LIV. 1808. CHAP. march, by a French brigade. Surrounded in this manner with embarrassments, Junot held a council of war, the invariable sign of experienced difficulty, in which it was decided to concentrate the whole army at Lisbon, retaining merely garrisons at Almeida, Elvas, Setuval, and Peniche. Kellermann, after throwing a garrison into Elvas, fell back slowly towards Lisbon. Loison, meanwhile, was approaching Abrantes. In his progress he had several severe actions with the Portuguese peasants, who were dispersed with great slaughter, but who evinced, by their courage i. 161, 163. in disaster, what materials were to be found among them 205. Thiers, for a formidable resistance in future times. He reached ix. 208, Lisbon, having irritated the insurrection more by his cruelty than he had overawed it by his success.1 June 9. 1 Thiébault, 131, 165, 174. Nap. Nevis, i. 212. 54. Loison the Alen July 25. His recall to the capital was rendered necessary by the Operations progress of the insurrection elsewhere in the Alentejo, which ofoon in had elected a junta, and established a sort of provisional tejo. government at Evora. Resolved to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, where the proximity of English succours from Gibraltar rendered the revolt peculiarly formidable, Junot fitted out a more powerful expedition, consisting of seven thousand infantry and twelve hundred horse, with eight guns, which was sent forth under the command of the sanguinary Loison. After dispersing several armed assemblages which strove in vain to obstruct his progress, this general came up with the main body at the insurgents posted in front of Evora. Ten thousand Portuguese peasants, and four thousand Spanish troops, who had advanced to support them from Badajoz, were there assembled, with twelve pieces of cannon. They were wholly unable, however, to withstand the shock of the French legions; at the first onset, the undisciplined peasantry fled from the terrible charge of their dragoons. the whole weight of the action on their hands, retired in The Spanish auxiliaries, seeing themselves left alone with haste, and were speedily thrown into disorder; and in the general confusion, the victorious troops entered the town, where a feeble resistance only was atternpted, but June 29. CHAP. LIV. 1808. an indiscriminate massacre immediately commenced. Neither age nor sex was spared: armed and unarmed were inhumanly put to the sword. It is the boast of the French historians, that while "they lost only two hundred and ninety, eight thousand were slain or wounded 1 Thiébault, on the part of the insurgents." Never, while Portuguese 165. blood flows in the human veins, will the remembrance of that dreadful day be forgotten; never will the French be any other than an object of execration to the descendants of those who perished in that inhuman massacre. But the 2 Thiebault, cup of human suffering was full; the hour of retribution 131, 175. Nap. i. 161, was fast approaching; and Loison was awakened from 165, South. his fancied dream of security, and the further prosecution Nevis, i. of his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, by intelli- iv. 246, 272. gence that a BRITISH ARMY HAD APPEARED OFF THE 213, 214. COAST OF PORTUGAL.2 ii. 72, 155. 205. Foy, Thiers, ix. 55. cabinet Cours to Ever since the insurrection in the Peninsula had assumed a serious aspect, the English government had The English resolved upon sending out powerful military succours to resolve on its assistance, and at length bringing the strength of the sending suctwo nations to a fair trial with land forces. Fortunately, Portugal. a body of about ten thousand men was already assembled at Cork, having been collected there by the preceding administration, for the purpose of an expedition against South America a proposed diversion of force, at a time when every sabre and bayonet was required in European warfare, which appears almost inconceivable; unless, as Colonel Napier sarcastically observes, it was projected in imitation of the Romans, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at their gates. The command of the 180. expedition was given to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, whose great capacity had been evinced in the glorious fields of Indian warfare, and more recently in the easier conquest of the Danish Militia. At the same time, General Miranda, the able adventurer, who had so long been concerned in projects for the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country, was given to understand 3 Nap. i. H LIV. 1808. CHAP. that no countenance could now be shown by the British government to any such designs. Two smaller divisions were soon afterwards prepared, and set sail from Ramsgate and Margate; and orders were sent to Sir John Moore, who, with twelve thousand men, had been sent to Goteborg to aid the King of Sweden in his heroic defence of his kingdom against Russia-an offer which 180. Gur that gallant monarch declined to accept *—to return forthwith to England, to form a further reinforcement of the armies in the Peninsula.1 1 Nap. i. wood, iv. 21, 24. 