LIV. 1808. CHAP. reached the rear of Reding as soon as Castanos could that of Dupont, and then the fate which the Spanish generals designed for the French troops must have overtaken themselves. When he arrived at Guaroman, however, about half way, the troops were so much exhausted by the heat that Vedel, though he heard the cannonade, now only six miles distant, hourly increasing, had the weakness to allow them some hours of repose. This halt proved decisive: while it continued, Dupont's troops, whom he might with ease have reached in two hours, were reduced to desperation. At noon the firing suddenly ceased, and the soldiers flattered themselves that the danger had passed it was the suspension of arms, which was about to bring unheard-of disgrace upon them all. When they resumed their march, at two in the afternoon, they soon came upon the rear of Reding, and, discrediting the statement of an armistice, which was immediately made known to them, commenced an attack, made prisoners a battalion of Irish in the service of Spain, captured some guns, and dispersed the new levies which defended them. They were within a league of their comrades in distress, when an officer from Dupont arrived with the mournful intelligence that a suspension of arms had been 1 Tor. i. 367, agreed to, and that they had no alternative but submission. 368. Foy, It was all over; the halt of a few hours at Guaroman Nap. i. 122, had ruined the expedition: twenty thousand men were about to lay down their arms; Europe was to be electrified, the empire of Napoleon shaken to its foundation. Such is the importance of time in war.1 iv. 85, 91. 124. Jom. ii. 62, 63. Thiers, ix. 163, 168. Dupont in the outset proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole French troops were to be allowed to retire, with their artillery and baggage, out of Andalusia; and Castanos was at first inclined to have acceded to the proposal. But at this critical moment the despatches were intercepted and brought to headquarters, which announced the approach of Cuesta to the capital, and recalled Dupont to aid in its defence. A convention LIV. 1808. would no longer be listened to an absolute surrender of CHAP. arms was required, under condition only of the troops being sent to France by sea. After many fruitless efforts to avoid so hard a fate, and after assuring himself that his men were too much discouraged to attempt to extricate themselves by force of arms, this was agreed to by Dupont; but he insinuated to Vedel that he might endeavour to extricate himself from the toils. That general accordingly retired to Carolina; but the Spaniards threatened to put Dupont and his whole division to the sword if this movement was not stopped, and Vedel included in the capitulation. Intimidated by these menaces, orders to this effect were despatched by Dupont : and so completely was the spirit of the French officers broken, that, out of twenty-four whom Vedel assembled to deliberate on the course they should pursue at this crisis, only four, including that general himself, voted for disregarding the capitulation, and continuing their retreat, which was now open, to la Mancha. Nay, to such an extent did the panic extend, that a Spanish detachment crossed the mountains, and made prisoners upon the strength of the capitulation of Baylen, all the French depots and insulated bodies as far as Toledo, which, with 1 Nap. i. 12, those who laid down their arms on the field, swelled the 124. Foy captives to twenty-one thousand. Two thousand had Tor. i. 370, fallen in the battle-a thousand in the previous opera- ii. 64. ations, or from the effect of sickness: twenty-four thousand 169, 181. men were lost to France!1 iv. 97, 106, 372. Jom. Thiers, ix. 37. sensation in Spain Language can convey to future ages no adequate idea of the impression which this extraordinary event pro- Immense duced in Europe. Hardly anything since the opening of which it the Revolutionary war had at all approached to it in proces importance. Hitherto the career of the French armies and over had been one of almost unbroken success; and even though the talents of the Archduke Charles and the firmness of the Russians had for a time arrested the torrent, yet it had been suspended only to break out shortly after with VOL. VIII. 21 Europe, LIV. 1808. CHAP. accumulated force, and sweep away every obstacle which courage, combination, or genius could oppose to its progress. Even at their lowest point of depression, disgrace had never sullied the Republican ranks; victorious or vanquished, they had ever commanded the respect of their enemies; no large bodies had laid down their arms; their retreat had ever been that of brave and honourable men. Now, however, a disaster such as France had never experienced since the battle of Pavia had overtaken their standards twenty thousand men had surrendered; the imperial eagles had found in Andalusia the Caudine Forks. Fame and incorrect information gave greater importance to this triumph than even its intrinsic magnitude