LIV. 1808 which they should adopt. The first, with the honour CHAP. and good faith of a gallant soldier, in opposition to the public clamour, insisted that the capitulation should be religiously observed;-the latter, setting aside every other consideration in the desire to gain a temporary popularity with the multitude, contended that no treaty could be binding with men who had committed such enormities on the Spanish soil as the French prisoners; that to let them return to France, loaded with the spoil of Cordova, torn from the wretched inhabitants in open violation of the laws of war, would be a palpable act of insanity; and that, having once got them in their power, the only sensible course was to detain them till the war was over. These specious but sophistical arguments, unworthy of a Spanish officer, found a responsive echo in the breasts of the infuriated multitude; the public effervescence increased as they advanced in their march. In consequence of the discovery of precious spoils in the knapsacks of some of the soldiers at Lebrixa, a tumult ensued between the peasantry and the prisoners, which cost many lives to the latter; the sacred vases of Cordova and Jaen were loudly demanded; and at Port St Mary's, the accidental Tor. i. 375, circumstance of one of these holy cups falling from the iv. 107, 108. havresack of a soldier gave rise to such a tumult that a general search of the baggage could no longer be pre- 184. vented.1 376. Foy, Nap. i. 125, 126. Thiers, ix. 182, disgraceful treatment of the prison ers. These disorders were, perhaps, unavoidable in the 41. circumstances in which the Spanish government of the And their province was situated, and the unexampled treachery with which they had been assailed by the French; but for the subsequent violation of the capitulation no apology can be found. Desirous of maintaining their popularity, the junta of Seville acceded to the opinion of Morla, in which they in vain endeavoured to get Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple to concur. Instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such LIV. 1808. CHAP. were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, very few remained at the conclusion of the war." Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France; but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept in lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and, with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those confined in one hulk, who overpowered their guards during the night and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen three years afterwards, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country. This frightful act of injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful. It gave the French, in their turn, too fair a ground for 1 Foy, iv. inveighing against the perfidy of their enemies, exasTor: i. 375, perated the feelings of their armies, who had at first 377. Nap entered into this contest with lukewarm dispositions or undisguised aversion, and repeatedly afterwards stimulated them to desperate and sanguinary resistance, under circumstances when, with a more trustworthy enemy, they would have entered into terms of accommodation.1 107, 109. i. 125, 127. South. i. 502, 510. Collingwood, ii. 124. * Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer to the junta of Seville, when his opinion was asked on this subject, is worthy of a place in history :-" It is quite clear that the capitulation is binding on the contracting parties, so far as they have the means of carrying it into execution. The laws of honour, not considerations of expediency, should ever govern soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; the surrender of General Vedel could only be supposed to have arisen from the confidence which he placed in the honour which characterised the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, especially one newly formed, is public property, which ought not to be lightly squandered. The matter, therefore, is clear on considerations of honour and justice: even viewed in the light of expedience, it is far from being beyond dispute." Lord Collingwood, when applied to, answered, "that if the Spanish government had not seamen enough to man transport-vessels for conveying the troops, he would order British seamen to fit out their merchant-vessels for that purpose: that the capitulation must be observed so far as possible; if the conditions were impossible, they annulled themselves."-SOUTHEY, i. 502, 504; COLLINGWOOD'S Memoirs, ii. 127, 128. The fate of the generals and officers who were returned to France from Cadiz, was hardly less deplorable than that of their comrades who lingered in LIV. 1808. 42. of Joseph rid, and tion of the hind the The news of the capitulation of Baylen arrived at CHAP. Madrid on the 29th July, and diffused universal consternation among the adherents of Joseph. A council of war was immediately summoned by Savary; and opinions Departure were much divided on the course which should be pur- from Madsued. Moncey proposed that Bessières' division should concentrabe recalled, and that with their united forces they should French take up a position in front of the capital, and defend it troops beto the last extremity. But Savary, to whom the situa- Ebro. tion which he held as lieutenant-general of the King, as well as the known confidence which he enjoyed with the Emperor, gave a preponderating voice in the deliberations, strongly urged the necessity of retiring to the northward, and taking counsel from circumstances, as to the point to which the retreat should be prolonged. On the 30th July the King commenced his retreat: the hospitals had previously been evacuated for Bayonne; the heavy artillery, which could not be brought away, amounting to eighty pieces, was spiked; but the retiring monarch and his satelites carried off with them all the jewels