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day following, Lord Leveson Gower set out for the British CHAP. shores.*

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sians declare

This declaration of war against Great Britain was attended by a summons to Sweden to join in the league The Rusagainst the latter kingdom; and it soon appeared, from war against the vigorous preparations for the prosecution of the war Oct. 6. in that quarter, that the cession of Finland to Russia had, as already explained, been arranged at Tilsit, and

Sweden.

The Russian manifesto bore-" The great value which the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty enhanced the regret at per- Russian ceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him. Twice has manifesto. the Emperor taken up arms in a cause which was directly that of England, and he solicited in vain from England such a co-operation as her own interest demanded. He did not demand that her troops should be united to his; he desired only they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her own cause she did not act in union with him, but, coolly looking on the bloody spectacle of a war which had been kindled at her will, she, instead of co-operating, sent troops to attack Buenos Ayres and Alexandria. And what sensibly touched the heart of the Emperor, was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects at the very time that the blood of the Russians was shed in the most glorious of warfares, which drew down and fixed against the armies of his Imperial Majesty all the military force of the French Emperor, with whom the English then were and still are at war. Nevertheless, when the two Emperors made peace, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his old friendship, proffered his mediation to effect a general pacification: but the King of England rejected the mediation. The treaty between Russia and France was intended to procure a general peace; but at that very moment England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself: though it was to cast upon the north of Europe firebrands which were to light anew the flames of war. Her fleets and her armies appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a parallel example. A peacefully disposed and moderate power sees itself assaulted as if it had been forging plots and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, did not dissemble his resentment against England; new proposals were made by England for the neutrality of Denmark, but to these the Emperor would not accede. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England, proclaims anew the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and annuls all conventions inconsistent with its spirit."-Parl. Deb. x. 218, 221.

Britain.

To this manifesto it was replied, in a long and able declaration by Great Britain, drawn up by Mr Canning-" His Majesty was apprised of the secret Declaration conditions which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences at Tilsit; by Great but he indulged a hope that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate Dec. 18. negotiation, and its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and the interests of the Russian empire, would have led the Emperor to extricate himself from these trammels, contracted in a moment of despondency and

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CHAP. that the Czar was resolved to add that important province, lying so near his capital, to his extensive dominions, as soon as the necessary preparations could be made for

1807.

alarm. His Majesty deemed it necessary to demand a specific explanation from Russia with respect to these arrangements with France, the concealment of which could not but confirm the impression already received as to their character and tendency. The demand was made in the most amicable manner, and with every degree of delicacy and forbearance; but the declaration of war by the Emperor of Russia proves but too distinctly that this forbearance was misplaced. It proves, unhappily, that the influence acquired over Russia by the inveterate enemy of England, is such as to excite a causeless animosity between the two nations, whose long connection and mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation. The King of England does full justice to the motives which induced the Emperor of Russia twice to take up arms in the common cause. But surely the Emperor of Russia, on the last occasion, had a more pressing cause to join his arms to those of his ally, the King of Prussia, than Great Britain, then actually at war with that power. The reference to the war with the Porte is peculiarly unfortunate, when it was undertaken at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining the Russian interests against those of France. If, however, the peace of Tilsit was really a punishment for the inactivity of Great Britain, it was singularly unfortunate that it took place at a time when England was making the most strenuous exertions in the common cause, and had actually got that great armament prepared, which she has since been obliged to employ to disconcert a combination directed against her own immediate interests and security. The complaint of vexations to Russian commerce is a mere imaginary grievance, never heard of before, and now put forth only to countenance the exaggerated declamations by which France strives to inflame the animosity of the other Continental powers. The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his Majesty-they are not yet communicated-not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so unsuitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; conditions to which the Emperor of Russia could not object, as the first was the same which the Emperor had himself annexed to the mediation of Austria between himself and France, not four months before; and the second was clearly called for by the previous and long-established relations between Russia and Great Britain. Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war." English Declaration, December 18, 1807; Parl. Deb. x. 118-122. It will be observed how studiously, in these diplomatic papers, Russia eludes allusion to the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. "The capture of the Danish fleet," says Hardenberg, was not the cause, but the pretext, of Russia's rupture with England. The cabinet of St Petersburg, if the truth was known, was not sorry of so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the north, as it already was in the south, of Europe; and, notwithstanding all the loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, it beheld with more satisfaction the success of England in that quarter than it would have done the

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its subjugation.* As fast as the troops arrived from the CHAP. Niemen at St Petersburg, they were passed through to the frontiers of Finland; and such a force was soon accumulated there as rendered hopeless the preservation of that bright jewel of the Swedish crown. A formal declaration of war was, however, delayed till the spring following, when the preparations of the cabinet of St Petersburg were completed, and the season of the year enabled them to resume military operations. In the interval the Swedish government had so carefully abstained from giving any cause of complaint to the northern autocrat, that, when he came to assign to the world his reasons for a rupture, he could find no ground whatever on which to justify his hostilities, but that the Swedish monarch had not acceded to his proposal to break with England, and join his forces to those of Russia, and was desirous of preserving throughout the contest a strict neutrality—a pretext for a war, which came with a singularly bad grace from a power which affected to feel such indignation at the English government for having, for a similar reason, and when well informed of the secret designs of France against the Danish fleet, commenced hostilities against the court of Copenhagen.1 Napoleon anxiously encouraged iii, 223. the Czar in his designs against Finland, in the hope of

junction of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of the French Emperor."HARDENBERG, X. 49.

