LI. 1807. 1 Parl. Deb. 310, 342, 43. article of the treaty of Tilsit re garding the afterwards CHAP. and rightly proposed by the English government. The expedition had been originally destined for co-operation with the Russians and Prussians; but upon the peace of Tilsit, with a promptitude and energy worthy of the highest commendation, ministers at once gave it a different destination; and though this bold step may now be unanimously blamed on the Continent by writers who take their opinions on every subject from the beck of one or other of the imperial despots who rule its empires, it will one day be applauded by an impartial posterity x. 267, 287, as the salvation of the British empire. Upon a divi350, 383. sion, both Houses supported ministers: the Commons by a majority of 253 to 108; the Peers by one of 105 to 48.1 The great circumstance which long suggested a painful The secret doubt as to the justice of the Copenhagen expedition, was the non-production of the alleged clauses in the secret treaty of Tilsit, of which ministers asserted they were in possession, which provided for the seizure of the fleet produced. by France and Russia. Notwithstanding all the taunts with which they were assailed on this subject, they for long withheld their production from the public, and it came in consequence to be seriously doubted whether such an article really existed until at length, in 1817, when the reasons for withholding it had ceased by the death of the persons by whom it had been revealed, the decisive article was publicly brought forward in parliament. Thus had the British Cabinet the merit of having at once early discovered, and instantly acted upon, the hidden designs of the enemy; paralysed, by the vigour of their measures, the formidable naval force which was preparing against them in the north; and afterwards, for a long course of years, generously borne the whole load Parl. Deb. of opprobrium with which they were assailed, rather than,2 by a premature publication of the secret information they xlvi. § 79. had received, endanger the persons by whom it had been transmitted.* See the Article, *The writers on the law of nations are clear that in such circumstances as LI. 1807. mediation of Aug. 29. The negotiations contemplated by the treaty of Tilsit CHAP. were not long of being set on foot. Early in August, the cabinet of St Petersburg tendered their good offices to that 44. of London with a view to the conclusion of a general peace. Ineffectual To this Mr Canning answered, that Great Britain was Russia. perfectly willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desir- Aug. 5. able an object; and required in return a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as the best pledge of the friendly and pacific intentions of his imperial majesty. Baron Budberg, on the part of Alexander, eluded this demand; and instead, entered into a Sept. 2. statement of many grievances of Russia against this country, some of which, especially the want of co-operation when the contest was quivering in the balance on the Vistula, were too well founded. Matters were in this dubious state when intelligence arrived of the landing of the British forces in Zealand, and the demand made for the delivery, in deposit, of the Danish fleet. From the outset, the cabinet of St Petersburg manifested the utmost disquietude at this intelligence, and loudly protested against it as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. In reply, the British ambassador explicitly stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the destined co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the the Danish fleet was here placed, its seizure was perfectly justifiable. "I may," says Grotius, "without considering whether it is merited or not, take possession of that which belongs to another, if I have reason to fear any evil from his holding it; but I cannot make myself master or proprietor of it, the property having nothing to do with the end which I propose. I can only keep possession of the thing seized till my safety is sufficiently provided for.”—GROTIUS, b. iii. c. 1. § 2.—This was precisely what the English government proposed to Denmark. Napoleon felt the Copenhagen blow most keenly, the more so that it was achieved by a vigour and decision in the English councils to which they had Napoleon's long been strangers, and which, in that instance, even surpassed his own secret opi-, nion regardpromptitude. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouché, "was ing the the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of Copenhagen expedition. which the navy of Denmark was to have been put at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoleon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous coup-de-main was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."-Mémoires de Fouché, ii. 37. LI. 1807. CHAP. British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion, by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations, and of the grounds on which France was willing to treat, and which appeared to the cabinet of St Petersburg so reasonable, that they gave them the additional weight of their interposition. The Russian cabinet, however, both when Baron Budberg had the direction of its foreign affairs, and after he was succeeded, early in September, by Count Romanzoff, constantly eluded this demand; and the intelligence of the capture of the Danish fleet gave them a plausible pretext for breaking off the negotiation, without complying with so inconvenient a requisition.* Alexander, however, in his confidential interviews with Savary and Romanzoff, openly admitted that he had been surprised by the vigour of the British cabinet; that he had calculated upon being able to postpone his declaration of war against England 1 Parl. Deb. till December, when the Baltic would be closed by ice Sav. iii. against their fleets; but that, if the French Emperor viii. 215. insisted on it, he was ready immediately to declare war.1t Sept. 9. x. 195, 200, 126. Thiers, which it was viewed by Upon the capture of Copenhagen being known in the Russian capital, the Emperor demanded of the English ambassador whether the fleet would be restored at the *It appears, however, from the following passage in Sir Walter Scott, eviSecret satis- dently founded on official information, that the cabinet of St Petersburg, though faction with obliged to yield to circumstances, were secretly gratified at the vigorous and decisive blow struck at the Danish fleet. "An English officer of literary celeAlexander. brity" (probably Sir R. Wilson) " was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the Emperor's expression of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as with a prince who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."