LII. 1807. 345, 352. France on July 19, 1806.* Nor were these diplomatic CHAP. arrangements unsupported by warlike demonstrations. On the contrary, the most active measures were taken to 1 Toreno, i. put the army on the Pyrenean frontier on the most effi- 6. Bign. v. cient footing; and on the 19th July Earl Yarmouth Lord Yarwrote to Mr Secretary Fox-"There is a considerable Despatch, army already forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men 19, 1806. are there already: this army is ostensibly directed against viii. 122. Portugal, but it will take Spain also." 1 the mouth's Paris, July Parl. Deb. covery of these de signs rouses Spain against France. The alarming discovery of the manner in which the 3. French Emperor was thus disposing of portions of the The disSpanish dominions—a state with which he was in close alliance at the time-without even going through form of asking their consent to the cessions they were inst required to make, added to the irritation which the Spanish government already felt at the dethronement of the Neapolitan branch of the house of Bourbon. It produced the same impression on the cabinet of Madrid that a similar discovery, made at the same time, of the offer of Napoleon to cede Hanover, recently bestowed on Prussia by himself, to Great Britain, as an inducement to that power to enter into a maritime peace, did on that of Berlin. Both these powers had for ten years cordially supported France: Spain, in particular, had placed her fleets and treasures at its disposal; and not only annu corps of 12,000 men is at this moment embarking at Portsmouth, and will shortly arrive at Lisbon; meanwhile, the court of Lisbon may draw at pleasure on the treasury of England for the charges consequent on the war.'" For, ii. 123. The English expedition sailed, but afterwards went on to Sicily, as the Portuguese government, relieved of their present danger by the Prussian war, and desirous not to embroil themselves further with France, not only declined their aid, but prevailed on the English government to withdraw their squadron from the Tagus. "M. d'Oubril and Talleyrand have fixed upon Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica for his Sicilian Majesty, if they cannot prevail on us to evacuate Sicily."-LORD YARMOUTH to Mr SECRETARY Fox, July 19 and 20, 1806; Parl. Deb. viii. 122. And again, on the 26th September, Champagny proposed to Lord Lauderdale "that his Sicilian Majesty should have the Balearic Isles, and an annuity from the court of Spain to enable him to maintain his dignity."-LORD LAUDERDALE'S Despatch to EARL SPENCER, Paris, 26th September 1806; Parl Deb. viii. 193, 194. LII. 1807. CHAP. ally paid an enormous tribute (£2,800,000) towards the expenses of the war, but submitted for its prosecution to the destruction of her marine, and the entire stoppage of her foreign and colonial trade. When, therefore, in return for so many sacrifices, made in a cause foreign to the real interests of their country, her ministers found not only that the interests of the Peninsula were noways regarded by Napoleon in his negotiations with England and Russia, but that he had actually offered the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, his tried and faithful ally, to appease the jealousy and satisfy the demands of these his old and inveterate enemies, their indignation knew no bounds.1 1 Hard. x 80, 81. To reno, i. 6, 7. Bign. vii. 43. 4. Extreme irritation The veil which had so long hung before their eyes was at once violently rent asunder; they saw clearly that produced fidelity in alliance, and long-continued national support, at Madrid. afforded no guarantee whatever for the lasting support of the French monarch; and that, when it suited his purpose, he had no scruples in purchasing a temporary respite from the hostility of an enemy by the permanent spoliation of a friend. The Prince of the Peace also was personally mortified at the exclusion of the Spanish minister at Paris from all share in the conferences going on with d'Oubril and Lord Yarmouth for the conclusion of a general peace. Under the influence of such pressing public and private causes of irritation, the Spanish minister lent a willing ear to the advances of the Russian ambassador at Madrid, Baron Strogonoff, who strongly represented the impolicy of continuing any longer the alliance with a conqueror who sacrificed his allies to propitiate his enemies; and a convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Spanish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a donderry, i. party, by which it was agreed, that as soon as the fa Aug. 28, 1806. 2 Lord Lon 19. Hard. x. 80, 81. Toreno, i. 6, 7. vourable opportunity arrived, by the French armies being far advanced on their road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities on the Pyrenees, and LIL invite the English Cabinet to co-operate in averting the CHAP. dangers with which it was menaced from the Spanish peninsula.* 1807. 5. proclama Prince of The whole of this secret negotiation was made known to Napoleon through the activity of his ambassador at Madrid, Premature and by the intercepting of some of the correspondence in tion by the cipher in which it was carried on, before the Prussian war Peace. was commenced. But he dissembled his resentment, and resolved to strike a decisive blow in the north of Germany, before he carried into effect the views which he now began to entertain for the total conquest and appropriation of both kingdoms in the Peninsula. The imprudence of the Prince of the Peace, however, publicly revealed the designs which were in agitation before the proper season had arrived; for, in a proclamation published in the beginning Oct. 5,1806. of October at Madrid, he invited "all Spaniards to unite themselves under the national standards; the rich to make sacrifices for the charges of a war which will soon be called for by the common good; the magistrates to do all in their power to rouse the public enthusiasm, in