LII. 1808. never paid by sovereigns except to crowned heads. During CHAP. the entertainment, the attention of the Emperor to his guest was unbounded; and although he still eluded the decisive word "Majesty," yet his manner was such as to inspire both Ferdinand and his attendants with the belief that he was their decided friend, and that every difficulty would speedily be adjusted. But this pleasing illusion was of short duration. After sitting a short time at table, Ferdinand returned to his hotel; while Escoiquiz remained, by special desire, to have a private conference with Napoleon. In the course of it, the Emperor fully unfolded his real design, and informed the faithful counsellor, without disguise, that his royal master must make up his mind to an immediate abdication. Escoiquiz pleaded and remonstrated, but in vain: he was informed, in the most peremptory terms, that he had no alternative but immediate submission. He concluded in these words-" Neither you nor Spain can resist me. Policy, policy must alone direct such a person as me. Return to your prince; dispose him to become King of Etruria, if he will be a king somewhere; for he may rest assured he shall never be a king of Spain." At the same time Savary, at the hotel of Ferdinand VII., made the same announcement to that monarch in person. A few minutes after the Spanish King arrived there, he was followed by Savary, who announced, on the part of the Emperor, that his resolution was irrevocably taken, that Ferdinand must instantly resign the throne both of Spain and of the Indies, in both of which the family of the Bourbons was to be succeeded by a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. Should he agree amicably to these conditions, hopes were held out that he might obtain the grand-duchy of Tuscany as an indem- 60. Tor. i. nity. It is remarkable that Napoleon should have chosen Thib.vi.356, for the time of this stunning announcement the very iii. 151, 1532. moment when Ferdinand had returned from his gracious 260, 262. reception at the imperial residence; and for the person 582, 583. to convey it, the very officer who had been despatched 1 Cev.33,37, 146, 147. 357. Foy, South. i. Thiers, viii. LII. 1808. CHAP. by himself to Madrid for the purpose of inducing him to advance to Bayonne to meet him, and who had offered to pledge his head, not five days before, that the moment he arrived there the Prince of Asturias would be recognised as King of Spain. 72. the abdica tion. This terrible announcement fell with the more force Arguments upon Ferdinand and his counsellors, that they were enof Napoleon to enforce tirely unprepared for it; the assurances held out by Savary and the letters of Napoleon having inspired them with the belief, that all that was wanting to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs was, that Ferdinand should show so much deference to Napoleon as to proceed to Bayonne to meet him. Neither the Prince nor his council, however, were overwhelmed by the extraordinary disclosure. Without absolutely committing themselves at first to any decided proposition, they continued the negotiation for nearly a week afterwards, both by means of Cevallos and Escoiquiz, who had frequent interviews with Napoleon in person, and with Champagny, who had now succeeded Talleyrand as his minister for foreign affairs. These conferences, however, came to nothing. On the part of Napoleon and his ministers, it was strongly urged that the interest, not merely of France, but of Spain, imperatively required that the two monarchies should be placed under dynasties belonging to the same family; that Napoleon could not submit any more than Louis XIV. to have a dubious ally or hidden enemy in his rear, while engaged with the forces of Europe in front; that the secret hostility of Spain had been clearly evinced by the ill-timed proclamation of the Prince of the Peace immediately before the battle of 1 Moniteur, Jena; that the numberless corruptions and abuses of 1808. Thib, the Spanish internal administration loudly called for an vi. 356, 359. immediate remedy, and this could never be applied with Escoiq. 26, safety by any other authority but that great conqueror 168, 172. who, educated amidst the storms and enlightened by the 586, 587. experience of the Revolution,' was now the master of such irresistible power as to be able to give to other states Sept. 7, Cev. 35, 36. 35. Sav. iii. Thiers, viii. LII. the benefits of liberal institutions suited to the spirit of CHAP. the age, without the risk of those convulsions which had obliterated so many of their beneficial effects in his own country. 1808. Ferdinand's It was replied to these specious arguments, which came 73. with additional weight from the mouth of the Emperor, Answer of by Cevallos and Escoiquiz, that it was as impolitic as counsellors. unjust to compel a sovereign who had left his own dominions to throw himself upon the honour of another, and that too at the special request of that other, to renounce the throne which had descended to him from his ancestors; that if anything was deemed illegal in the resignation of Charles IV. at Aranjuez, that might be a good reason for restoring the throne to the deposed monarch, but could be none for transferring it to the French Emperor; that the effort, however, now made to obtain a renunciation of the crown from Ferdinand evidently showed that the transaction was regarded as legal, and that the title to dispose of the crown was vested in its present holder; that the expedience, for both monarchies, of a close alliance between France and Spain, was indeed. indisputable; but that France had already enjoyed it ever since the peace of Bâle, and the way to secure it in future was instantly to recognise the Prince of Asturias, whereby both the monarch and his subjects would be bound by such important obligations as would render the future union between the two monarchies indissoluble; whereas, by wresting from him his sceptre, the most imminent risk would be run of exciting a national war in the Peninsula, and giving the English an advantageous base from which to direct their military efforts against Napoleon, besides the certainty of separating the Transatlantic colonies from the mother country, and throwing 1 Cev. 37,45. those vast and rising states, with their important treasures Escoiq. 