measures of no other test than success, it is impossible to deny that the religious feelings and the tempered balance of power which in England both saved the country from a disastrous convulsion, and by restraining the excesses of freedom, preserved its existence, were equally favourable to the maintenance of that high standard of morality which, in nations as well as individuals, constitutes the only secure basis of durable prosperity. There is no example in modern times of such an armament being at once made prize and brought home by any power. At Trafalgar, only four ships of the nineteen taken were brought to the British harbours; at La Hogue, none of the prizes were saved, out of eighteen taken: and at Toulon, in 1793, no more than three sail of the line and three frigates were brought away out of the vast fleet there committed to the flames. See SMOLLETT's History, ii. 151; and ante, Chap. XIII., § 113. The Copenhagen expedition, as might have been expected, led to vehement debates in both houses of parliament, which, though now of comparatively little importance, as the publication of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit has completely justified the measure, are of historical value, as indicating the opinions entertained, and the arguments advanced at the time in the country, on a subject of such vital importance to the honour and security of the empire. CHAP. LI. 1807. 34. in parlia 1- ment against the Copen If dition. On the part of the Opposition, it was strongly urged by Mr Granville Sharpe, Mr Ponsonby, and Lord Erskine Arguments "The ground stated in the King's speech for the Copenhagen expedition was, that the government were in pos- hagen expesession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which it was stipulated that the Danish fleet should be employed against this country. If so, why are they not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet for such a purpose on the first summons. this is really the case, on what grounds is the charge supported? True, the ships of Copenhagen were in a certain degree of preparation, but not more so than they have been for the last half century. Was it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by French troops? If history be consulted, it will be found that no considerable armament has crossed the Great Belt on the ice for a hundred and fifty years, in the face of an allied British and Swedish naval force. Such an attempt would never have been thought of, so that the Danes had no reason to tremble for their capital. When the Copenhagen expedition set sail, there were three hundred and fifty Danish ships in British harbours, with cargoes worth two millions; and when the British consul applied to the Chamber of Commerce, at the Danish capital, he received for answer, that LI. CHAP. there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as no such circumstances existed as were likely to disturb the 1807. neutrality of Denmark. The plea, therefore, of impending danger, to justify so flagrant a breach of neutral rights, has not even for its basis the essential ground of correctness, in point of fact. 35. against its "The vindication of this step, supposing that some Argument danger had been shown to have existed, must rest upon necessity. its necessity; for the first principles of justice demonstrate, and the concurring testimony of all writers on the law of nations has established, that one belligerent could not be justified in taking its property from a neutral state, unless it is clearly established that its enemy meant and was able to take possession of it, and apply it to the purposes of its hostility. How, then, is it to be justified, when every appearance is against the opinion that the enemy had either the inclination or the power to convert the Danish navy into an instrument for our destruction? But this is not all: supposing it proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that Buonaparte intended to have seized the Copenhagen fleet, and had a force at his command adequate to that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that our enemy was meditating a similar spoliation, and that it was best to be beforehand with him? Is it not a principle of morality applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not authorise another; and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation from the laws and usages of war? How much more, therefore, is an illegal act indefencible, committed not in retaliation for, but in anticipation of, a similar unjustifiable stretch on the enemy's part! Better, far better, that Buonaparte should have carried his alleged designs into full effect, and united the Danish navy to his own, than that we should have stained our national character by an act, indefencible by those who were to profit, execrable in the estimation of those who were to suffer by it. |