LIV. 1808. July 13. val which remained, to put his troops into good condition; CHAP. and on the 13th July, Cuesta moved forward with the united forces, amounting to twenty-five thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of cannon, to RioSECO. Bessières' force was much less numerous, amounting only to fifteen thousand men, and twenty-five guns: Tor 1 Nap.i. 106. but of these nearly two thousand were admirable horse- 348, Foy, men, and the composition of the whole was such as more 308. Thiers, than to counterbalance the inferiority in point of num- 112. bers.1 iii. 302, ix, 111, 347, Rio-Seco. The dispositions of Cuesta for the battle were as faulty 20. as the resolution to hazard it was ill-advised. Contrary Battle of alike to the rules of the military art, and the dictates of July 14. common sense, he drew up his troops in two lines at the Atlas, distance of a mile and a half from each other. The Plate 50. first, ten thousand strong, under Blake, with fifteen pieces of cannon, but in great part composed of raw levies, was stationed on the edge of a plateau in advance, of rugged and difficult access; the second, fifteen hundred toises (nine thousand feet) in the rear and to the left, led by Cuesta in person, consisted of fifteen thousand men, almost all regular soldiers, and fifteen guns. The few cavalry they had were with the first line. Bessières, perceiving at once the advantage which this disposition offered to an enterprising attack, prepared to avail himself of it, by throwing the bulk of his forces round the left of Blake, into the chasm between the two lines, so as to overwhelm the first before the second could come up have been better to have sent him a single regiment direct, than three by so circuitous a route as that by which Frère was ordered to march. In civil wars it is the important points which must be defended, and no attempt should be made to go everywhere. The grand object of all the armies should be to preserve Madrid; it is there that everything is to be lost or won. Madrid cannot be seriously menaced except by the army of Galicia: but it may be so there; for Bessières has not adequate forces to insure its defeat. It may be threatened by the army of Andalusia, but hardly endangered; for in proportion as Dupont falls back, he is reinforced, and with their twenty thousand men he and Vedel should at least be able to keep the enemy in check in that quarter."-Notes addressed to SAVARY on the affairs of Spain by NAPOLEON, 13th July 1808; taken at the battle of Vitoria in King JOSEPH's Portfolio, NAPIER, i. Appendix, No. 1. VOL. VIII. 2 H LIV. 1808. CHAP. to its assistance. Penetrating rapidly into the open space, he attacked Blake both in flank and rear with such vigour, that in an instant his lines were broken, his artillery taken, his men dispersed. As soon as he saw the rout of his first line, Cuesta moved forward with the second to the attack, and succeeded in reaching the enemy before the disorder consequent on their rapid success and pursuit had been repaired. The consequences had well-nigh proved fatal to the victors. Cuesta's right wing, advancNap. i. 107. ing swiftly and steadily forward in good order, overthrew 113, 115. several French battalions which had not fully recovered their ranks, and captured four guns.1 1 Foy, iii. 310, 313. Tor. ii. 352. Thiers, ix. 21. This disaster, like that experienced by Zach's grenadiers Defeat of the at Marengo, might, with a less skilful commander or less Spaniards. steady troops, have turned the fortune of the day; for the example of disorder is contagious, and the confusion was already spreading into the French centre, when Bessières, with the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, twelve hundred strong, charged Cuesta's right, which had become exposed by the rapidity of its advance, in flank, with great vigour; and Merle's division, returning from the pursuit of Blake, renewed the combat in front. A short but sanguinary struggle ensued. The Spanish infantry fought bravely, and for a few minutes the fate of the battle was undecided; but at length they were broken, and the loud shouts of victory which had been raised in the Castilian ranks, passed to the French side. After this it was no longer a battle, but a massacre and rout; the Spaniards broke and dispersed on all sides, leaving eighteen guns, and their whole ammunition, besides two thousand prisoners, in the hands of the enemy. Three thousand had fallen on the field, while the loss of the victors did not exceed twelve hundred men. The town of Rio-Seco, taken in the pursuit, was sacked and plundered with merciless severity, and all the nuns in the convents were subjected to the brutal violence of the soldiery. Few days have been more disastrous to Spain; for, worse thanthe LIV. 1808. loss of artillery and prisoners, it destroyed all confidence CHAP. in the ability of their troops to withstand the enemy in the field; while to Napoleon it was the source of unbounded, and, as it turned out, premature exultation. "It is Villa Viciosa," he exclaimed, when the joyful intelligence arrived at Bayonne; "Bessières has placed Joseph on the throne of Spain."