and precious articles from the palaces they had occupied. They retired by the great road to Burgos, where headquarters prolonged torments on board the Spanish hulks. Dupont and all the generals were immediately arrested and sent to prison, where they lingered, without either trial or investigation for many years afterwards. General Marescot who, though in a subaltern rank, had taken a certain part in the negotiation, loudly, but in vain, demanded to be brought to a court-martial. Neither he nor Dupont, nor any of the superior officers connected with the capitulation of Baylen, were ever more heard of till after the fall of Napoleon in 1814. In 1812, a court of inquiry sat on the generals, and condemned them all but Feb. 17, 1812. public opinion was far from supporting their decision. Shortly after (1st May 1. May 1812), an imperial decree forbade, on pain of death, any capitulation in the field which should amount to a laying down of arms. Such was Napoleon's irritation with regard to everything connected with this convention, that, when he afterwards saw General Legendre, who, as chief of the staff to Dupont, had officially affixed his signature to the treaty, he was seized with a trembling from head to foot, and his indignation found vent in these words:"How, General! did your hand not wither when you signed that infamous capitulation?" He never afterwards heard Baylen alluded to without evincing such indignation as showed how deeply it had wounded his mind.-Fox, iv. 110, 113. CHAP. 1808. were established on the 9th August; but even there they made no stand, but fell back behind the Ebro to Miranda; the rear-guard collecting as it went along all the garrisons of the towns and castles which had been occupied to the south of that river. They experienced no molestation from the Spaniards during their retreat; notwithstanding which, all the villages and hamlets through which they passed were given up to pillage, and a great number burned. Soon after Joseph reached Miranda, Bessières 1 Foy, iv. arrived with his corps, and Verdier came up with the force which had been engaged in the siege of Saragossa; so that, including Moncey's corps and the troops brought up from Madrid, above fifty thousand veteran troops could, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, be collected for the defence of the Ebro.1* 117, 124. Thib. vi. 442, 443. Sav. iii. 275 277 192, 198. Thiers, 43. in Cata While this decisive stroke was struck in the south of Spain, the contest had already assumed elsewhere a sanguinary character; the success had been more checkered in the Catalonian mountains; and the British army, under the guidance of WELLINGTON, had chased the French eagles from the rock of Lisbon. Napoleon, who was by no means aware of the obstacles Campaign which the tenacious spirit and rugged mountains of Catalonia. lonia were to oppose to his arms, had directed Duhesme to co-operate with Lefebvre-Desnouettes in the siege of July 10. * Savary was blamed by Napoleon for this retreat to the Ebro, and he alleged that the line of the Duro might have been maintained, and the operations against Saragossa in consequence not interrupted. In justice to the French general, however, it must be observed, that his situation in the capital, after the surrender of Dupont, had become extremely critical; and that the losses which the troops at the capital had undergone, were such as to preclude the hope of a successful stand being made against the united Spanish armies which might advance from the south. Shortly after his arrival at Madrid he had written in these luminous and explicit terms to the Emperor, in a despatch which throws great light on the state of the contest at that period:-"It is no longer a mere affair in which, by punishing the leaders, a revolt may be suppressed. If the arrival of the King does not pacify the country, we shall have a regular war on our hands with the troops of the line, and one of extermination with the peasantry. The system of sending movable columns over the provinces is likely to induce partial LIV. 1808. Saragossa, and with Moncey in his movement on Valen- CHAP. cia. In order to accomplish these objects, that general, early in June, fitted out two corps: the first, four thousand five hundred strong, under the orders of General Chabran, was despatched towards the south, with instructions to make itself master of Tarragona and Tortosa, and then proceed on and co-operate with Marshal Moncey; while the second, under General Schwartz, consisting of three thousand eight hundred men, after punishing Manresa, destroying the powder-mills there, and levying a heavy contribution on its inhabitants, was to push on to Lerida, and, after securing that important fortress, give its aid to Lefebvre-Desnouettes before the walls of Saragossa. These columns quitted Barcelona early in June, and directed their march to their respective points of des- June 4. tination; but both experienced defeat. The tocsin was 18.. ringing on all the hills; the villages were deserted; the 75. Tor. i. woods and higher parts of the mountains, the rugged passes and inaccessible thickets, formed so many rallying points ix. 60, 61. to the courageous Somatenes. 1* 1 Duhesme, 309. Foy, iv. 143, 147, 312. Thiers, Schwartz Schwartz, indeed, in his march towards Saragossa, 44. forced the celebrated pass of Bruch, though beset with Defeat of armed men; but, advancing a little farther, he encoun- near Casa tered a disaster at Casa Mansana. The villagers assailed the invaders with showers of stones, balls, and even boiling water, from the roofs of the houses: the peasants, checks, which will lead to the spreading of the insurrection. It is indispens- * The Somatenes are the levée-en-masse, which, by an ancient law of Catalonia, are bound to turn out and defend their parishes whenever the Somaten, or alarm-bell, is heard from the churches.-TORENO, i. 309, Mansana. June 6. |