LIV. 1808. quarter; and as Junot perceived that his men had got CHAP. entangled in a ravine, he pushed on Solignac's brigade of Loison's division to relieve him. The French, under Solignac, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came on with the utmost impetuosity, and first encountered Ferguson's brigade on the summit of the ridge. Several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged between these dauntless antagonists with extraordinary execution. on both sides, as the fire-arms, almost within pistolshot, told with murderous effect on the dense array of either line. At length, however, the three English regiments which had hitherto singly maintained the combat (the 40th, 36th, and 71st), being supported by three others, levelled their bayonets, and rushing forward with Sir A. irresistible impetuosity, drove the French line headlong Despatch. down the steep, with the loss of all its artillery. So . iv. dreadful was the execution by the bayonet on occasion, that the whole front line of one of the French ii. 330, 339. regiments went down like grass before the scythe, and three hundred men lay dead as they had stood in their ix. 231. ranks.1 this Wellesley's Gurw. 93, 95. Thieb. 195, 201. Foy, Jom. iii. 71, 72. Nap. i. 215. Thiers, 70. the French. Brennier's brigade, however, still remained-and with these troops Junot made a gallant attempt to regain the Defeat of day. Forming his men under cover of the rocks and woods which concealed them from the enemy, Brennier, with his columns in admirable order, came suddenly upon the victorious British as they were lying on the ground, in loose array, reposing after their success, and, suddenly charging, drove them back, and retook the guns. But always with the same success. It can hardly fail of proving successful, if the part of the line menaced by the head of the column can be relied on to withstand the shock till the fire of the other parts on the flank of the column has produced the desired effect; but unless this is the case, the column will break the line, and, deploying against the oblique line, now itself taken in flank, soon drive it off the field. Of all the European troops, the British are the only ones by whom this hazardous, but, if successful, decisive mode of resisting the attack in column was habitually practised. General Loison, who witnessed this able movement, desired, after the Convention of Cintra, to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and, with true military frankness, congratulated him on the steadiness and talent with which he had, with a battalion line, withstood the formidable attack of the French column.-See SCOTT's Napoleon, vi. 235. LIV. CHAP. his triumph was only momentary. The surprised troops rallied upon the heights in their rear, to which they had 1808. been driven, and, facing about, poured in a destructive volley upon their pursuers; and immediately charging back again with a loud shout, not only again captured the artillery, but made Brennier himself prisoner, and drove the enemy a second time in utter confusion down the hill. So complete was the rout, that Solignac's brigade was driven off the ground towards the English left, in a different direction from Brennier's; the former general was desperately wounded, and his troops would all have been made prisoners had not an unexpected order from Sir Harry Burrard obliged Ferguson to halt in the midst of his success. The broken French upon this rallied and Wellesley's reunited, and the whole fell back to the heights on the Gurw. iv. opposite side of the valley, considerably to the north of Nap. i. 212, the ground from which they had commenced their attack 1. 142. 144. in the morning-leaving in the hands of the victors thir330, 339. teen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, Thieb. 195, and four hundred prisoners, besides two thousand who had fallen on the field. The English had to lament the loss of nearly eight wounded.1 1 Sir A. Despatches, 93, 96. 216. Lond. Foy, iv. 201. Jom. iii. 71, 72. Scott, vi. 234, 235. 71. poses to follow up the victory. hundred men in killed and Like the Allied sovereigns at Austerlitz, Junot had made Sir A. Wel- his attack by a flank-march directed in echelon athwart the lesley pro- front, against the left of the British in position; and his disaster, like theirs, was in a great measure owing to that cause, which brought his different columns not simultaneously, but at successive periods into action. Sir Arthur Wellesley had as decisive success in his power as Napoleon at the close of the day; for not only had the brigade under Hill on the right, and those of Crawfurd and the Portuguese in reserve, never fired a shot, but two other brigades had suffered very little. The entire army was in excellent order and the most enthusiastic spirits; the shouts of victory, the triumphant clang of trumpets, was heard along their whole line; and from the direction which the broken LIV. 1808. French had taken after their defeat, they were entirely CHAP. cut off from the retreat to Lisbon. On the other hand, the British, who had repulsed their oblique attack, and driven them off in a north-easterly direction, were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. This situation of things promised the greatest results to immediate activity. Sir Arthur was fully aware of the vast advantages thus placed within his grasp, and prepared, by immediate and decisive operations, instantly to turn them to the best account. He proposed with the five brigades on the left, about nine thousand men, and the Portuguese, sixteen hundred more, to follow up his success against the retreating columns of the enemy, now blended together in great confusion on the opposite heights, and drive them as far as possible back in a north-easterly direction over the Sierra da Baragueda, away from the capital; while