LI. 1807. * CHAP. carry her projects of conquest into effect. Napoleon, as already stated, had agreed at Tilsit, that the evacuation might be indefinitely postponed; but hardly had he returned to Paris, when, being engrossed with his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, and unable to appropriate to himself, in consequence, his anticipated share of the Ottoman spoils, while at the same time he felt the utmost disquietude at the approach of Russia to the Dardanelles, he repented of the ready consent which he had given to the advances of Russia in that direction, and became desirous to throw every obstacle in the way of their further prosecution. In terms of the stipulation to that effect in the former treaty, the mediation of France had been offered to the Divan, which having been accepted, and an armistice concluded, nothing remained to justify the prolonged occupation of the principalities. Russia, however, was too great a power to leave the seeds of any misunderstanding with it, when Napoleon was engaged in his projects in the Spanish peninsula; and Aug. 24. accordingly he soon after wrote to Alexander, that the armistice on the Danube had been concluded without his authority; that he disapproved of it; that the Russian 1 Bign. vi. troops might be continued in the principalities; that as 429, Hard to the final partition of the Ottoman empire, that was so Thiers, vi, grave a question, that it required mature consideration; and that France and Russia, united, might accomplish the greatest things yet seen in modern times.1+ x. 51. Sav. 110. 222, 225. viii. It appeared the more necessary to bring it to a termi * "Vous pouvez le traîner en longue."-Ante, Chap. XLVI. § 80, note. Napoleon wrote to Alexander,-" Qu'il était étranger à la rédaction de l'armistice avec la Porte, qu'il le désapprouvait (ce qui emportait l'approbation tacite de l'occupation prolongée des provinces du Danube), et que, quant au maintien ou au partage de l'empire Ottoman, cette question était si grave, si intéressante dans le présent et l'avenir, qu'il avait besoin d'y penser mûrement; qu'il ne pouvait en traiter par écrit, et que c'était avec M. de Tolstoy qu'il se proposait de l'approfondir; qu'il la réservait à cet ambassadeur, et que c'était même afin de l'attendre qu'il avait retardé son départ pour l'Italie, où il était cependant pressé de se rendre. Unissons-nous, disait Napoléon à Alexandre, et nous accomplirons les plus grandes choses des temps modernes."-NAPOLEON to ALEXANDER, 17th Sept. 1807; THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, viii, 225. LI. 50. of the Turks nation, as the Turks, though they gladly availed them- CHAP. selves of the French mediation at first, did so in the belief that they were to obtain thereby the evacuation of 1807. Moldavia and Wallachia. But no sooner did they dis- Alienation cover that this was not really intended, and that the from the Muscovite standards were still to remain on the Danube, French. than they loudly expressed their resolution to continue, in preference, the conflict. They said, with justice, "In what worse situation could we be, if the French, instead of being victorious, had been beaten in Poland? Is this the Emperor's care for his allies, whom he has drawn into the conflict, to leave their richest provinces in the hands of their enemies?" Savary, therefore, received orders to insist in the mildest possible manner, but still to insist, for the evacuation of the principalities; and to consent to the prolonged occupation of them by the Russian forces, only on condition that Alexander sanctioned the continued possession of Silesia by the French troops. Napoleon strongly contended that the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia should not take place, according to the secret treaty of Tilsit, till the French were in a condition to take possession of Greece and Albania, which they were not at present; but he offered to wink at the Russians extending their empire to the Danube, provided Alexander would agree to indemnify him by the cession of Silesia and other provinces of Prussia, reducing that power to 2,000,000 souls.* This act of spoliation of an allied power, Alexander, much to his credit, positively * "Si la violation du traité de Tilsit,' disait Napoleon à lui, elle ne doit être pas au profit d'une seule des deux parties contractantes. Elle doit être, pour la France, dans une partie des états de la Prusse, dont ce traité stipule la restitution—partie égale, en population, en resources, en richesses, aux deux provinces Turques. De cette manière l'allié de la France, l'allié de la Russie, éprouverait une perte égale. La Prusse, il est vrai, n'aurait pas plus qu'à-peu-près deux millions d'habitants, mais il ne serait pas grand malheur à la Prusse à subir ce nouvel affaiblissement. La ruine totale de l'empire Ottoman doit être rec lé jusqu'au moment où le partage de ses vastes débris pourra se faire d'une manière plus avantageuse pour l'une et pour l'autre, sans avoir à craindre qu'une autre puissance, leur ennemi, vienne s'approprier, par l'acquisition de l'Egypte et des iles, les plus riches dépouilles."-NAPOLEON to ALEXANDER, 22d Dec. 1807; BIGNON, vii. 43, 44. LI. 1807. CHAP. refused to accede to.* At length the respective pretensions of these high contracting powers were arranged in this manner, that France agreed to Russia continuing in the possession of the Danubian principalities, and Russia consented to the prolonged occupation of Silesia by the French troops. This arrangement for the time settled their differences; the two autocrats readily con1 Ann. Reg. sented to wink at their mutual infractions of the rights of other states; each abandoned an ally to the tender merii. 110, 111. cies of an enemy; and as the Turks found that they had been betrayed by Napoleon, and some account of the Hard. x. 51, secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which provided for their partition, had reached them, they declined the further intervention of the French, and prepared to renew the war.1† 1807, 742. State Pa pers. Sav. Bign. vi. 429, 430. 53. Corresp. Conf. de Nap. vii. 364, 385. cret de *""Comment,' s'écria Alexandre, 'pourrais-je consentir à partager, de fait, les dépouilles d'une malheureux prince que l'Empereur a désigné à la France et à l'Europe comme ayant été rétabli à ma consideration?""