LII. 1808. April 18. CHAP. Bayonne, if he proved refractory.* When the Duke of Mahon wished still to remonstrate, Escoiquiz, who entirely directed the King, interrupted him by the words “ The affair is settled; to-morrow we set out for Bayonne; we have received all the assurances which we could desire." Still the public anxiety continued; and when the horses came to the door the following morning, a vast crowd assembled, and cut the traces. A proclamation was immediately issued to calm the general effervescence, in which the King declared, "that he was assured of the constant and sincere friendship of the Emperor of France, and that, in a few days, the people would return thanks to God for the prudence which dictated the temporary absence which gave them so much disquietude." Upon this resistance ceased, and the carriage, surrounded by a April 21. mournful and submissive, but still unconvinced crowd, 119. Ceval took its departure, guarded by the French division of Escoiq. 52, Verdier. At Vitoria it was surrounded by the superb squadrons of the Imperial Guard, and Ferdinand set out at the gallop in state, a real prisoner in the hands of De Pradt, his perfidious ally. Two days afterwards he crossed the 210, 214... Bidassoa, and, proceeding to Bayonne, finally committed himself to the honour of the French Emperor.1 In former days, other kings, won by the arts of the Roman 1 Tor. i. 115, los, 31, 33. 56. Foy, iii. 148, 151. Thib. vi. 345, 351. 74. Sav. iii. Thiers, viii. 581. When he put this insidious epistle into Savary's hands, Napoleon said to him, "If the Prince of Asturias had followed wise counsels, I should have found him here; but from what you tell me, I suppose he conceived apprehensions from the preparations of the Grand-duke of Berg (Murat). Return, and give him this letter from me; allow him to make his reflections on it. You have no need of finesse; he is more interested in it than I am. Let him do as he pleases. According to your answer or your silence, I shall take my line, and also adopt such measures as may prevent him from returning elsewhere except to his father. There is the fruit of bad counsels. Here is a prince who perhaps will cease to reign in a few days, or induce a war between France and Spain.” At the same time he wrote to Murat to save the life of the Prince of the Peace, but to send him immediately to Bayonne.-SAVARY, iii. 200, 212, 213. "Napoléon ordonna sur-le-champ à Murat ainsi qu'au maréchal Bessières de ne pas hésiter, et, sur un simple avis du Général Savary, de faire arrêter le Prince des Asturies, en publiant du même coup la protestation de Charles IV., en déclarant que celui-ci régnait seul, et que son fils n'était qu'un usurpateur qui avait provoqué la révolution d'Aranjuez pour s'emparer du trône."—THIERS, viii. 572, 573. LII. 1808. Emperors, had done the same, and had experienced the CHAP. 59. Charles IV., sent by Bayonne. Upon his departure from Madrid, Ferdinand had intrusted the government to a regency, of which Don Antonio, Godoy, uncle to Ferdinand, was the head. Murat, however, was the and the real centre of authority: the presence of thirty thousand Queen, are French troops gave him an influence which was irresist- Murat to ible. No sooner had the King left the capital than he insisted that the Prince of the Peace should be immediately given up to him. Don Antonio refused to do so, until he received authority from Ferdinand, to whom he instantly despatched a courier for instructions. Meanwhile the French general continued to insist for the delivery of the important prisoner, threatening, at the same time, to put to the sword, in case of refusal, the six hundred provincial guards intrusted with his custody. At length authority arrived from the King for his surrender, which the Infant communicated to the officer in command of the Guards, with the simple observation, "that on the surrender of April 20. Godoy depended the preservation of the crown of Spain to his nephew." On the same day Godoy set out from Madrid under a strong French escort, and six days afterwards arrived at Bayonne. Meanwhile Murat harassed the regency with repeated and vexatious demands, apparently prompted by no other motive than to disgust them with April 26. the cares of an unsubstantial command, and accustom the people to regard the French headquarters as the centre from which all real authority emanated. Soon after he repaired in person to the Escurial, and had long and repeated conferences with Charles IV. and the old Queen. #66 Reges infestos suspectosque, comminationibus magis quam querelis, vi compressit. Quosdam, per blanditias atque promissa extractos ad se, non remisit―ut Marobodicum Germanum, Rheuscopoem Thracem, Archelaum Cappadocem, cujus etiam regnum in formam provinciæ redegit.”—SUETONIUS Tiberius," i. 474. Valpy's Classics. LII. 1808. 1 Ante, ch. note. CHAP. The result of their deliberations soon appeared in the transmission to Don Antonio of the ante-dated and secret state paper, already noticed,' in which the King protested lii. § 45, against his abdication as brought about by constraint and intimidation; and by the earnest advice of Murat, he set out immediately after, in company with the Queen, surrounded by French guards, for Bayonne, to lay his grievances at the feet of Napoleon, where he arrived four days April 30. after his fallen favourite. Thus did the French Emperor, by the influence of his name, the terrors of his armies, and the astuteness of his diplomatists, succeed in inducing the leaders of all the parties which distracted Spain, including the late and present sovereign, to place their persons at his disposal; while, at the same time, the communications on his part which brought about this extraordinary result were managed with such address, and enveloped in such mystery, that not only could none 142, 145. of them boast of possessing a distinct pledge of what he 592, 595. intended to do, but all had reason to hope that the result would prove entirely conformable to their interests.2 2 Tor. i. 124, 127 152, 155. Foy, iii. Thib. vi. 353, 354. Hard. x. Thiers, viii. 60. barrassment in regard to sular affairs. Meanwhile Napoleon, though possessed of such extraGreat em- ordinary influence, and invested with almost absolute experienced power over the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and the by Napoleon interests of the crowned heads which they contained, was the Penin extremely embarrassed how to