LI. 1807. 55. CHAP. irresistible preponderance in the Euxine and Baltic seas; to France, already master of the half of Germany, was allotted Italy, Poland, and the Spanish peninsula, with a Universal promise of obtaining Greece, Macedonia, and the islands of now openly the Archipelago. It was Napoleon himself who proposed Russia and this vast scheme of spoliation to Alexander; the ambition France. of the Czar, great as it was, had never contemplated any empire was thing so extensive.* He now openly showed his determination to dethrone all sovereigns who did not instantly adhere to his designs against Great Britain, and replace them by others drawn from his family, who might be expected to be obedient to his will. France and Russia, relying on each other's support, now laid aside all moderation, and even the semblance of justice, in their proceedings; and, strong in their mutual forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states, even unoffending neutrals or faithful allies, which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire to one or other would, it was likely, be the result of a desperate strife between them, and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts. Already this danger had become apparent all the fleets of Europe were combined under the command of the French Emperor; and in a few years he would 1 Thiers,viii. have two hundred sail of the line to beat down in the 243. Bign. vii. 43, 44. Channel the naval forces of England, and carry slavery and ruin into the British dominions.1 Such were, then, * "Je ne pensais pas,' dit Alexandre au Général Savary, 'aux provinces du Danube; c'est votre Empereur qui, en recevant la nouvelle de la chute de Selim, s'est écrié à Tilsit: On ne peut rien faire avec ces barbares! la Provi dence me dégage envers eux; arrangeons-nous à leurs depens!'”—THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, viii. 219. LI. 1807. the consequences of the subversion of the balance of CHAP. power; such the dangers which induce the far-seeing sagacity of political wisdom to commence the conflict for national independence as soon as the rights of inferior powers are menaced. portance of already naval con Although, however, both the liberties of England and 56. independence of Europe were at this time placed in such Great imimminent peril, yet a great step had already been made the stroke towards diminishing the danger. The Copenhagen expe- struck at dition had completely paralysed the right wing of the Napoleon's naval force by which Napoleon expected to effect our federacy. subjugation. The capture of twenty ships of the line and fifteen frigates, with all their stores complete, equivalent, in Napoleon's estimation, to the destruction of eighty thousand land troops, was perhaps the greatest maritime blow ever yet struck by any nation, and weakened the naval resources of the French Emperor to a degree greater in extent than any single calamity, except Trafalgar, yet experienced during the war. The hostility of Russia, predetermined at Tilsit, was by this stroke kept almost within the bounds of compulsory neutrality. Sweden was encouraged to continue in the English alliance; the maritime force of the Baltic was in a manner withdrawn from the contest; a few sail of the line were all that were required to be maintained by England in that quarter. It is remarkable that this great achievement, fraught with such momentous consequences at that eventful crisis, was regarded by the nation at the time with divided and uneasy sentiments; and that the Opposition never had so largely the support of the public as when they assailed the government on account of a measure calculated, in its ultimate results, to prove the salvation of the country. But it is not to be supposed that this dissatisfaction was owing to factious motives; on the contrary, it was brought about by the ascendancy in the public mind of the best and noblest principles of our nature. And it is a memorable circumstance, highly LI. 1807. CHAP. characteristic of the salutary influence of public opinion under a really free government, in bringing the actions of public men to the test of general morality, that while in France, where revolutionary ascendancy had extinguished every feeling in regard to public matters, except the admiration of success, and in Russia, where a despotic sway had hitherto prevented the growth of any public opinion whatever, universal satisfaction ensued at the ill-gotten gains of the respective Emperors, the English people mourned at the greatest maritime conquest yet achieved by their arms; and disdained to purchase even national independence at the expense, as it was then in error supposed, of the national faith. CHAPTER LII. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. LII. 1807. 1. views of with refer ence to the Spanish Peninsula. on Portugal. No sooner had Napoleon returned to Paris, than he CHAP. began to turn his eyes towards the Spanish peninsula, and the means of bringing the resources of its monarchies more immediately under the control of France than they Ambitious had hitherto been brought, even by the abject submission Napoleon of both courts to his commands. His designs against Portugal had been of very long standing. Lord Yarmouth had gained a clue to them while conducting the His design negotiations at Paris in July 1806, for the conclusion of a general peace; and so pressing did the danger at that time appear, that government despatched Earl St Vincent with a powerful squadron to the Tagus, to watch over British interests in that quarter, and afford to the Portuguese government every assistance in his power in July 1806. warding off the danger with which they were threatened. Lord Rosslyn accompanied the expedition in a political character, and was authorised to offer the cabinet of Lisbon assistance in men and money, to aid them in repelling the threatened invasion. Nor were these measures of precaution uncalled for: a corps of thirty thousand men, under the name of the "army of the Gironde," was assembling at Bayonne, commanded by Junot; and it was ascertained, by undoubted information, that their destina VOL. VIII. T LII. 1807. CHAP. tion was Lisbon.* The presence of the British fleet, under Earl St Vincent, in the Tagus for a period of several months, revived the drooping spirits of the Portuguese government; but after the battle of Jena, their terror of France so far prevailed as to induce them to 79. Parl. solicit the removal of that squadron. The march, however, of the French armies to Prussia, postponed, for a considerable period at least, the threatened invasion.1† 1 Hard. x. Deb. viii. 134. 2. 19, 1806. At the same period when these preparations, avowedly And against directed against Portugal, were going forward on the Spain. Pyrenean frontier, the cabinet of Madrid discovered, through their ambassador at Paris, that Napoleon was offering to bestow on others, without their knowledge or consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. It has been already noticed that, in his anxiety for peace Treaty July, with England, he offered to cede the Spanish settlement of Puerto Rico; and, to obtain Sicily from the British government for his brother Joseph, he proposed to give up the Balearic Isles as a compensation to the dispossesssed family of Naples. Even this was not all. To make up the amount of indemnity, it was seriously proposed that a large annuity, imposed as a burden for ever on the Spanish crown, should be settled on the dislodged family, and stipulations to this effect were inserted in the secret articles of the treaty which M. d'Oubril signed with Ante, ch. xlii. § 79. 2 'Switzerland," said Talleyrand to Lord Yarmouth at Paris, on 27th July 1806, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be averted but by a peace with England; but still less can we alter for any other consideration our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembled at Bayonne. This is for the consideration of Great Britain. -LORD YARMOUTH'S Despatch, July 30, 1806: Parl. Deb. viii. 134. Even so early as this period, the project of partitioning Portugal, and conferring a portion of it on the Prince of the Peace, afterwards embodied in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was formed. "Lord Rosslyn," says General Foy, "was no sooner admitted to the council of Lisbon than he announced that it was all over with Portugal; that a French army, assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, was ready to invade it, and that its conquest was already arranged between the King of Spain and the Prince of the Peace. 'That great project,' added he, 'has been confided by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale during the negotiations at Paris. The ministers of the King of England could not see without uneasiness the peril of their ancient allies; they have flown to their succour. A |