* Deeming the war over, 1 South. i. he left that fortress, and pursued his journey by Bordeaux 480, 481, for the French capital: while Joseph, relieved now of all 313. Tor. ii. anxiety in regard to his communications, pursued his journey to Madrid, where he arrived, as already mentioned, 116, 117. on the 21st July.1 Foy, iii.310, 352, 354. Nap. i. 107. Thiers, ix. 22. parations of Napoleon was premature in this judgment: Rio-Seco placed Joseph on the throne of Madrid; but it neither Further prefinished the war nor maintained him there. The emperor Napoleon did not, however, suspend his military preparations: nine for the war. thousand Poles, who had entered the service of France, were directed, with four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, from the Grand Army in Germany, towards the Pyrenees. Six others were soon to follow. All the princes of the Rhenish Confederacy received orders to send a regiment each in the same direction: the Guards of Joseph followed him to Spain from Naples. Tuscany and the kingdom of Italy were commanded to send their contingents to reinforce Duhesme in Catalonia. Reinforcements to the amount of forty thousand men were thus provided, which all arrived in Spain during the three following months, but too late to arrest the progress of misfortune. While both the French Emperor and his royal brother were indulging in the sanguine hope that all was terminated, a dreadful disaster had occurred in 2 Foy, iv. Andalusia, and a blow been struck on the banks of the 48, 49. Guadalquivir which resounded from one end of Europe to 98. the other.2 * In allusion to the battle at Villa Viciosa, where Philip V. and the Duke de Vendôme gained a complete victory over the Allies, which decided the Succession War in favour of the house of Bourbon. Thiers, ix. CHAP. LIV. 1808. Atlas, 23. June 2. Dupont, who was at Toledo when the insurrection broke out in all parts of Spain, received, on the 24th May, an order from Murat, then lieutenant-general of March of Spain, to move upon Cadiz, by the route of the Sierra Dupont into Andalusia. Morena, Cordova, and Seville. He had with him a division of his own corps, a battalion of the Marines of the Plate 48. Guard, a Swiss regiment, and 2500 dragoons, in all about thirteen thousand men. He was to be joined in Andalusia by four thousand men and ten guns drawn from the army of Portugal. Having immediately set out, he experienced no resistance while traversing the open plains of la Mancha; and in the Sierra Morena found the villages indeed deserted, but no enemy to dispute his progress. At Andujar, however, where he arrived on the 2d June, he received information of the real state of matters in that province-that Seville, Cadiz, and all the principal towns were ruled by juntas, which had declared war against France; that the army at St Roque had joined the patriot cause, and that the peasants by thousands were flocking into the burghs to enrol themselves under the national banners. Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Madrid for reinforcements; and, after establishing an hospital at Andujar and taking measures of precaution to secure his rear, set out four days afterwards, and continued his march towards Cordova, still following the left bank of the Guadalquivir. This road, however, after running eight-and-twenty leagues on that bank of 1 Tor. i. 320. the river, crosses it at Alcolea by a long bridge of nine227. Nap. i. teen arches, strongly constructed of black marble. It ix. 67, 70. was at its extremity that the Spaniards awaited the enemy.1 June 7. Foy, iii. 224, 112. Thiers, 24. the bridge The end of the bridge on the left bank was fortified by Capture of a tête-de-pont; twelve guns were mounted on the right of Alcolea, bank to enfilade the approach to it, and three thousand regular troops, supported by ten thousand armed peasants, waited in Alcolea to dispute the passage; while the heights on the left bank, in the rear of the French, were LIV. 1808. occupied by a cloud of insurgents ready to fall on their CHAP. rear as soon as they were actively engaged with the more regular force in the front. The French general, seeing such preparations ready for his reception, delayed the attack till the following morning, and meanwhile made his dispositions against the numerous enemies by whom he was surrounded. This was no difficult matter: a very small part only of the Spanish force was adequate to the encounter of regular soldiers. At daybreak on the following morning, General Fresia, with a battalion of infantry June 8. and a large body of cavalry, attacked the peasants on the left bank, and by a few charges dispersed them: at the same time a column with ease broke into the tête-de-pont, the works of which were not yet finished, and rapidly charging across the bridge, of which the arches had not been cut, routed the Spanish troops at Alcolea on the opposite side with such loss that all their artillery was taken. Echevaria, the commander, despairing of ing Cordova, fled with such precipitance, that night he reached Ecija, twelve leagues from the battle.1 1 Foy, iii. defend- Nap. i. 112, 113. Tor. i. Thiers, ix, sack of Abandoned to their own resources, and destitute of any 25. leaders for their guidance, the magistrates having all fled Taking and on the first alarm, the inhabitants of Cordova, before Cordova, which the French presented themselves the same day, were in no condition to resist the invaders. The gates nevertheless were shut, and the old towers which flanked their approaches filled with armed men, by whom, as the cannon of the enemy approached, a feeble fire was kept up. A parleying for surrender, however, took place, and the conferences were going on, when, under pretence of a few random shots from some windows, the guns were discharged at the gates, which were instantly burst open; the troops rushed into the town, where hardly any resistance was made, but which notwithstanding underwent all the horrors of a place carried by assault. A scene of indescribable horror ensued, fraught with acute but pass |