act. Not that he swerved in the slightest degree from his intention of making, as he himself said, a "clean sweep of them" (maison nette), but that he perceived, in the clearest light, the abyss on the edge of which he was placed, and anticipated, with just and sagacious foresight, the incalculable consequences which might result from the lighting of the flames of a national war in the Peninsula. Through all the weakness and submission of the last century, he still discerned the traces of energy and resolution in the Spanish character. The timidity of its foreign conduct, the abuses of its internal administration, he justly ascribed to the corruption of the nobles, or the imbecility of the court. His LII. 1808. generals had transmitted daily accounts of the alarming CHAP. excitement which seemed to prevail, especially among the lower classes of the community; and he rightly concluded that he would be involved in inextricable embarrassment if, on a side where he had so long been entirely secure, there should arise a contest animated by the indignant feelings of a nation hitherto a stranger to revolutionary passions. M. de Tournon, a secret agent whom he employed at Madrid, from a well-founded distrust of Murat's political capacity, and a thorough perception of his ambitious views on the Spanish crown, transmitted at this critical juncture detailed and graphic accounts of the enthusiasm of the people in favour of Ferdinand VII., of the extreme jealousy which prevailed of French interference, and of the great danger of lighting up a national war in Spain, where political passions had not yet worn themselves out, and the people were by nature and temperament vehement and impassioned, and inclined to act, alike individually and collectively, on the impulse of the moment. These wise representations for a brief period made a great impression on Napoleon. His instructions. to Murat, accordingly, at this period, were to conduct himself with the utmost circumspection; to avoid everything which might excite an angry feeling or provoke a 1 Napoleon hostile collision; to strengthen his military hold of the to Murat, country; but to do nothing which might disturb the 1808. Sav. pacific negotiations by which he hoped, without drawing Thiers, viii. the sword, to obtain in a few days the whole objects his ambition.1 # March 29, iii. 168. 541, 543, of 515. * "I fear," said Napoleon, "M. Grand-duke of Berg, that you are deceiving me on the real situation of Spain, and that you deceive yourself also. The His admirevents of the 19th March have singularly complicated our affairs; I am in the able letter to Murat, porgreatest perplexity; never suppose that you are engaged with a disarmed traying his nation, and that you have only to show yourself to insure the submission of views regarding Spain. The revolution of 20th March proves that they still have energy. You them. have to deal with a virgin people; they already have all the courage, and they March 29. will soon have all the enthusiasm, which you meet with among men who are not worn out by political passions. "The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain; if they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they will rouse the CHAP. LII. 1808. 61. of resistance the invaders. April 21. Murat, however, was not a character to execute with skill the delicate mission with which he was intrusted; and he was too much accustomed to make everything Symptoms bend to military force, to be qualified to assume at once, in Spain to in circumstances singularly difficult, the foresight and circumspection of an experienced diplomatist. His precipitance and arrogance, accordingly, accelerated the catastrophe the Emperor was so solicitous to avoid. The Emperor, too, on hearing of the acclamations with which Murat had been received on entering Madrid, got the better of all his scruples, and returned with more determination than ever to his ambitious designs. He entirely mistook the cause of the favourable demonstration which had been made, thinking it was an indication of a par people and induce an unending war. At present I have many partisans among them; if I show myself as a conqueror, I will soon cease to have any. The Prince of the Peace is detested, because they accuse him of having given up Spain to France: that is the cry which led to the usurpation of Ferdinand; but for it the popular party would have been the least powerful. The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities essential for the chief of a nation; that want, however, will not prevent them, in order to oppose us, from making him a hero. I have no wish to use violence towards that family; it is never expe dient to render one's-self odious, and inflame hatred. Spain has above one hundred thousand men in arms; less would suffice to sustain an interior war; scattered over several points, they might succeed in effecting the total overthrow of the monarchy. I have now exhibited to you the difficulties which are manifest; there are others which you will not fail soon to discover. "England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments; she sends out forces daily, which she keeps on the coasts of Portugal and the Mediterranean; she is making enrolments of Sicilians and Portuguese. The royal family having quitted Portugal to establish itself in the Indies, nothing but a revolution can change the state of that country, and that is the event for which, perhaps, Europe is the least prepared. The persons who see the monstrous state of the government in its true light are a small minority; the great majority profit by its abuses. Consistently with the interests of my empire, I can do infinite good to Spain. What are the best means of attaining that object? Should I advance to Madrid, and assume the rights of a protector by declaring for the father against the son? It is difficult to re-establish Charles IV. His rule and his favourite have become so unpopular, they could not stand three months. Ferdinand, again, is the enemy of France; it is because he is so that they have put him on the throne. To keep him there would be to assist the factions who, for twenty-five years, have wished the subjugation of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond; the Queen Elizabeth and other Princesses perished miserably when it was wished to sacrifice them to atrocious vengeance. I think we should precipitate nothing, and take counsel from future events. |