deserved. It was unknown or overlooked that it was by a skilful series of military movements on the one side, and an extraordinary combination of errors on the other, that Dupont had been brought to such hazardous straits; by the firmness of the Swiss and Walloon guards, the precision in fire of the Spanish artillery, and the inexperience of his own troops, that he had been compelled to surrender. It was generally imagined that the French veterans had laid down their arms to the Spanish peasants; it was unknown or forgotten that the victory was really gained by experienced soldiers and the imaginations of men, both in the Peninsula and over all Europe, were fired by the belief that a new era had dawned upon mankind; that the superiority of disciplined troops and regular armies was at an end; and that popular enthusiasm and general zeal were all that were necessary to secure the victory, even over the greatest and most formidable veteran armies. 38. effect of the How widely this belief spread, how generally it was Disastrous acted upon, and what oceans of blood it caused to be delusive spilt in vain in Spain itself, will amply appear in the sequel of this history; and probably, by inspiring the of this vic people of that country with an overweening idea of their own strength, and of the capability of raw levies to contend opinion en tertained tory. LIV. 1808. with regular forces, it contributed, in no small degree, to CHAP. that almost unbroken train of disasters in the field which their armies, when unsupported by the British, subsequently experienced during the remainder of the war. But in the first instance it produced a prodigious and most important burst of exultation and enthusiasm. It determined the conduct of many of the grandees and nobles of Spain, who had at Bayonne adhered to the usurper, but now, with the Dukes del Infantado and del Parque, Cevallos and Penuela, rejoined the ranks of their countrymen; and by throwing the capital and chief towns of the kingdom, with the exception of the frontier fortresses, into the hands of the insurgents, gave the struggle, in the eyes of all Europe, as well as of the people themselves, the character of a national contest. Nor was the Montg. vi. effect less momentous over the whole Continent, by afford- 35110. ing a convincing proof that the French were not invincible, Lond. i. 97. and opening the eyes of all governments to the immense Nell. i. 124, addition which the military force, on which they had ii. 64. hitherto exclusively relied, might receive from the ardour 188, 196. and enthusiasm of the people.1 iv. Foy, 125. Jom. Thiers, ix. Napoleon was at Bordeaux when the account of the 39. capitulation reached him. Never, since the disaster at Opinion of Trafalgar, had he been so completely overwhelmed: for a time he could not speak; the excess of his depres- capitula "Is your Would sion excited the alarm of his ministers. Napoleon on this tion. LIV. 1808. CHAP. to consent that the havresacks of our soldiers should be searched like those of robbers! Could I have ever expected that of General Dupont, a man whom I loved, and was rearing up to become a marshal? They say he had no other way to prevent the destruction of the army, to save the lives of the soldiers! Better, far better, to have perished with arms in their hands-that no one should have escaped! Their death would have been glorious: we should have avenged them. You can always supply the place of soldiers: honour alone, when once lost, can never be regained. It is in vain to tell me the soldiers were conscripts, unused to arms. Were they inferior to those I commanded in Italy? It is always the general who makes the army. Better a lion in command of a troop of deer, than a deer at the head of a troop of lions. Oh! wretched caprice of human affairs! A whole lifetime lost by a surprise of the senses, a shake of the nerves! But the fate of empires must not be subjected to such chances. The safety of the state demands an 1 Thib. vi. inexorable example. In war, a great disaster always designates an enormous fault!" What a sentence on Napoleon's own conduct in 1812!1 439. Bign. vii. 323. 40. violation of If the capitulation itself was dishonourable to the Shameful French arms, the subsequent violation of it by the the capitula Spaniards was still more disgraceful to the victors, and tion by the remains a dark stain on the Castilian good faith. From Spaniards. the moment that the long file of prisoners began their march towards Cadiz as the place of their embarkation, it was found to be extremely difficult to restrain the indignation of the people, who loudy complained that so large a body of men, for the most part stained by robbery or murder committed in Spain, should be forwarded to France, apparently for no other purpose but that they might be again let loose in the Peninsula to commit similar devastations. Alarmed at the increase and serious character of the excitement, the junta of Seville consulted Castanos and Morla, the governor of Cadiz, on the course |