-Scorr's Life of Napoleon, vi. 24. Certainly of all the remarkable qualities of Alexander's mind, his profound power of dissimulation was the most extraordinary; and this was the opinion formed by Lord Cathcart, and all who had an opportunity of seeing him even in the most unreserved and confidential manner. †“‘Vous le savez,' dit Alexandre au Général Savary,' dans plusieurs entre LI. 1807. 45. that power land. conclusion of a general peace. To this Lord Leveson CHAP. Gower replied, that "the object for which the expedition had been undertaken-viz. the removing of the Danish fleet, during the continuance of hostilities, beyond the Rupture of reach of France-having been accomplished, the English with Eng government was perfectly willing to renounce any advan- Oct. 29. tage which could be derived from the continuance of the war with Denmark, and earnestly pressed the Emperor to recommend neutrality on these conditions to the Prince- Nov. 2. Royal." These moderate views so far prevailed with the Russian cabinet, that a note was presented by them to Savary, to signify the wish of the Emperor that the neutrality of Denmark should be re-established; and there Nov. 4. was every prospect of the peace of the north being undisturbed by any further hostility, when the arrival of a messenger from Paris, with decisive instructions from Napoleon, such as had been expected by the Czar, at once put an end to the negotiation. He brought a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the instant closing of the Russian harbours against the ships of Great Britain. The Emperor Alexander was startled by the imperative tone of the mandate, as, since his return to St Petersburg, he had been endeavouring to withdraw from tiens fort longs, nos efforts pour la paix aboutissent à la guerre. Je m'y attendais; mais, je l'avoue, je ne m'attendais ni à l'expédition de Copenhague, ni à l'arrogance du cabinet Britannique. Mon parti est pris, et je suis prêt à tenir mes engagements. Dans mon entrevue avec l'Empereur Napoléon, nous avions calculé que, si la guerre devait continuer, je serais amené à me prononcer en Décembre; et je désirais que ce ne fût pas avant, pour n'avoir la guerre avec les Anglais qu'après la clôture de la Baltique. Peu importe, je me prononcerai tout de suite. Dites à votre maître que, s'il le désire, je vais renvoyer Lord Gower. Cronstadt est armé, et si les Anglais veulent s'y essayer, ils verront qu'avoir affaire aux Russes est autre chose que d'avoir affaire à des Turcs ou à des Espagnols. Cependant je ne déciderai rien sans un courrier de Paris, car il ne faut pas nous hasarder à contrarier les calculs de Napoléon. D'ailleurs je voudrais, avant de rompre, que mes flottes fussent rentrées dans les ports Russes. Quoi qu'il en soit, je suis entièrement disposé à tenir la conduite qui conviendra le mieux à votre maître. Qu'il m'envoie même, si cela lui convient, une note toute rédigée, et je la ferai remettre à Lord Gower en même temps que des passe-ports.""-THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, viii. 215. LL. 1807. CHAP. his promises in that particular. But it was too late: Savary appealed to his personal honour pledged at Tilsit, and the Emperor, at whatever hazard to himself or his 1 See the dominions, felt himself bound to comply.'* Next day a note was presented to the British ambassador, breaking x. 195, 218. off all relations between the two countries, requiring his 126, 128. immediate departure from St Petersburg, and reannouncing the principles of the armed neutrality; and on the whole pa pers in Parl. Deb. Sav. iii. statement of ambassadors on the causes of the rup ture. * The statements of the French and English ambassadors on this point are Concurring very material, as not only are they perfectly in unison with each other, but the English they distinctly prove that the rupture with Russia had no connection with the and French Copenhagen expedition, but was the result of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. Savary says-" In the first days of November I received a courier from the Emperor, who brought instructions from the minister of foreign affairs to insist upon the execution of one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. On the day following I said to the Emperor, at a special audience, 'Sire, I am charged with the desire of my master that you should unite your force to his to compel England to listen to his proposals.' 'Very well,' replied the Emperor, I have given him my word that I would do so, and I will keep my promise; see Romanzoff, and return to speak with me on the subject.' On the day following I returned; and the Emperor then said that it had been agreed that France and Russia should unite to summon England, but that the mediation of Russia was first to be proposed, which should still be done. I represented that this had already taken place, and that England had refused his mediation. He mused a moment, and then said, 'I understand you, and since your master desires it, I am quite disposed to fulfil my engagements. I will to-day give orders to Romanzoff.' Two days afterwards the hostile note against England was issued, and the British ambassador demanded his passports. Having gained this much, though well aware that the principal object of Napoleon was to strike at the English commerce, I deemed it expedient to shut my eyes to the time given to the British vessels to clear out from the Russian harbours."-SAVARY, iii. 126, 128. Lord L. Gower says in his despatch to Mr Canning, November 4, 1807,-" Some members of the council who were consulted on the matter, advised the Emperor not to reject so fair an opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe; and their opinion was so far taken that a note was written to General Savary, with the view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French general has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian cabinet, alarmed at the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overtures received from England." And on 8th November he wrote to the same minister, "The enclosed note, the contents of which are so extremely important," (they contained a declaration of war), "has been produced by a peremptory demand, brought by the last messenger from Paris, for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and the French mission boasts that, after some difficulty, they have gained a complete victory, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Buonaparte's views. I shall ask my passports to-morrow."-LORD L. GOWER to MR CANNING, St Petersburg, 4th and 8th Nov. 1807.-Parl. Deb. x. 215, 216. |