the brigades of Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, six thousand strong, should make straight for the defile of Torres Vedras, which lay open to the south, and thence push on to Montachique, and cut off all retreat on the part of the French to Lisbon. Considering that Junot had lost twothirds of his artillery, and great part of his reserve park of ammunition, there can be no doubt that this operation would have proved successful, and that not only would Lisbon have fallen an easy prey to the victors, but Junot himself, dence, iv. driven to an eccentric and disastrous retreat through an Burghersh's insurgent and mountainous country, almost destitute of Ib. iv. 214. roads, would have been too happy to find shelter under 145, 146. the cannon of Almeida with half his forces.1 1 Gurw. iv. 99, and Evi 207. Lord Evidence, Lond. i. vented by Burrard. Orders to this effect were already given, and the army 72. was preparing to execute them, when the assumption of But is prethe command by Sir Harry Burrard at once arrested the Sir Harry career of victory. That officer, who had arrived on the field with his staff early in the day, had with generous forbearance declined to take the command from Sir Arthur during the battle; but after it was over, considering the responsibility of ulterior operations as resting on LIV. 1808. CHAP. himself, he gave orders to halt at all points, and remain in position at Vimeira till the expected reinforcements under Sir John Moore joined the army. Sir Arthur, in the strongest terms, and with military frankness, represented to his superior general, on the field of battle, the inestimable importance of instantly following up the beaten enemy, driving him still further to the north-east, and interposing between his disordered columns and the strong defiles of Torres Vedras, the real gates of the capital. But all was in vain. Sir Harry Burrard, though a respectable veteran, had none of the vigour or daring requisite for decisive success; he belonged to the old school, by whom one battle was considered sufficient work for one week, and deemed it imprudent, when the artillery-horses were fatigued, and the cavalry destroyed, to hazard anything by a further advance, the more especially as ultimate success without any risk was certainly to be looked for upon the arrival of Sir John Moore's division. He persisted, accordingly, in his resolution not to move from his ground: the precious moments were lost, never to be regained; the disordered French, Wellesley's seeing with astonishment that they were not pursued, Gurw. iv. re-formed their ranks. Junot, that very night, by a Evid. Ibid. forced and circuitous march, regained the defiles of Torres Lord Burg Vedras, and secured his retreat to the capital; while Sir dence, Ibid. Arthur, seeing the opportunity was lost, and concealing the bitterness of his disappointment under an affected gaiety, said to the officers of his staff, "Gentlemen, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot red-legged partridges. 1 Sir. A. Despatches. 99, and iv. 207, 208. hersh's Evi iv. 214. Lond. i. 145, 146, Nap. i. 216, 217. Sir Harry Burrard's tenure of the supreme direction Lord Burghersh, in his evidence before the court of inquiry, declared,"I recollect, that on the evening of 21st August, Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard to advance, giving as a reason that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon, and that, in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon."-Evidence, Court of Inquiry; GURWOOD, iv. 214. LIV. 1808. tice is con of affairs was of short duration. Early on the morning CHAP. of the 22d, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar, and immediately landed and assumed the command; so 73. that within thirty hours a pitched battle had been fought, An armisa decisive operation rejected, and three successive com- cluded. manders called to the direction of the army. After consulting with Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, and getting the best information he could, he resolved to advance on the 23d against Junot, now in position at Torres Vedras, Aug. 23. and orders to that effect had already been issued, when information was brought that a French flag of truce had 1 Gurw. iv. reached the outposts. It proved to be General Keller- 104. Nap.i. mann, with a proposal from Junot for a suspension of iv. 340. arms, with a view to the evacuation of Portugal.1 220. Foy, any Reasons 22d, to an armis which led sides. In truth, the situation of Junot since the battle of 74. Vimeira had been such, that he had no longer alternative to adopt. Early on the morning of the a council of war was held at Torres Vedras; and the tice on both proverb almost invariably holds good, that such a council never fights. The French generals were aware that a powerful reinforcement, under Sir John Moore, was on the eve of landing; that a city containing three hundred thousand agitated and hostile citizens was in the rear; that the forts and points of defence which it contained were hardly tenable against an army of thirty thousand English troops; and that to attempt a retreat through Portugal, intersected as it was by mountain torrents and almost inaccessible ridges, in the face of an insurgent population, and pursued by a victorious army, could not fail to be attended with the greatest disasters. In these circumstances, it was unanimously agreed that enough had been done for the honour of the imperial arms, and 2 that to endeavour to obtain by negotiation a convention Gurw. iv. which might restore the army to the French soil, and Thieb. 204, ultimately to renewed operations in the north of Spain, iv. 344. was the most prudent course which could be adopted.2 232. General Kellermann was selected for this delicate nis 2 220, 225. 105, 116. 206. Foy, Thiers, ix. |