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LII.

1808.

between two faithful allies." The surprise was complete; CHAP. but the perfidy and disgrace so evident, that the brave d'Armagnac, who gained it, expressed his disgust at being employed on such a service in his despatches to Berthier announcing it.*

lona.

37.

Duhesme's instructions were, in like manner, to make himself master of Barcelona; and he was not long of of Barcefulfilling his orders. Boldly advancing towards that for- Feb. 13. tress, under the pretence of pursuing his march to Valencia, he totally disregarded the summons of the Conde de Espeleta, the captain-general of the province, who required him to suspend his movements till advices were received from Madrid, and so intimidated the governor, by threatening to throw upon him the whole responsibility of any differences which might arise between the two nations from the refusal to admit the French soldiers within the walls, that he succeeded in getting possession of the town. Still, however, Fort Montjuic and the citadel were in the hands of the Spaniards; but the same system of audacious treachery shortly after made the invaders masters of these strongholds. Count Theodore Lecchi, the commander of the Italian division, assembled his troops as for a parade on the glacis of the citadel. After the inspection was over, the Italian general came with Feb. 28. his staff on horseback, to converse with the Spanish officers, and insensibly moved forward to the drawbridge; and while still there, so as to prevent its being drawn up, Feb. 2953, a company of grenadiers stole unperceived round the 58. Nell. i. palisades, and rushing in, disarmed the Spanish guard at ii. 78, 80. the gate, and introduced four battalions, who got posses- 488, 489. sion of the place.1 Montjuic fell still more easily: the

those which have been recalled from the Levant or withdrawn from Sicily. The vigilance of their cruisers on the Spanish coast is hourly increasing; they seem disposed to avenge themselves on that kingdom for the reverses they have experienced in the colonies. The whole Peninsula, therefore, in an especial manner calls for the attention of his majesty."-CLARKE and CHAMPAGNY'S Reports, Moniteur, 24th Jan. 1808; and Foy, iii. 76, 77.

* “Ce sont là de vilaines missions.”—D'ARMAGNAC au Ministre de la Guerre, Feb. 9, 1808; THIERS, viii. 490.

106. Foy,

Thiers, viii.

LII.

1808.

CHAP. governor, though a man of courage and honour, was unable to withstand the peremptory summons of the French general, who audaciously demanded the surrender of that impregnable fortress, with the menace to render him responsible for the whole consequences of a war with France, which would inevitably result from a refusal.*

38. And of

Figueras and San Sebastian.

San Fernando de Figueras next fell into the hands of the French. The governor, on his guard against surprise, was cajoled into permitting two hundred conscripts to be lodged in the citadel, the finest fortification in Spain, under pretence that there was not accommodation for them in the town. Instead of conscripts, chosen soldiers were introduced, who in the night overpowered the sentinels, and admitted four regiments that lay in the neighbourhood. Finally, San Sebastian, the key to the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, and the destined theatre of such desperate struggles between the French and English, was obtained on still more easy terms. By permission of the Spaniards, it had become the depot for the hospital of the French regiments who had passed through; but the governor, conceiving disquietude at the visible increase in the number of these pretended patients, 58. Foy, and having learned some indiscrete expressions of Murat 10. South. as to San Sebastian being indispensable to the security of the French army, communicated his fears to the capviii, 490. tain-general of the province, and also to the Prince of the Peace, with an earnest request for instructions.2 The

March 3.

2 Tor. i. 53,

78, 85. Nell.

i. 199, 204.

Thib. vi.

312. Thiers,

* "My soldiers," said he, “are in possession of the citadel; instantly open the gates of Montjuic, for I have the special commands of the Emperor Napoleon to place garrisons in your fortresses. If you hesitate, I will on the spot declare war against Spain, and you will be exclusively responsible for all the torrents of blood which your resistance will cause to be shed." The name of Napoleon produced all these marvellous effects; it operated like a charm in paralysing the resistance even of the most intrepid spirits; many could encounter death, few had the moral courage to undergo the political risk consequent on resistance to his mandate. The Spanish governors at this period had also another excuse-the perfidy with which they were assailed by his orders was so unprecedented as to be inconceivable to men of honour.-See Foy, iii. 80.

LII.

prince, too far gone to recede, counselled submission, CHAP. though his eyes were now opened to the treachery of which he had been the victim; and, to his disgrace be 1808. it said, the last bulwark of his country was yielded up in consequence of express instructions from him, written with his own hand.*

39.

improves

the north of

troops.

Thus were taken, by the treachery and artifices of the French Emperor, the four frontier fortresses of Spain; Napoleon those which command the three great roads by Perpig- his success, nan, Navarre, and Biscay, across the Pyrenees, and the and covers possession of which gives an invader the entire command Spain with of the only passes practicable for an army from France into the Peninsula. And they were taken not only during a period of profound peace, but of close alliance between the two countries, and by a power which, only a few months before, had solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Spanish dominions! History has few blacker or more disgraceful deeds to commemorate; and, doubtless, the perpetration of them must have been a subject of shame to many of the brave men engaged in the undertaking, how much soever the better feelings of the majority may have been obliterated by that fatal revolutionary principle which measures the morality of all public actions by no other test but success. To the disgrace of Napoleon, it is now proved by the instructions to Murat, signed with his own hand, that these atrocious acts of perfidy were not only planned, but directly enjoined by himself. + Napoleon, however, who never inquired into the means,

On the margin of the letter of the Duke de Mahon, captain-general of Guipuscoa, requesting instructions, and fully detailing the danger, was written in the Prince of the Peace's own hand-" Let the governor give up the place, since he has not the means of resisting; but let him do so in an amicable manner, as has been done in other places where there were even fewer reasons or grounds for excuse than in the case of San Sebastian."-March 3, 1808; TORENO, i. 58. The general answer returned by the Prince of the Peace to the repeated demands which he received from the north, for instructions how to act, had previously been-" Receive the French well; they are our allies; they come to us as friends."--HARDENBERG, X. 122.

