CHAP. tion. But in the long run, in undergoing the fatigues of LIII. a campaign, in discharging its multifarious duties, and 1808. facing its varied difficulties, the superiority of veteran armies, or even new levies incorporated with a veteran frame, soon becomes conspicuous. The Spaniards never were a match for the French, either in regular combats or in the conduct of a campaign; and although the native courage of the English, even in the outset, uniformly gave them the advantage in pitched battles, yet it was long before they became at all equal to their opponents in the general conduct of a campaign. It augments our admiration for the illustrious chief and his able lieutenants who ultimately led them to victory under such disadvantages, that they were compelled not only to lead, but in a manner to educate their troops in presence of the 1 Foy, i. 80, enemy; and that it was while struggling to maintain 81. Jom, ii. their ground against superior bands of a veteran foe, that 157, 158. they imbibed in many respects even the rudiments of the military art.1 36. Hard. x. 21. character of army. The English army, however, at this period was far from Force and being in the inefficient state, either in respect to discithe British pline or experience, which was generally presumed on the Continent; and the French government, which judged from recent events, and were ignorant of the vast efforts in the military department which had been made since the commencement of the war, were equally mistaken as to the courage and capacity of the regular forces, and the extent to which a warlike spirit had imbued the nation. The British regular troops in the spring of 1808 consisted of nearly two hundred thousand men, of whom twentysix thousand were cavalry, besides eighty thousand militia, equal in discipline and equipment to the troops of the line, though not bound to serve beyond the British isles; and two hundred and ninety thousand volunteers, of whom twenty-five thousand were cavalry, in a very considerable state of efficiency. Great part of this immense force, without doubt, was absorbed in the defence of the LIII. 1808. numerous and extensive colonies which formed part of the CHAP. English dominions. But the official returns proved that a hundred thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, were disposable in the British isles and in a minute. made out by the Duke of York, it was proved, that “in 1808, sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign in Spain without detriment to any other service." Of this force it is not going too far to say that it was all in the highest state of discipline and equip-1 Parl. Rement; and that not only was it equal for a pitched battle turns, July to any body of men of similar amount which could be Deb. ix. 3d App. and brought against it, but, if all assembled, was adequate to Napier,i.81. the encounter of the largest army ever yet collected in single field under the standards of Napoleon.1* 1807. Parl. App. and a Foy, i. 210. which it was and regard But it was not so much from underrating the numerical 22. strength, as from mistaking the spirit which animated the Spirit with British army, and the degree of interest which its exploits animated excited in the country, that the French government was ed by the led to regard too lightly the chances of success which it people. possessed in a Continental struggle. With all his information and sagacity, Napoleon here fell into the common error of judging of the present by the past. The English soldiers had achieved so little during the war, that it was generally supposed they were incapable of doing anything: their navy had done so much, that it was taken for granted Of this force of regulars, 81,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry were at home in the British isles, and of course disposable. In the muster-rolls of the English army, sabres and bayonets are alone estimated, which is not the case in the French and Continental services: a peculiarity which made the real strength of the English regular army about 200,000 men.-Parl. Deb. ix. iii. App. 2 D VOL. VIII. CHAP. it could do anything, and that the whole interest and LIII. 1808. pride of the nation were centred on its triumphs. In the interim, however, the general arming of the people, the excitement produced by the threats of invasion, the profound interest kept alive by the Continental war, the triumphs of Alexandria and Maida, had awakened a most extraordinary degree of military ardour, and diffused no inconsiderable amount of military information, throughout the people. The warlike establishments which pervaded the country were admirably calculated to foster this growing enthusiasm, and turn it to the best account in augmenting the numbers and increasing the spirit of the regular army. The militia served as an invaluable nursery for the line; the volunteers, changed soon after into local militia, corresponding very nearly to the German landwehr, provided a never-failing supply of recruits, tolerably instructed in the rudiments of discipline, for the militia. Numbers of young men of all ranks, caught by the animation, the idleness, or the dress of soldiers, embraced the military profession: thenceforward to the end of the war there was no difficulty whatever experienced