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* "Quant à la Suède,' dit Alexandre à Savary, je ne suis pas en mesure, et je demande le temps de réorganiser mes régiments fort maltraités par la dernière guerre, et fort éloignés de la Finlande. En outre sur ce théâtre mon armée ne me suffit pas. Dans les basfonds des golfes du Nord on se sert beaucoup de flotilles à rames. Les Suédois en ont une très-nombreuse; la mienne n'est pas encore équippé, et je ne veux pas m'exposer à un échec de la part d'un si petit état. Dites donc à votre maître qu'aussitôt mes moyens préparés, Jaceablerai la Suède, qu'il me faut attendre Décembre ou Janvier. Je suis prêt à declarer contre les Anglais immédiatement. Je suis même d'avis que nous ne nous bornions pas là, et que nous exigions de l'Autriche son adhésion, voluntaire ou forcée, à la coalition Continentale. J'ai vu Napoleon, je me flatte de lui avoir inspiré une partie des sentiments qu'il m'a inspirés à moi-même, et je suis certain qu'il est sincère. Pour moi je lui promets une franchise entière, et j'en attends une semblable de sa part. Oh! si je pouvais le voir comme à Tilsit, tous les jours, à toute heure! quel entretien que le sien ! quel esprit ! quel génie !"-THIERS, viii. 215, 217.

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1 Thiers,

CHAP. diverting his ambition from the Danube, and leaving the stage clear there for his own projects.

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Invasion

and conquest of

Russia.

Feb. 6,1808.

This declaration was immediately followed by a proclamation to the Fins by the Russian commander, in which he declared that he entered their territory with no Finland by hostile intentions, and solely to preserve them from the horrors of war, and invited them to abstain from hostilities or resistance to Russia: a promise instantly belied by the formal occupation of the whole provinces by the Muscovite forces, and the establishment of Russian authorities in every part of them, excepting those fortresses still held by Swedish garrisons. Meanwhile the King of Sweden, faithful to his engagements, relying on the support of Great Britain, and encouraged by the great blow struck at the Danish power by the English armament, bade defiance to the united hostility of France and Russia. He replied to the Russian manifesto in a dignified proclamation—a model for greater powers and more prosperous fortunes-in which he bitterly complained of the invasion of his dominions, and the incitement to revolt held out to his subjects by the Russian forces, without any declaration of war or ground of hostility; contrasted the present subservience of Russia to France with the repeated declarations she had made that its ambition was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, and her solemn engagements to conclude no peace with that which should be "inconsistent with the glory power of the Russian name, the security of the empire, the sanctity of alliances, and the general security of Europe;" and justly observed that the present war, based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign con2 Ann. Reg. nections to the northern powers, was undertaken for no other object but to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Cronstadt and Revel.2

1 See Rus

sian mani

festo, Aug.

30, 1806.

1808, 237, 303, and

307. Sav.

iii. 112.

It was not to be supposed that Denmark, after the grievous though unavoidable loss she had sustained, would

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enters cor

the war.

not resent to the utmost of her power the hostility of CHAP. Great Britain. She threw herself, accordingly, without reserve into the arms of France, and made every preparation for the most active hostility; though the loss of Denmark her fleet and dismantling of her arsenal deprived her of dially into the means of carrying on any efficient warfare, and, on the other hand, exposed her commerce and colonies to total destruction. The Prince-Royal, carried away by an excusable resentment, overlooked all these considerations, and not only constantly refused to ratify the capitulation of Copenhagen, but concluded, soon after, a treaty offensive and defensive with the Emperor Napoleon, which, by a singular coincidence, was signed on the very day on Oct. 16. which Junot, at the head of a powerful army, commenced his march from Bayonne to enforce a similar obedience to the secret resolutions adopted at Tilsit from the court of Lisbon. Meanwhile Napoleon wrote to Alexander, informing him of the treaty with Denmark, and again pressing him to invade Finland, in order to compel the submission of Sweden; and thus, by having the com- 48, 49. mand of both coasts, shut the Baltic against the English 225. fleets.1

1 Hard. x.

Thiers, viii.

Russia and

While a new war was thus kindling from the ashes of 49. the old one in the north of Europe, Russia was steadily Affairs of prosecuting those ambitious designs on her southern fron- Turkey. tier, the unmolested liberty to advance in which had constituted the principal lure held out by Napoleon to gain her alliance on the shores of the Niemen. In this attempt, however, she did not experience all the facilities which she expected. As the main object of Napoleon, in the negotiations at Tilsit, was to accelerate the rupture of Russia with Great Britain, and procure her accession to the Continental System, so the ruling principle of 429. Russia was to obtain facilities for the prosecution of her designs against the Ottoman empire, and in the mean time to postpone the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, till she was better prepared to

2

2 Bign. vi.

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