"Les instructions à Murat étaient à réunir 600,000 rations de biscuit déjà fabriquées à Bayonne, occuper sur-le-champ la citadelle de Pampelune, les forts

LII.

1808.

CHAP. provided the end was favourable, was overjoyed at this easy acquisition of the keys of Spain, and was led from it to discard all fears of a serious rupture in the course of his projected changes of dynasty in the Peninsula. With his accustomed vigour, he instantly prepared to make the most of his extraordinary good fortune in these important conquests. Fresh troops were quickly poured into the newly-acquired fortresses; their ramparts were armed, their ditches scoured, their arsenals filled; the monks in them were all turned adrift, and the monasteries converted into barracks. Several millions of biscuits were baked in the frontier towns of France, and speedily stored in their extensive magazines. The whole country from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with armed men; the Spanish authorities in all the towns were supplanted by French ones; and before a single shot had yet been fired, or one angry i. 195, 205. note interchanged between the cabinets, the whole of Spain, north of the Ebro, had been already wrested from the crown of Castile.1*

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85, 87, 89.

Tor. i. 59,

60. South.

Lond. i. 57,

60.

How deeply soever Godoy may have been implicated, by long-established intimacy and recent lures, in the meshes of French diplomacy, he could not any longer remain blind to the evident tendency of the designs of

de Barcelone, la place de St Sébastien; donner aux commandants espagnols, pour raison de cette occupation, la règle ordinaire d'assurer ses derrières quand on marche en avant, même en pays ami; tenir toutes les troupes bien ensemble, comme en approchant de l'ennemi; ne pas accepter de communi'cation avec la cour d'Espagne, sans en avoir l'ordre formel; ne répondre à aucune lettre du Prince de la Paix; dire, si on était interrogé de manière à ne pouvoir se taire, que les troupes françaises entraient en Espagne pour un but connu de Napoléon seul, but certainement avantageux à la cause de l'Espagne et de la France; prononcer vaguement les mots de Cadix, de Gibraltar; annoncer aux provinces Basques que leurs privilèges seraient respectés; recommander les relations les plus fraternelles avec le généreux peuple Espagnol; ne jamais mêler à toutes ces protestations d'amitié d'autre nom que celui du peuple Espagnol, et ne jamais parler ni du Roi Charles IV., ni de son gouvernement.”—Instructions of NAPOLEON to MURAT, 20th February 1808; THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, viii. 464, 465.

*

General Foy, though a liberal writer, and of the Napoleon school, gives a full detail, much to his credit, of these disgraceful transactions, and draws a veil over none of the dishonourable deeds by which they were accomplished.—

LII.

1808.

40.

of the Peace

begins to

see through

designs of

Napoleon.

Napoleon. The seizure of Pampeluna first drew the veil CHAP. in part from his eyes; the successive captures of Barcelona, Figueras, and San Sebastian, next tore it asunder; finally, the proclamation of Junot, on the 1st February, The Prince at once dashed to the earth all his hopes of national or individual aggrandisement. The portentous announce the real ment that Junot was to administer the affairs of Portugal in its whole extent, in the name of the Emperor, evinced clearly that all the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour either of the Spanish family, who had ceded the throne of Tuscany, or of the Prince of the Peace individually, were blown to the winds. The private correspondence of that ambitious statesman, accordingly, at this period, evinces the utmost uneasiness regarding the designs of France. But the uncertainty of which he so bitterly complained was of short duration. A requisition by Napoleon for the removal of the Spanish Feb. 6. fleet to Toulon, which the cabinet of Madrid were weak enough to comply with, though the rapid succession of events prevented its execution, was soon followed by Feb. 27. a formal demand of all Spain to the north of the Ebro, to be incorporated with the French monarchy. In return, he offered to cede to the Spanish monarchy 5. Foy, ii. his newly acquired realm of Portugal; but it was 109. readily foreseen that the proposal would prove entirely

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See Fox, iii. 75, 85. This is the true and honourable spirit of history, and withal the most politic, for it gives double weight to the defence of his country on other points when undertaken by such a champion.

1 Thib. vi.

312, 313.

Hard. x. 122, 123.

Tor. i. 58,

* On 9th February, Godoy wrote to his agent Isquierdo at Paris the following secret despatch :-"I receive no news: I live in uncertainty: the treaty is His secret already a dead letter; this kingdom is covered with troops; the harbours of despatch to Isquierdo at Portugal are about to be occupied by them; Junot governs the whole of that this period. country. We have just received a demand for the remainder of our fleets to co-operate with the French, which must be complied with. Everything is uncertainty, intrigue, and distrust; public opinion is divided; the heirapparent to the throne was lately involved in a treasonable conspiracy; the French troops live at free quarters on the country; the people are exhausted by their requisitions. You yourself have been to little purpose at Paris; the ambassador there is useless. What is to come of all this? What will be the end of this uncertainty? If you know anything, for God's sake let me know it: anything is better than this uncertainty."-GODOY to ISQUIERDO, 9th February 1808; THIBAUDEAU, vi. 311, 313.

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