56. stitution of commanders tion. Though the direction of the Cork expedition, however, Strange sub- was intrusted to Sir Arthur, yet a senior officer, Sir successive Harry Burrard, was appointed to supersede him in the Cother command shortly after he landed in Portugal; who again tish expedi- was to retain the supreme direction only until Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar. Thus, in the most momentous period of the campaign, that in which the British troops were first to be engaged with the enemy, and when they were exposed to all the difficulty incident to a first landing on a hostile shore, they were to be intrusted successively to the command of three different generals an arrangement as characteristic of the utter ignorance of military affairs which at that period prevailed in the British government, as the cheerful acquiescence of their first commander in the appointment of any officer, how unknown soever to fame, over his head, was of the single-hearted feeling and patriotic devotion which, in every age, have been found to be the accompaniments of real greatness.2+ 2 Well. Desp. by Gurwood, v. 1, 3, 21, 22, 43. * The particulars of this expedition, and the causes of the disagreement with the Swedish monarch, will be found subsequently, chap. LXX, which treats of the war between Sweden and Russia. + When Sir A. Wellesley received the command of the expedition at Cork, government gave him no reason to believe that he was to be superseded in the supreme direction of it. The first intimation he received of that intention was by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, dated 15th July 1808, which reached him when at sea, off Mondego Bay. Many officers, who had held the situa tions and achieved the victories which he had in India, would have at once resigned the command in which he was now reduced to so subordinate a station; but Sir Arthur acted otherwise. In answer to Lord Castlereagh, he said "Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the LIV. 1808. 57. mand of the and arrives The expedition, under the command of Sir Arthur, CHAP. sailed from Cork on the 12th July, but the general himself preceded them in a fast-sailing frigate, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. He immediately entered into Sir A. Wellesley takes communication with the junta of Galicia, from whom he the comreceived the distressing intelligence of the defeat at Rio-expedition, Seco; and was also made acquainted with the desire of the off Mondego Spaniards in that quarter to receive no succours, except in Bay. arms, stores, and money, from England-a resolution of which it is hard to say, after such a disaster, whether it savoured more of magnanimous resolution or presumptuous confidence.* He found the opinion of all classes so unanimous in hatred of the French, "that no one dared to show that he was a friend to them." Having supplied the junta, therefore, with two hundred thousand pounds in money, and assured them of the speedy arrival of extensive military stores, which in a great measure elevated their spirits after their late misfortunes, he proceeded to the southward to secure the main objects of the expedition-which were, in the first instance, an attack upon the Tagus; and afterwards, the detachment of such a force to the southward as might effectually secure Cadiz future command of the army. All that I can say on the subject is, that whether * 66 Notwithstanding the recent defeat of the Galician army, the junta here LIV. 1808. CHAP. from any attack by the French under Dupont. As the whole force of the expedition, when joined by the reinforcements from England, the corps of Sir John Moore, and that under General Spencer, which was off Cadiz, was estimated by government at thirty thousand men, it was thought that ample means existed to achieve both these objects. And as the primary condition of all successful military efforts, by a transmarine power, is the securing strong seaports as a base for the army, and a point of refuge in case of disaster, it is evident that the attainment of one or both of these objects was an indispensable preliminary to future operations. It was fortunate, however, that subsequent events rendered the dispersion of the English force, and the formation of a double base of operations, unnecessary. The British army Gurw. iv. was thereby concentrated in Portugal, where it had a strong country to defend, a docile population to work Nap. i. 187. upon, and a central position on the flank of the French 20, 33. Lond. i. 114, 116. 58. the British troops at Mondego Bay, and tion Sir armies in Spain to maintain.1 and Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Oporto on the 26th, Arrival of and proceeded on with the expedition to Mondego Bay, which he reached on the 30th July. Having there received intelligence of the surrender of Dupont, he by deemed all operations in Andalusia unnecessary; Arthur having sent orders to General Spencer to come round from the Bay of Cadiz and join him, he determined upon an immediate landing a bold and decisive resolution, considering that his own force did not exceed ten thousand men,* and Junot had fifteen thousand at Wellesley. have not expressed any wish to receive the assistance of British troops; and they again repeated, this morning, that they could put any number of men into the field if they were provided with arms and money; and I think this disinclination to receive the assistance of British troops, is founded in a great degree on the objection to give the command of their troops to British officers." -WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Corunna, July 21, 1807; Gurwood, iv. 27. *The exact number was 9280 sabres and bayonets-about 10,000 men, including subalterns and officers. Spencer's corps was 4793 strong—about 5000 men.-GURWOOD, iv. 20. |