-BIGNON, vii. 46, 47. The negotiation between Savary and Romanzoff, and his conversations Curious se- with Alexander himself on this important subject, which are given in the secret spatch from and confidential correspondence of Napoleon, are highly curious, as indicating Savary at St the ulterior ambitious views of the great empires which they severally reprePetersburg to Napoleon. sented, and the seeds of that jealousy which, in the midst of unbounded protes tations of present regard, was laying the foundation of future and mortal hostility. By despatches from Napoleon, dated Fontainebleau, Oct. 14, 1807, Savary was required to inquire what was the cause which had retarded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops, and to observe that peace could not be re-established between Russia and the Porte till that evacuation had taken place, as it was the condition which must precede the armistice which was to be the foundation of the definitive treaty; that the delay to evacuate could not fail to annul the armistice which had been concluded, and rekindle the flames of war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. In reply, the Emperor Alexander, after alleging various insignificant reasons for not commencing the evacuation, observed :—" Circumstances now appear to require a deviation in this particular from the strict letter of the treaty of Tilsit. The latest advices from Vienna and Odessa concur in stating that the influence of France has declined at Constantinople: it is even said that Lord A. Paget, the English ambassador, has embarked on board Lord Collingwood's fleet in the Dardanelles. There is every probability that a treaty will be concluded between England and the Porte hostile to you, and consequently to me; and that, if I should evacuate these provinces, I should soon have to re-enter them in order to avert the war from my own frontiers. I must revert to what the Emperor Napoleon said to me, not once, but ten times, at Tilsit, in respect to these provinces, and I have more confidence in these assurances than in all the reasons of expedience or policy which may subsequently appear to gainsay them. Why, then, renounce my present advantages, when past experience tells me so clearly what will ensue if I evacuate these provinces ? LI. 1807. 51. the constitu Italian Meanwhile Napoleon had set out for Italy, where great CHAP. political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the French nation, to share in the rapid mutations which its government Changes in underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to tion of the accept a change in its constitution. Napoleon, in conse-states. quence, suppressed the legislative body, and substituted in its room a senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As the members of this senate were nominated and paid by government, this last shadow of representative institutions became a perfect mockery. Nov. 20. Nevertheless the great conqueror was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy; their depuEven supposing that you have the upper hand at Constantinople, you can never prevent bands of insurgents from crossing the Danube, and renewing the pillage of these provinces: the orders of the Porte are null a mile from Constantinople. In our conversations at Tilsit, your Emperor often said, that he was noways set on that evacuation; that it might be indefinitely postponed; that it was not possible any longer to tolerate the Turks in Europe; that he left me at liberty to drive them into Asia. It was only on a subsequent occasion that he went back from his word so far as to speak of leaving the Turks Constantinople and some of the adjacent provinces." Savary replied, “Russia can always renew the war if you find it advisable. It is needless to refer to the engagements between the two monarchs; the Emperor Napoleon has too much confidence in the honour of the Emperor Alexander to doubt the validity of the reasons which have hitherto prevented him from executing these secret engagements: but still he is desirous of seeing them carried into effect, as a peace between Russia and the Porte is all that remains to complete the execution of the stipulations of the public treaty of Tilsit. All that the Emperor Napoleon has said at Tilsit shall be religiously executed; nor is there anything in the secret treaty which is calculated to thwart the desires of Russia. Nay, the surest and most expeditious mode to arrive at it, is to carry into execution the public treaty; for we must conclude an armistice with the Turks before a treaty is concluded; or do you propose at once to write their epitaph?” “I yesterday had a long interview," replied Alexander, "with the Swedish ambassador, and strongly urged him to enter into all the views of France, and represented the risk he would run in not making common cause with her and Russia. Meanwhile the march of the troops continues; in seven or eight days the last division will have arrived, and fifty thousand men will be ready to commence the war on the frontiers of Finland. When you demanded from me a declaration of war against England, I was well aware it was no trifling change of policy which was required; no slight change of system, which could be altered as soon as adopted. Had I conceived it to be such, I would never have put my name to it; but I viewed it in a more extended light. What am I 1807. "You CHAP. ties, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other II. in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy: they had supplicated heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoleon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose sight of the main object of his policy-the consolidation of his dominions, the rendering them all dependent on his imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. will always find," said he, "the source of your prosperity, the best guarantee alike of your institutions and of your independence, in the constant union of the iron crown with the imperial crown of France. But to obtain this felicity you must show yourselves worthy of it. It is time that the Italian youth should seek some more ennobling employment than idling away their lives at the feet of women; and that the women of Italy should spurn every lover who cannot lay claim to their favour by the exhibition of honourable scars." 1 1 Bot, iv. 224, 230. Hard. x. 26. Montg. vi. 293. 52. Union of Parma and Placentia Great works at Milan. State of From Milan the Emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice; he there admired the marble palaces, varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen to France of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amidst illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings; and, returning to Milan, arranged with an authoritative hand all the affairs of the peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Italy. Dec. 10. required to do? said I to myself. To prepare great events which will cause the memory of mournful ones to be forgotten, and put the two states in such political relations as can never be disturbed. Impressed with these ideas, and within twenty-four hours after your requisition, I did what you desired, though that was not only noways conducive to our interests, but, on the contrary, exposed us to very serious losses. Now, you insist that I should make war on Sweden; I am ready to do so; my armies are on her frontier; but what return are we to obtain for so many sacrifices? Wallachia and Moldavia are the recompense which the nation expects, and you wish to bereave us of them. What reply can we make to our people, if, after their evacuation, they ask us what |