order to enable the nation to enter with glory in the lists which were preparing." This proclamation reached Napoleon on the field of Jena, the evening after the battle. He was not prepared for so vigorous a step on the part 79,81. De of one who had so long been the obsequious minister of Pradt, Sur his will; and it may be conceived what his feelings were d'Espagne, on receiving accounts of so decided a demonstration in a i. 83. moment of unexampled triumph.1 Too skilled in dissembling, however, to give any premature vent to his feelings, he contented himself with instructing his ambassador at Madrid to demand an expla M. Bignon says (vii. 197) that the preparations of Spain were not owing to this hostile step of Napoleon appropriating the Balearic Isles, because they began in August 1806, at which time the treaty of July 19, by which it was stipulated, could not have been known. But that defence of Napoleon is entirely overthrown by the simple fact that that treaty was known and communicated to the British government on the very day (July 19, 1806) on which it was signed.-See ante, Chap. LII. § 2, note. Hard. x. la Rév. 15. South. LII. 1807. 6. Profound dissimulation and address of regarding it. CHAP. nation of so extraordinary a measure, and feigned entire satisfaction with the flimsy pretence that it was directed against an anticipated descent of the Moors. Nay, he had the address to render this perilous step the means of forwarding his ultimate designs against the Peninsula: for, Napoleon by threatening the Prince of the Peace with the utmost consequences of his resentment, if the most unequivocal proofs of devotion to the cause of France were not speedily given, he succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cabinet of Madrid to the march of the Marquis Romana, with the flower of the Spanish army, from the banks of the Ebro to the shores of the Baltic; thereby denuding the Peninsula of its best defenders, and leaving it, as he supposed, an easy prey to his ambitious designs.* At the same time the court of Lisbon, justly alarmed at the perilous situation in which they were placed by this ill-timed revelation of their secret designs, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project which all concerned pretended now equally to condemn; and, to propi15. London- tiate the conqueror by an act which they were well aware 22. would be well received, compelled Earl St Vincent to withdraw with his squadron from the Tagus.1 1 Hard. x. 79, 81. Pen. War, la Rév. derry, i. 21, 7. resolves on thronement tuguese This meditated though abortive resistance of Spain, Napoleon however, to the projects of spoliation which he had in the de- contemplation, produced a very great impression on of the Span- Napoleon. He perceived, in the clearest manner, the ish and Por- risk to which he was exposed, if, while actively engaged monarchs. in a German or Russian war in front, he were to be suddenly assailed by the monarchies of the Peninsula in rear; a quarter where the French frontier was in a great measure defenceless, and from which the armies of England might find an easy entrance into the heart of his * The details now given on the spoliation of Spain, which had been contemplated by Napoleon in the diplomatic conferences with the English government at Paris in July 1806, and the actual conclusion of a treaty for that spoliation with Russia in that month, are of the highest importance in the development of the remote causes of the Peninsular war, as they demonstrate that the well-known proclamation of the Prince of the Peace on the 5th October was not, as the French panegyrists of Napoleon represent, an un CHAP. LII. 1807. dominions. He felt with Louis XIV. that it was necessary there should be no longer any Pyrenees; and as the Revolution had altered the reigning family on the throne of France, it appeared indispensable that a similar change should take place in the Peninsular monarchies. By effecting that object, he thought, apparently with reason, that not only would the resources of the kingdoms it contained be more completely placed at his disposal, but his rear would be secured by the co-operation of princes whose existence depended on the maintenance of his authority; and a new Family Compact, founded on the same reasons of blood connection and state policy which had rendered it so important to the Bourbon, would, in like manner, secure the perpetuity of the Napoleon dynasty. From the people, either of Spain or Portugal, he anticipated little or no opposition, deeming them, like the Italians, indifferent to political changes, provided that no diminution were made in their private enjoyments. Although, therefore, he dissembled his intentions. as long as the war continued in the north of Europe, he had already taken his resolution, and the determination was irrevocable, that the houses of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, being opposed to this project, was not taken into confidence on the subject; but Talleyrand warmly x. 81, 82. supported it to the extent, at least, of incorporating the 276. Thiers, whole of the Spanish provinces to the north of the Ebro 257. with the French empire.1 The peace of Tilsit, however, placed Napoleon in a very different situation, and gave him at once the means of securing in the most effectual manner the concurrence of Alexander in the dethronement of the Peninsular called-for act of original hostility on the part of the Spanish government, but a defensive measure merely, rendered necessary by the discovery of Napoleon's previous declared intention of bestowing on strangers, without the consent of the government, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. This important fact, demonstrated beyond dispute by the state-papers above quoted, appears to be entirely unknown to Southey (Penins. War, i. 83), Napier (Penins. War, i. 4), and even to Lord Londonderry (Londond. i. 21, 23). 1 Las Cas. Londond. i. 22. Hard. X. Thib. vi. viii. 253, |