26, and commerce, into the arms of the inveterate enemy of 168, 170. the French empire.1 To this last argument, the justice of which could not 50. Sav. iii. 1808. 74. Napoleon. April 24. CHAP. be denied, Napoleon replied, that he was well aware of LII. that danger, but that he had provided against it by having sent out frigates to the South American states, who were Reply of prepared to receive with thankfulness their transfer to a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. These conferences, as might have been expected, led to no result; at a secret meeting of the counsellors of Ferdinand, held at midnight, it was resolved to decline the proposals of the French Emperor, and demand passports for their immediate return to Spain, which was accordingly done next day. Napoleon was highly indignant at this resistance to his wishes, and refused the passports, under the pretence that, till the Aranjuez affair was cleared up, he could neither issue passports to Ferdinand as King of Spain, nor permit him to depart from a situation where he was liable to answer for his conduct to his justly offended parent. At the same time, a decisive report was presented by Champagny to the Emperor, which was, of course, merely the echo of his private instructions. This state paper set out with his favourite maxim, that the design of Louis XIV. must be resumed; that policy required, justice authorised, the troubles of Spain rendered it indispensable, that a change of dynasty should take place; that the interests of France and Spain indispensably called for identity both in the dynasty who governed and the institutions which prevailed amongst them; that to recognise the Prince of Asturias was to surrender Spain to the enemies of France, and deliver it over to English usurpation; to restore Charles IV. was vi. 356, 359, to renew the reign of imbecility and corruption, and Cev. 35, 38. occasion a boundless effusion both of French and Spanish 62. Sav. iii. blood: no alternative remained, therefore, but for NapoTor. i. 148, leon to dispossess them both, and establish in Spain a iii. 152. prince of his own family, with institutions analogous to those of the French empire.1 April 26. 1 Moniteur, Sept. 7, 1808. Thib. Escoiq. 26, 168, 172. 150. Foy, Napoleon was greatly perplexed at the steady refusal of Ferdinand to surrender the throne. He had not LII. 1808. 75. sends for and has a ference with calculated upon such firmness in any prince of the house CHAP. of Bourbon. Not that he had the slightest hesitation as to persisting in his original plan of entirely dethroning that family, but that he attached the greatest weight to Napoleon the acquisition of a legal title to their possessions. No Charles IV., man knew better that, although force may subjugate the private conphysical strength, a sense of legal right is generally Escoiquiz. necessary to win the moral consent of nations; and although Spain seemed prostrated, with its fortresses and capital in his possession, yet he deemed his acquisitions insecure till he had obtained, in form at least, the consent of the legal inheritors of its throne. Hoping, therefore, to succeed better with the father than he had done with the son, he reiterated his directions to Murat to send on Charles IV. and the Queen, with the Prince of the Peace, to Bayonne as quickly as possible. Such was his anxiety on this subject, that he enjoined him, if necessary, to use force to compel them to come.* Meanwhile, in private conferences with Escoiquiz, he unfolded with unreserved confidence, from their very commencement, his views upon the Spanish Peninsula. They took their rise, he stated, from the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace on the eve of the battle of Jena. Ever since that important revelation, he had been able to see nothing in the relation of the Spanish government but secret enmity veiled under the mask of friendship; the contemplated marriage of the Prince of Asturias to a relation of his own, appeared but a feeble bond to hold together nations now actuated by hostile sentiments: he proposed to give to the Prince of Asturias an indemnity in Portugal or Tuscany, and to place one of his brothers * "Regardant la présence de Charles IV. comme indispensable pour opposer au droit du fils le droit du père, il pressa vivement Murat de faire partir les vieux souverains, et de lui envoyer aussi le Prince de la Paix, toujours prisonnier à Villa-Viciosa. Napoléon enjoignit à Murat d'employer la force, s'il le fallait, non pour le départ de la vieille cour, qui demandait instamment à se mettre en route et que personne ne songeait à retenir, mais pour la délivrance du Prince de la Paix, que les Espagnols ne voulaient relâcher à aucun prix."-THIERS, viii. 590, 591. |