in finding adequate supplies of recruits for the army, and filling up all the fearful chasms which war and disease made in its ranks. Thus, while the French were deluded with the idea that the English were altogether contemptible by land, they had already made great progress in the formation of a powerful army; and while their enemies 212, 220, were talking about sea-wolves and maritime skill, the x. 158, 159. spirit was engerdered destined to produce the triumphs of 1 Foy, i. 210, 221. Hard. 23. and quali ties of the British soldiers. Vitoria and Waterloo.1 The vast ameliorations effected by the Duke of York Character in the discipline and organisation of the army, and the improved military education which the younger officers had now for some years received, had at the same period afforded increased advantages for the successful display of that physical strength, and that undaunted moral resolution, which in every age have formed the great charac LIII. 1808. teristics of the British soldiers. The latter invaluable CHAP. quality gave them a very great advantage: it is the true basis of a powerful army. Skill, experience, discipline, can be superadded by practice, or acquired by exercise ; but if this one moral quality be wanting, all such acquisitions will prove of little avail. How inferior soever to their antagonists in experience, or that dexterity in the varied duties of a campaign which actual service alone can give, the English soldiers, from the very first, had the animating conviction that they were their equals, possibly their superiors, in actual combat; and that all the advantages of their veteran opponents would be at an end if once they engaged in a regular battle. And so it proved even from the outset ; and it is inconceivable how soon this one quality of dogged resolution in the field came to neutralise all the superiority of acquired skill and veteran discipline. The military is essentially a practical art; its wants and necessities are soon brought home by actual experience and suffering to an army in the field. But no amount of experience or discipline can supply the want of individual courage; with it, all the rest is easily acquired. If it possesses the resolution to fight, and the discipline to obey, a very short time will supply the rest. There is no education so rapid and effectual as that which takes place in the presence of an enemy. tween the French Of various natural and acquired excellence, it is hard 24. to say whether, in the Peninsular war, the British or Parallel beFrench soldiers, after a few years, were the most admir- British and able. In the service of light troops; in undergoing with troops. cheerfulness the fatigues of a campaign; in dexterity at making themselves comfortable under privation; in rapidity of firing, care of their horses by the cavalry, and enthusiastic gallantry at the first onset, the French troops for a long period had the advantage; and this, joined to their almost invariable superiority of numbers, had ordinarily turned the general issue of the campaign in their favour. But when the hostile lines actually met, and the LIII. 1808. CHAP. national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers from the very beginning successfully asserted their superiority. It is a most extraordinary fact, but one which this History will abundantly demonstrate, that in every battle between the English and the French, from the beginning to the end of the Peninsular war, without exception, the former were victorious, although they were for the most part inexperienced at first in actual warfare, and their opponents had been trained in fifteen years of conflict and victory. Splendid in appearance, overflowing with courage, irresistible in a single charge, the British cavalry could hardly be said to be equal-at least for general service, or the protracted fatigues of a campaign-to that of Napoleon: a remarkable circumstance when the great attention bestowed on horses in England is taken into consideration. But their artillery, superior to any in the world in the admirable equipment of the guns and ammunition train, was second to none in the coolness and practice of the gunners; and in the steadiness and precision of their fire, the constancy which they displayed under danger, their calmness in anger, and the terrible vehemence of their charge with the bayonet, the British infantry were beyond all question the first in Europe.1* 1 Foy, i. 226, 227. 25. effect of the In one important particular, the English army was Important formed upon an entirely different principle from the British French. In the latter, the officers constituted in no ing exclu degree a separate class from the soldiers; the equality, sively taken which was the object of universal desire at the outset of officers be from the higher ranks. the Revolution, and the conscription, which reached indiscriminately all ranks in its later stages, alike forbade any such line of demarcation. Thus, not only had all the marshals and generals in the service originally entered on the military career in the ranks, but to such as survived the rapid consumption of life in the imperial wars, pro "Le soldat Anglais," says General Foy, "possède la qualité la plus précieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère.”—Foy, i. 227. |